DIRECTORATE OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

MASTER OF ARTS-POLITICAL SCIENCES

SEMESTER -IV

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

SOFT CORE 402

BLOCK-2

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL

Postal Address:

The Registrar,

University of North Bengal,

Raja Rammohunpur,

P.O.-N.B.U., Dist-Darjeeling,

West Bengal, Pin-734013,

India.

Phone: (O) +91 0353-2776331/2699008

Fax: (0353) 2776313, 2699001

Email: regnbu@sancharnet.in ; regnbu@nbu.ac.in

Wesbsite: www.nbu.ac.in

First Published in 2019

FOREWORD

The Self Learning Material (SLM) is written with the aim of providing simple and organized study content to all the learners. The SLMs are prepared on the framework of being mutually cohesive, internally consistent and structured as per the university's syllabi. It is a humble attempt to give glimpses of the various approaches and dimensions to the topic of study and to kindle the learner's interest to the subject

We have tried to put together information from various sources into this book that has been written in an engaging style with interesting and relevant examples. It introduces you to the insights of subject concepts and theories and presents them in a way that is easy to understand and comprehend.

We always believe in continuous improvement and would periodically update the content in the very interest of the learners. It may be added that despite enormous efforts and coordination, there is every possibility for some omission or inadequacy in few areas or topics, which would definitely be rectified in future.

We hope you enjoy learning from this book and the experience truly enrich your learning and help you to advance in your career and future endeavours.

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

BLOCK -1

BLOCK-2

BLOCK 2: POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Introduction to the Block

Unit 8 deals with Civil society and the state. The concept of state occupies a central place in Political Science. No discussion on political theory is complete without reference to the word 'state'.

Unit 9 deals with Civil society and the public sphere- Habermas. Theories of the public sphere developed alongside both the modern state with its powerful administrative apparatus and the modern capitalist economy with its equally powerful capacity to expand wealth but also inequalities, tendencies to crisis, and intensified exploitation of nature and people.

Unit 10 deals with Citizenship: changing perspective. Citizenship is one of the most commonly used terms in a democracy. It is used at all levels of politics; in formal legal documents, in laws, in constitutions, in party manifestoes and in speeches.

Unit 11 deals with 'New' social movements. Since the middle of the last century 'social movements have moved from noninstitutionalized margins of society to its very core'.

Unit 12 deals with Politics and globalization. Political globalization refers to the growth of the worldwide political system, both in size and complexity.

Unit 13 deals with Identity and culture. This unit will examine the problems of identity among the tribes in India, the variety of cultural strategies for asserting this identity and the multiple political and personal agendas of identity.

Unit 14 deals with Politics of violence: terrorism, revolution and war. The category of political violence include state and non-state actors; it may originate from internal or external sponsors; take forms that range from terrorism and guerilla warfare to sectarian violence, police actions, riots and assassinations.

UNIT 8: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

STRUCTURE

8.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know the State and Civil Society: Meaning and Characteristics
- To discuss the Concept of the State: An Overview
- To know the Concept of Civil Society: An Overview
- To understand Relationship between State and Civil Society

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of state occupies a central place in Political Science. No discussion on political theory is complete without reference to the word 'state'. The state, indeed, touches every aspect of human life, and this is why it has, very rightly, captured the attention of all political philosophers since the days of Plato. To understand the state as an administrative machinery ordering public life is to know its one aspect. Important though this aspect is, it is not the only aspect which explains as to what it is. The state is where it operates on. Its real meaning together with its other related implications emerges more clearly when it is understood in relation to the domain of its area of operation, which is what society is. What is state? What is society or civil society? What is the relationship between the two or how do the two stand in relation to each other? What is so particular about civil society that gives the state a different connotation? These questions have been, and actually are, central to the themes of political theory and to these questions, answers have been addressed by numerous political theorists. A discussion on issues relating to these two terms, the state and civil society, would help us to know their meanings, implications and the relative perspectives in which these two concepts stand to each other.

8.2 STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: MEANING AND CHARACTERISTICS

It is very common to address society as civil society, civil society as political society, political society as state. To understand each as one or the other is to know none of them. While the concept 'society' is a generic term, the term civil society denotes a type of society particular to a time and set in a particular situation. 'Society' refers, in general terms, to the totality of 'social relationships', conscious or unconscious, deliberate or otherwise. 'Civil Society', on the other hand, concerns itself to matters relating to 'public'. This brings the term 'civil society' close to the concept of 'political society'. Indeed, the two terms presuppose a society where civility is their characteristic feature, but 'civil society' extends to areas far away from the reach of 'political society'. The

institution of family, for example, is an area covered by 'civil society', but it is a domain where 'political society' does better to stay away from. 'Political society' covers a whole range of activities related to 'political' directly or indirectly, but it remains wider than the term 'state' when the latter is treated merely as a matter of governance. It is indeed, important to know the meanings of these terms clearly if one seeks to understand the relationship between them, especially between the state and civil society.

8.2.1 Meaning of State

The state, as a word stato, appeared in Italy in the early part of the sixteenth century in the writings of Machiavelli (1469-1527). The meaning of the state in the sense of a body politic became common in England and France in the later part of the sixteenth century. The word staatskunst became the German equivalent of ragione di stato during the seventeenth century and a little later, the word staatrecht got the meaning of jus publican (see Sabine, "State", The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences Vol. XIV). Thus, came the use of the term 'State'. The state has included, from the beginning, a reference to a land and a people, but this alone would not constitute a state. It refers also to a unity, a unity of legal and political authority, regulating the outstanding external relationships of man in society, existing within society. It is what it does, i.e., creates a system of order and control, and for this, is vested with the legal power of using compulsion and coercion. A state, thus, is found in its elaborate system. It is found in its institutions which create laws and which enforce them, i.e., in institutions such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is found in the bureaucratic institutions which are attached to every executive branch of the government. It is found in the institutions which are called into operation when its will is challenged, i.e., the military and the police. The state is the sum – total of these institutions. Ralph Miliband (The State in Capitalist Society) writes, "These are the institutions – the government, the administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies – which make up the state…". In these institutions lies the state power; through these institutions come the laws of the state, and

from them spring the legal right of using physical force. The state as governance is a system related to what may be called the political system or the political society. It includes, on the one hand, institutions such as the political parties, pressure groups, the opposition, etc., and on the other, large-scale industrial houses, religious and caste institutions, trade unions, etc. These institutions, existing outside of the state system, attempt to influence the functioning of the state, somewhere even dominating it, and somewhere in collaboration with it. Skocpol (States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China) sums up what Neera Chandhoke (State and Civil Society) calls the statist perspective of the state, "the state properly conceived …. is rather a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations…. Moreover, coercive and administrative organizations are only parts of overall political systems. These systems also may contain institutions through which social interests are represented in state policy-making as well as institutions through which non-state actors are mobilised to participate in policy implementation. Nevertheless, the administrative and coercive organisations are the basis of state power." The other strand giving the state a meaning comes from Michael Foucault ('Truth and Power' in P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucalt Reader, 1987) who regards the state as built on power relations already existing in society. Chandhoke writes about Foucault, "The state, he (Foucault) concluded, can only operate on the basis of existing relations of domination and oppression in society." Rejecting both the perspectives of the state, Chandhoke says, "The statists (Skocpol and others) concentrate on the state at the expense of society, and the theorists in the Foucauldian mode concentrate on social interaction at the expense of the state." She concludes that the state, with a view to understanding it in relation to society, and vice-versa, "is a social relation because it is the codified power of the social formation."

8.2.2 Meaning of Civil Society

The concept of civil society, to give it a meaning, embraces an entire range of assumptions, values and institutions, such as political, social and civil rights, the rule of law, representative institutions, a public sphere, and above all a plurality of associations. Commenting on it, David Held (Models of Democracy) stated that it retains "a distinctive character to the extent that it is made up of areas of social life …. the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction … which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals, and groups outside the direct control of the state." Adding to political interaction, civil society constitutes what Jurgen Habermas called 'the public sphere'. Enlarging the view of civil society, one may include in it the structure of modern national state, economic modernization, great interconnectedness with other societies, free enterprise and what John Dunn (Western Political Theory) refers to as "the modern representative democratic republic." Chandhoke sums up the meaning of civil society "as the public sphere where individuals come together for various purposes both for their self-interest and for the reproduction of an entity called society." "It is a", she continues, "sphere which is public because it is formally accessible to all, and in principle all are allowed entry into this sphere as the bearers of rights." The concept of civil society came up as and when a social community sought to organise itself independently of the specific direction of state power. Historically, the concept, Chandhoke says, "came into existence when the classical political economists sought to control the power of the Mercantilist State". With the passage of time, the concept of civil society moved on progressively: becoming a central plank of democratic movements in eighteenth century

8.2.3 Characteristics of State and Civil Society

State exists within the society. This makes the state and society analytically distinct. The two are not the same. Society is a web of social relationships and as such, includes the totality of social practices, which are essentially plural, but at the same time, are relational. The hierarchically organised and maintained social practices of a given community establish, in their turn, all kinds of power equations and relations among its members. The state comes in to give these power

relations a fixity, and thereby to society its stability. The state gives legitimacy to social relationships as expressed in social practices because it recognises them and codifies them through legal acts. It is in this sense that the state can be described as the codified power of the social formation of a given time. The state, so considered, is itself a distinct and discrete organisation of power in so far as it possesses the capacity to select, categorise, crystallise and arrange power in formal codes and institutions. And this capacity gives to the state its status – power, power to take decisions, power to enforce decisions, and also power to coerce those who defy them. But the state so considered derives its power from society. It is, in this sense, a codified power, but within the framework of the society in which it operates. The state, as a social relation and also as a codified power in a given society, would have certain characteristics of its own. These characteristics can be stated as: a) The state is a power, organised in itself. It has the power to legitimise social relations and gives them recognition through formal codes and institutions. This gives the state a distinct and irreducible status in society while making it autonomous from classes and contending factions existing in it. b) The state emerges as a set of specifically political practices which defines binding decisions and enforces them, to the extent of intervening in every aspect of social life. c) The state monopolises all means of coercion. No other organisation in the society has this power. d) The state gives fixity to social relations, and social stability to society. The social order, according to Chandhoke, "is constituted through the state and exists within the parameters laid down by the state." e) The state exists within the framework of a given society. As society responds to the changing conditions compelled by numerous social forces, the state responds to the changing society. The state always reflects the changing relations of society. As society constantly re-enacts itself, so does the state. The liberal and the marxist perspectives of civil society differ drastically. For the liberals, civil society presupposes democratic states together with the accountability of the states, the limits on state power, the responsiveness to the spontaneous life and the interactions of civil society. For the marxists, civil society is the arena of class conflicts, selfish competition and exploitation, the state acting to protect the interests of the owning

classes. A definition of civil society comprising the insights of both the liberals and the marxists must take into account the following: a) The state power must be controlled and it has to become responsive through democratic practices of an independent civil society State exists within the society. This makes the state and society analytically distinct. The two are not the same. Society is a web of social relationships and as such, includes the totality of social practices, which are essentially plural, but at the same time, are relational. The hierarchically organised and maintained social practices of a given community establish, in their turn, all kinds of power equations and relations among its members. The state comes in to give these power relations a fixity, and thereby to society its stability. The state gives legitimacy to social relationships as expressed in social practices because it recognises them and codifies them through legal acts. It is in this sense that the state can be described as the codified power of the social formation of a given time. The state, so considered, is itself a distinct and discrete organisation of power in so far as it possesses the capacity to select, categorise, crystallise and arrange power in formal codes and institutions. And this capacity gives to the state its status – power, power to take decisions, power to enforce decisions, and also power to coerce those who defy them. But the state so considered derives its power from society. It is, in this sense, a codified power, but within the framework of the society in which it operates. The state, as a social relation and also as a codified power in a given society, would have certain characteristics of its own. These characteristics can be stated as: a) The state is a power, organised in itself. It has the power to legitimise social relations and gives them recognition through formal codes and institutions. This gives the state a distinct and irreducible status in society while making it autonomous from classes and contending factions existing in it. b) The state emerges as a set of specifically political practices which defines binding decisions and enforces them, to the extent of intervening in every aspect of social life. c) The state monopolises all means of coercion. No other organisation in the society has this power. d) The state gives fixity to social relations, and social stability to society. The social order, according to Chandhoke, “is constituted through the state and exists within the parameters laid down

by the state." e) The state exists within the framework of a given society. As society responds to the changing conditions compelled by numerous social forces, the state responds to the changing society. The state always reflects the changing relations of society. As society constantly re-enacts itself, so does the state. The liberal and the marxist perspectives of civil society differ drastically. For the liberals, civil society presupposes democratic states together with the accountability of the states, the limits on state power, the responsiveness to the spontaneous life and the interactions of civil society. For the marxists, civil society is the arena of class conflicts, selfish competition and exploitation, the state acting to protect the interests of the owning classes. A definition of civil society comprising the insights of both the liberals and the marxists must take into account the following: a) The state power must be controlled and it has to become responsive through democratic practices of an independent civil society

8.3 CONCEPT OF THE STATE: AN OVERVIEW

The state, being at the very core of political theory, has been defined differently by different political philosophers since the time of the ancient Greek. For some, it is an institution of coercion, while for others, it is the custodian of the rights of the people. While some, like the anarchists, would like to abolish the state straight away, others like the socialists of the nonmarxian shade would want it to stay to establish socialism. Despite the fact that the state has meant different things to different people, one cannot ignore the central place the state has in political theory. One would do better, if one attempts to discuss the meaning of the state vis-à-vis society which has come to us by a host of eastern political philosophers.

8.3.1 The Pre-Modern Tradition

In all his works in political theory, there is a strong case which Plato (428/7- 348/7 BC) builds in favour of an omnipotent rule. The problem to which Plato addressed himself was not as to how best a government could be created, but as to how the best government could be installed. It

is the job of the government, Plato affirmed more than once, to help people live a complete life. It is, thus, with Plato a matter of just not a government, but a just government, just not a government any how, but a perfect government, the government that was able to deliver happiness for all who lived therein. For Plato, a state is a system of relationships in which everyone does his own business and where the job of the state is to maintain, and promote such relationships. Following his teacher Plato, Aristotle (384-322 BC) defined the state as polis (the ancient Greeks used polis for the state) as a community, which exists for the supreme good. He says that the state is "an association of households and villages sharing in a life of virtue, and aiming at an end which exists in perfect and self-complete existence." Both Plato and Aristotle, and for that matter all Greeks, thought of polis as more than a state. It was an arrangement of administrative machinery, a government or a constitution, but was also a school, a church laying the guidelines for a way of life, which for them, was nothing but leading a full life. For Plato and Aristotle, there was no distinction between the state and society: the state was an organ and a part of the society; it was submerged in the society itself. In addition, the Greeks thought of the polis as an ethical entity and that was why they assigned, ethical functions to be performed by the rulers of the state, i.e., good, happy and complete life. Barker writes, "It (the polis) is more than a legal structure: it is also a moral spirit". An ancient Greek would never imagine himself without the polis, he was only a part of the polis, a part of the whole. Barker says, "Here (in ancient Greece) were individuals, distinct from the state, yet in their communion forming the state." Wayper also says "For life to be worth living must have a meaning, and only in the polis they (the Greeks) were sure, did it acquire meaning. There was no distinction between political, social and ethical life in ancient Greece. The society was the state as the state was with Plato and Aristotle, a government: the freeman, the master was a citizen, a legislator and a member of the society; he as the ruler ruled the individual as a member of the society, all the individuals, the whole society. The slave-owing society of ancient Greek times could hardly be expected to give a theory of state, nay a theory of society, more than that of the government, precisely, the rulers". To Cicero's writings

would go the credit of giving a notion of the state which is not a polis, but a commonwealth. Like the ancient Greeks, Cicero also regards the state submerged in the society, a part, i.e., an integral part of the society. Cicero says, "The Commonwealth, then, is the people's affairs, and the people is not every group of man, associated in any manner, but is the coming together of a considerable number of men who are united by a common agreement about law and rights, and by the desire to participate in mutual advantages." From this, Cicero's theory of state can be summed up as: (i) the state is differentiated from people's gatherings, i.e., society (ii) the people enter the state after they agree on certain rules, giving people a 'legal' status, which lead them to form 'legal community (iii) the state exists when people agree to participate in its affairs. In Cicero's theory, there is a theory of state different from the theory of society; he makes a distinction between the state and the society; his theory of state is the theory of government as well as a theory of political community. The medieval political theory in the West was mainly concerned with Christianity where social life was more a religious life regulated by the dictates of the Roman Catholic Church headed by the Pope. Christendom ruled the universe and politics was controlled by the Church. The temporal power was regarded inferior to that of the ecclesiastical, the state acting as a footnote to the wider world. The state, in the medieval European world, was thought of as a means for reaching the City of God (St. Augustine), and the human law was to work under the divine law, natural law and ultimately, under the eternal law (St. Thomas). It was not the society that controlled the state, but those who controlled the society– the Pope, the Church priests, the monarchs and the feudal lords– who controlled the state i.e., the state machinery.

8.3.2 The Liberal-Individualist Tradition

With the modern age ushering in the Western World during the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, there appeared a definite theory of state. The liberal-individualist philosophers, with Hobbes (1588-1679) onward, came to make a clear distinction between the state and society by making the state a matter of mere governance. All liberals, basing their political theory on individuals, came to build political power, the state, as an

instrument, some like Hobbes giving all powers to the state while others like Bentham (1748-1832) making it a non-interventionist one. All liberals argue for an autonomous individual, the degree for individual autonomy differing from philosopher to philosopher. The liberals' laurels included "individual liberties, rights as sacred as natural, property ethos, rule of law, free, competitive and market economy … all to remain free from the interference of the state. The early modern political theory could not make distinction between state, and government, … All regarded state power as political power, and political power as the power of the government". The Machiavellian state (credit goes to Machiavelli for introducing the word 'state' in Political Science), whether princedom or republic, is a power state, meaning thereby that it exists for power and exists because of the power whose main interest is to maintain, enhance and enlarge its own authority. For Bodin (1530-1596), the state is "a lawful government, with sovereign powers, of different households, and their common affairs", considering the state affairs as concerning the 'public'. "The final cause, end, or design of men", Hobbes says, "is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life". With Locke (1632-1704), the liberal theory gets impetus and the state comes to protect property, and promote a better economic life, for liberalism comes to stay as the political philosophy of the capitalist class, the democratic flavour joining it at a later stage of development. The early liberal-democratic theory restricted the role of the state to the minimal, protecting life, liberty and property of its citizens from external aggression and internal chaos on the one hand, and providing a system of justice and public works, and amenities on the other hand, with no role for the welfare of the people. It was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) first, and T.H. Green (1836-1882) later who expanded the positive role of the state in preparing a conducive atmosphere where the individual could enjoy a better way of life. Mill and Green introduced democratic elements in the organisation and functioning of the state, though both could hardly leave their capitalistic shackles. To sum up, one may, therefore, conclude that the early modern political theorists such as Machiavelli and Bodin could hardly see beyond the omnipotent state. The contractualists, especially Hobbes, had thought that in order for

society to come into existence, a strong state is required. The early liberals such as Locke, Smith, Bentham held the view that as the society has the capacity to reproduce and regenerate itself, the state and its power should be minimal. But the later liberals, J.S. Mill, T.H. Green, De Tocqueville felt that numerous social associations, while enhancing social ability, could become instruments through which individuals could fashion a political discourse which could limit the nature of state power. The liberal pluralistic, in the third and fourth decades of the twentieth century were able to build a strong case for the numerous associations, existing in society, to control the omnipotence of the state while balancing the latter against the claims of the society.

8.3.3 The Marxian Tradition

The Marxian theory of the state emerged, as a reaction against liberalism. For the Marxists, state and society are two distinct entities, though the state is not independent of society. The society type explains the type of state, society providing the base on which stood the superstructure. The Marxists, regarding the state as a product of a class society, believe the state to be a class institution, protecting and promoting the possessing class, and oppressing and coercing the non-possessing class. For them, the state is an engine of class rule. But it is also an instrument of social and political change, its negative function is to destroy the remains of the earlier society, while it, through its constructive functions, builds the structure and culture of the class it is manned with. Chandhoke discerns three theoretical moments of the Marxist theory of state. The first such moment has been when Marx and Engels, in the Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848) 20 regard “the executive of the modern state ” as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”. Marx also writes in the preface to Towards a Critique of Political Economy (1859), “the totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.” This base-superstructure model of the state was a reaction to the liberal concept of the disembodied state standing apart from society as also a reaction against the Hegelian model

of the all-powerful state while subordinating civil society to it. The second moment, appearing around the 1960s and with Ralph Miliband and Hanza Alvi, questions the nature of the state and its relationship with society. In it, the state emerges as a distinct theoretical object in its own right and state-centric theory emerged as the dominant stream of political theory. The third theoretical moment was made possible through the contributions of Nicos Poulantzas and Claus Off. This moment saw political theorists preoccupied with concepts and theories. Following Gramsci, who had conceptualised the state as the political consideration of civil society, the Marxist political theorists of the third theoretical moment began a spiralling interest in civil society as the sphere where meaningful practices, both hegemonic and subversive, are generalised.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. How do you know the State and Civil Society: Meaning and Characteristics?

……
……
……

2. Discuss the Concept of the State: An Overview.

……
……
……

8.4 CONCEPT OF CIVIL SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW

The concept of civil society is associated with the Western intellectual tradition. With the epoichal changes in the West, the idea of civil society has grown progressively. Many factors have gone into developing the concept of the state as it has come to stay with us. These factors, to mention a few, include the emergence of secular authority, the development of the institution of property, the decline of the absolutist state, the growth of urban culture, the rise of nationalist and democratic

movements, until the end of the nineteenth century and the rule of law. As the capitalist economy with its democratising features has developed, so has the concept of civil society

8.4.1 The Pre-modern Tradition

If the idea of civil society contains in it the idea of what relates to public, the pre-modern times may well be regarded as opposed to the concept of civil society. The Platonic rulers alone were the administrators and a large number of those who constituted 'the producing class' had no role to play in public affairs. The Aristotelian notion of 'zoon politikon' (man as a political animal) was elitistic in the sense that (i) the political animal was a male, (ii) he alone was a citizen and (iii) he alone was a property holder. The rest of the population, the women, the slaves etc., constituted Oikes, i.e., the private world and that could hardly be termed as constituting the civil society. As the 'private' was not 'public', it was not political and none belonging to it had any citizenship rights. The Greek society, Chandhoke points out, did not 'possess any notion of inalienable rights of man to individual freedom which became so prominent a feature of early version of civil society."

By developing the concept of rights, legally ordained, and especially relating to property of the individual, there did emerge the notion of 'civil society' in ancient Roman thinking. Indeed the notion of 'civil society' did need such an atmosphere to shape itself, but the ancient Roman thought could hardly rise above that, notwithstanding the attempts at making distinction between 'private' and 'public' which the ancient Romans really did. During the whole medieval period in the West when politics took the back seat, the idea of civil societies got eclipsed. What related to 'public' as 'political' was limited to a very few people called the feudal lords, barons, dukes and counts. The idea of civil society was almost unknown.

8.4.2 The Liberal-individualist Tradition

The early modern period with Machiavelli and Bodin saw the emergence of politics, but the period itself did not witness the corresponding growth of the idea of civil society. The civil society, as a concept, rose with the

idea of individuals with rights, individuals related to the state, and individuals related to others in society. There is the clear reference to civil society both in Hobbes and Locke when the two sought to make a distinction between the 'state of nature', and the 'civil society' or the 'political society' after the contract was made. Both talk about the rights-bearing individuals; both sought the state to protect these rights. It is difficult to regard the contractualists, Hobbes and Locke, as theorists of civil society because (i) their formulations on civil society are found in an embryonic form and (ii) their attempts, despite a rational and persuasive explanation on state and society, remained arbitrary (see Chandhoke, State and Civil Society). The concept of civil society has emerged clearly between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century, especially with the classical political economy theorists such as Adam Smith. Classical political economy, echoing individual rights like laissez faire, freedom, equality, made the institution of state as simply irrelevant, devaluing it, and that of civil society as what Marx had said 'theatre of history'. This helped "the civil society", Chandhoke writes, "as a historically evolved area of individual rights and freedoms, where individuals in competition with each other pursued their respective private concern." The advent of the idea of civil society, coming from the writings of political economy theorists, was to have its shape vis-à-vis the state. J.S. Mill and De Tocqueville who thought that the state had become much more powerful than desired, sought to limit the power of the state through the mechanism devised in the ever developing concept of civil society. Chandhoke sums up this phase of liberalism, saying: "…. Civil society was used as a concept primarily for organizing state-society relations. The expansion of the state, it was perceptively recognized, would contribute to the shrinkage of the civil arena. State power could be limited only with the expansion of civil society." The process of democratisation in the west made it possible for civil society to expand itself, and in the process, restricted the area of the state. But elsewhere, the concept of the state gained prominence restricting thus, the arena of civil society. The views of Hegel, and therefore, of Marx and Gramsci should be of some interest.

8.4.3 The Hegelian, Marxian and Gramscian Traditions

There is a definite relationship between the state and civil society in the writings of Hegel (1770- 1831). He views the state as the latest link growing out of the development of various institutions. Describing the state as the synthesis, representing universality, of the thesis of families and the anti-thesis of civil society, Hegel recognises the state as higher in kind than civil society. Hegel regards the state as the highest, the latest, and even the final form of social institutions. For him, civil society, as the anti-thesis of the thesis of family is "an expression for the individualist and atomistic atmosphere of middle class commercial society in which relationships are external, governed by the 'unseen' hand of the economic laws rather than by the self-conscious will of 22 persons." So, civil society, a negative institution as it is for Hegel, belongs to the "realm of mechanical necessity, a resultant of the irrational forces of individual desires", governed, as Sabine says for Hegel, "by non-moral casual laws and hence, ethically anarchical." The thesis (the family) and the anti-thesis (the civil, the bourgeois society) merge into what Hegel calls the state (the synthesis). Thus, the state comes to have the universality of civil society and the specificity and the individuality of the family. Thus, while the political economy and the liberal-democratic theorists had given primacy to civil society, and had given the state a back seat, Hegel reverses the position and puts the state in the position of civil society. According to Hegel, ultimately civil society is subordinated to the state, and the individual, to the whole. "Consequently, in Hegelian formulation", Chandhoke says, "there can be no interrogation of the state, of its designs for universality, or of its rationale. The resolution of the contradiction of civil society is the state, and therefore, between the people and the state, there is no dichotomy, only legitimacy and acceptance." Marx, unlike Hegel who had made the civil society a hostage and who had idealised the state, seeks to restore the civil society to the position of making it the theatre of history. But the civil society, Marx argues, has failed to live up to its promises, had failed to create a situation where the individual could find freedom and democratic transformation, had to seek ways and means through which

individuals could integrate into the society and the state. Gramsci (1891-1937) following Marx and developing his theory of state takes into account the reality of civil society. His main proposition is that one cannot understand the state without understanding the civil society. He says that the 'state' should be understood as not only the apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of hegemony or civil society. Building on the Marxian notion of the state, Gramsci makes a distinction between the state as a political organisation (the integral state, the visible political constitution of civil society) and the state as government. The integral state keeps reproducing itself in the practices of everyday life through activities situated in civil society. It is hegemony which provides moral and intellectual leadership to practices in civil society. Hegemony, for Gramsci, works for both, for the dominant as well as the subaltern class in civil society. Each class must, Gramsci says, before seizing power, hegemonise social relations in society. To sum up, it may be said that for both the liberals and the Marxists, civil society is primary. While the liberals argue for the separation of civil society from the autonomy of the state, the Marxists, on the other hand, create an alternative tradition of civil society, in which, the civil society, with its all potentialities, has to keep itself always reorganised and transformed.

8.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The relationship between state and civil society is important in so far as it suggests the comparative position of each in relation to the other. In some analyses, this relationship is depicted as a zerosum game: the stronger the state, the weaker the civil society; the weaker the state, the stronger the civil society. Obviously, the expansion of the area of state activity would help minimise the role of civil society; the expansion of the area of civil society would help, on the other hand, minimise the role of the state. In modern liberal societies of our time, the civil society 'sphere' is larger than that of the state, while in dictatorial regimes of any sort, the state's 'sphere' is larger than that of civil society.

8.5.1 State and Civil Society: Integrative Relationship

State and civil society are not two opposite concepts. One does not stand in conflict with another. Neither is one the anti-thesis of the other. The two should not be regarded as usurping the area of each other. It is not a zero-sum game relationship between the two. Indeed, the relatively stronger state would put a premium on the role of civil society, but this, in no way, diminishes the effectiveness of civil society. The libertarian view, expressed in the writings of Hayek or Nozick, that the state is likely to oppress civil society is, more or less, ill-founded. The fact of the matter is that the relationships between state and civil society are reciprocal; the relationships are of an integrative nature, each strengthening the cause of the other. It is, infact, difficult to conceive of civil society functioning successfully without the state. We see the citizen simultaneously constrained by the state and protected by it. It is the state which provides the integrative framework within which the civil society operates; civil society cannot function properly without the state. The integrative framework, as expressed in laws and rules, is accepted as valid by all, the framework needs to be administered neutrally and in a manner consistent with the shared culture of society. We cannot imagine life without this integrative framework, which creates a degree of coherence and without which civil society is likely to become uncivil. Civil society has to open up, in the face of the all-powerful state, to challenge the bureaucratic devices lest it ends up in rigidity. It is, thus, the reciprocity between state and civil society that is significant or at least, should be considered significant. State power is to be exercised within the larger and wider sphere of civil society, and civil society has to keep state power on its toes so that it does not degenerate into absolutism.

8.5.2 State, Civil Society and Democracy

The two concepts, state and civil society, are not in conflict with each other. Democracy integrates the two. The claims of the state get strengthened by civil society and civil society is made more stable

through the state. The two have to work in a democratic frame: the democratic state within the framework of democratic civil society. In a democratic system, state and civil society can collaborate for effective functioning of each. The state has to be constituted democratically, wherein its powers are decentralised and its functions are performed within the rules and procedures already laid. Such a state has to respond to the ever-growing demands of civil society. Its role, more or less, is to coordinate, it has to interfere least in the social and economic life of the people; it has to be regulative in character. Civil society has to be more open and diversified. It has to keep the dialogue continuous and constant with the state and within all the constituents making it. Its area has to be ordained freely and openly, devices making up public opinion and public discourse state-free. In liberal-democratic states, there is a constant interplay of forces belonging to the state and civil society, each putting an imprint on the other. In dictatorial regimes, state power is used to control civil society and civil society gets integrated into the state: the state speaks for the civil society. Democracy alone unites the state with civil society. The state cannot exist for long if it is not democracy laden; civil society cannot exist unless it is democratically structured and functions democratically. A democratic state cannot exist if it is restrictive, coercive, prohibitive, and imposing; it cannot exist if it does not provide the civil society frame in perfect order; it cannot exist if it does not guarantee rights and freedoms to individuals. Likewise, a democratic civil society cannot exist if it does not allow every individual to act in the public sphere, it cannot exist if each and every citizen does not have equal claim on the state, if each citizen is not respected as a human being.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. What do you know about the Concept of Civil Society: An Overview?

……

……

……

2. What do you understand Relationship between State and Civil Society?

……

……

……

8.6 LET US SUM UP

State is not mere governance; it is a political community as well. It is, what Gramsci says, the visible political constitution of civil society, consisting of the entire complex of activities with which a ruling class maintains its dominance, and the ways in which it manages to win the consent of those over which it rules. It is, in other words, a complex of institutions and practices resting upon the nodal points of power in civil society. It is a social relation and as such, it is the codified power of social formation. Civil society consists of the entire range of assumptions, values and institutions such as political, social and civil rights, the rule of law, representative institutions, a public sphere and above all, a plurality of associations. The two concepts, state and civil society, have grown over time and along with them, their characteristics also developed. They have stood in relation to each other, each giving another a corresponding value. With the emergence of political economy and liberalism, civil society got a definite connotation, especially in relation to the state. State and civil society are closely related to each other. The state cannot be imagined without civil society, and civil society cannot be thought of without the state. The two exist in integrative relationships. The state, in democratic systems, protects civil society and civil society strengthens the state. In dictatorial regimes, the state controls the civil society.

8.7 KEY WORDS

State: A state is a polity that is typically established as a centralized organisation. There is no undisputed definition of a state. Max Weber's definition of a state as a polity that maintains a monopoly on the use of violence is widely used, as are many others.

Civil Society: Civil society can be understood as the "third sector" of society, distinct from government and business, and including the family and the private sphere.

8.8 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know the State and Civil Society: Meaning and Characteristics?
2. Discuss the Concept of the State: An Overview
3. What do you know about the Concept of Civil Society: An Overview?
4. What do you understand Relationship between State and Civil Society?

8.9 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Barrow, Clyde W. (2002). "The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate: An Intellectual History". In Aronowitz, Stanley; Bratsis, Peter (eds.). Paradigm lost: state theory reconsidered. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-3293-0.
- Bottomore, T.B., ed. (1991). "The State". A Dictionary of Marxist thought (2nd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-0-631-18082-1.
- Bratsis, Peter (2006). Everyday Life and the State. Paradigm. ISBN 978-1-59451-219-3.
- Faulks, Keith (2000). "Classical Theories of the State and Civil Society". Political sociology: a critical introduction. NYU Press. ISBN 978-0-8147-2709-6.
- Feldbrugge, Ferdinand J.M., ed. (2003). The law's beginning. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. ISBN 978-90-04-13705-9.
- Fisk, Milton (1989). The state and justice: an essay in political theory. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-38966-2.
- Friedeburg, Robert von (2011). State Forms and State Systems in Modern Europe. Institute of European History.

- Green, Penny & Ward, Tony (2009). "Violence and the State". In Coleman, Roy; et al. (eds.). State, Power, Crime. Sage. ISBN 978-1-4129-4805-0.
- Hall, John A., ed. (1994). The state: critical concepts (Vol. 1 & 2). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-08683-7.
- Hansen, Thomas Blom; Stepputat, Finn, eds. (2001). States of imagination: ethnographic explorations of the postcolonial state. Duke University Press. ISBN 978-0-8223-2798-1.
- Hoffman, John (1995). Beyond the state: an introductory critique. Polity Press. ISBN 978-0-7456-1181-5.
- Hoffman, John (2004). Citizenship beyond the state. Sage. ISBN 978-0-7619-4942-8.
- Jessop, Bob (1990). State theory: putting the Capitalist state in its place. Penn State Press. ISBN 978-0-271-00735-9.
- Jessop, Bob (2009). "Redesigning the State, Reorienting State Power, and Rethinking the State". In Leicht, Kevin T.; Jenkins, J. Craig (eds.). Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective. Springer. ISBN 978-0-387-68929-6.
- Lefebvre, Henri (2009). Brenner, Neil; Elden, Stuart (eds.). State, space, world: selected essays. University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-5317-1.
- Long, Roderick T. & Machan, Tibor R. (2008). Anarchism/minarchism: is a government part of a free country?. Ashgate Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7546-6066-8.
- Mann, Michael (1994). "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results". In Hall, John A. (ed.). The State: critical concepts, Volume 1. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-415-08680-6.
- Oppenheimer, Franz (1975). The state. Black Rose Books. ISBN 978-0-919618-59-6.
- Poulantzas, Nicos & Camiller, Patrick (2000). State, power, socialism. Verso. ISBN 978-1-85984-274-4.
- Sanders, John T. & Narveson, Jan (1996). For and against the state: new philosophical readings. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-8476-8165-5.

- Scott, James C. (1998). Seeing like a state: how certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-07815-2.
- Taylor, Michael (1982). Community, anarchy, and liberty. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-27014-4.
- Zippelius, Reinhold (2010). Allgemeine Staatslehre, Politikwissenschaft (16th ed.). C.H. Beck, Munich. ISBN 978-3406603426.
- Uzgalis, William (5 May 2007). "John Locke". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

8.10 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 8.2
2. See Section 8.3

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 8.4
2. See Section 8.5

UNIT 9: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE- HABERMAS

STRUCTURE

9.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, students can able to understand:

- To know Five Visions of Civil Society
- To discuss the Importance of the Public Sphere
- To know the Ideal of Publicness
- To discuss the Early Development Of Habermas's Interest In The Public Sphere And Reason
- To know Important Transitional Works
- To discuss Mature Positions

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The value of a public sphere rooted in civil society rests on three core claims: first, that there are matters of concern important to all citizens and to the organization of their lives together; second, that through dialog, debate and cultural creativity citizens might identify good approaches to these matters of public concern; and third, that states and other powerful organizations might be organized to serve the collective interests of ordinary people – the public – rather than state power as such, purely traditional values, or the personal interests of rulers and elites. These claims have become central to modern thinking about democracy and about politics, culture, and society more generally. Theories of the public sphere developed alongside both the modern state with its powerful administrative apparatus and the modern capitalist economy with its equally powerful capacity to expand wealth but also inequalities, tendencies to crisis, and intensified exploitation of nature and people. The public sphere represented the possibility of subjecting each of these new forces to greater collective choice and guidance. New media for communication have been important to this project, starting with print and literacy and extending through newspapers and broadcast media to the Internet and beyond. This approach to public communication grew partly on the basis of active public debate in the realms of science (Ezrahi 1990), religion (Zaret 2000) and literature (Habermas 1962, Hohendahl 1982). Debates in these other spheres demonstrated that the public use of reason could be effective and schooled citizens in the practices of public communication. At the same time, this emerging notion of society treated the happiness and prosperity of ordinary people as a legitimate public concern – unlike Greek thought, in which such matters were treated as mere private necessity. Classical republican thought was influential, with its emphases on the moral obligation of citizens to provide public leadership and service, and on the importance of the public matters – res publica - that bound citizens to each other (Pocock 1975; Weintraub 1997).

Thinking about public life was also transformed by the rise of what by the eighteenth century was called civil society. This meant society distinct from the state, organized ideally as a realm of liberty, with

freedom of religion, association, business activity, conversation and the press. The promise of civil society was that social life could be self-organizing, even in complex, large-scale societies, and that it could thereby be more free than if left to government officials or to technical experts. The idea of the public sphere was crucial to hopes for democracy. It connected civil society and the state through the principle that public understanding could inform the design and administration of state institutions to serve the interests of all citizens. Obviously these ideals are imperfectly realized, and some of these imperfections reflect tensions built into the very starting points of civil society thinking. As Hegel (1821) suggested, civil society reflects a struggle to reconcile individual self-interest with the achievement of an ethical community. And while the ideal of the public sphere holds that all participants speak as equals, the reality is that inequality and domination constantly distort collective communication.

9.2 FIVE VISIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The first and most basic notion of civil society comes from urban sociability. People interact, exchange goods or ideas, form relationships – and especially in cities, are sociable with strangers. Social life is not restricted to family and kin, or to neighbors, or to members of a single church. It reaches across the boundaries of different zones of private life to include those with whom there are no prior definitions of mutuality or dependency. A cousin you have not met is still family, but the person sitting next to you in the theater is very likely not. And during the early modern era there were more and more such public spaces where people mixed with each other – not just theaters but market places, coffee houses, streets and squares. Urban life was basic to the Renaissance – along with a renewed engagement with classical culture which itself celebrated urban life: the Greek polis or Rome itself. But early modern cities quickly surpassed their classical forebears in the extent to which they brought strangers together. The London of Shakespeare and Elizabeth I was a vital node in networks of culture, finance, and markets for goods and the movement of people. Medieval cities had traditions of self-governance, notably through guilds of craftsmen and merchants.

They organized social life with some autonomy from the feudal hierarchy. Likewise, though they were hierarchical and associated with the Church, medieval universities were generally urban sites of self-governance and sociability among strangers as they attracted students and scholars from different regions. Perhaps most importantly, the idea of self- government by communication among approximate equals, with respect for expertise not just inherited rank, was basic to the Republican ideals of thinkers like Machiavelli (1513). John Locke (1690) extended this idea of society forged by lateral communication – initially mainly among elites – beyond its urban roots. But cities remained vital exemplars of the capacity for social self-organization. They drew ever-larger populations of strangers, people of diverse backgrounds and occupations, into interaction that required only a minimum of formal governance. On a second account, the significance of markets shifted from physical spaces of direct interaction to larger-scale systems of exchange. This remained compatible, however, with the idea that freedom is maximized and the collective good achieved by relying as much as possible on individual choices, minimizing the role of government, of large-scale organizations, and of collective action. Adam Smith (1776) famously championed this view, though recent invocations of his name commonly offer caricatures of his theory. Markets, he held, made social selforganization possible not only by advancing exchange, reconciling supply and demand, and connecting those with different assets and needs, but also by leading individuals to serve the collective welfare – the wealth of nations – by producing to meet needs as efficiently as possible, and selling at prices set by the effort of each to buy cheap and sell dear. Markets thus produced a moral benefit by creating a collective good out of even self-interested individual action; in Bernard de Mandeville's (1714) phrase, markets made private vices into public virtues. For Smith, however, this only worked so long as all market actors were truly individuals, subject to the conditioning of market forces. Both joint-stock corporations and trade unions should be banned as constraints on trade that undermined the morality and psychological conditioning of markets. Absent such distortions, markets offered the public benefits of both wealth and the circulation of goods.

Moreover, for Smith markets demonstrated that civil society could be selforganizing and operate by its own implicit laws rather than state governance or intervention (though Smith recognized that states were crucial for a variety of purposes where markets performed poorly). However, although markets translated private choices in potential public benefits, they did not in themselves provide the mechanism for self-conscious public choices. On a third account, civil society is a matter of collective choice, but not government. The collective good is best achieved by the direct action of ordinary people organized in groups and associations (Edwards 2009). Civil society, in this view, is a matter of churches, charities, voluntary associations, and self-help movements. It is an arena in which people can do things for themselves and meet the needs of their fellow citizens. Here, freedom is not limited to individual choices in relation to markets, but also realized in collective, voluntary efforts. Neighbors may form an association to provide mutual security – a neighborhood watch – or to manage collective resources such as park or recreation facilities. Residents of a town or a country may collect funds and volunteer labor for purposes that are public insofar as they aim to advance a broader good than the sum of their selfish interests – for example by providing food for the poor, or running a recycling program, or supporting a public radio station. They may organize a social movement to try to persuade their fellow citizens that it would be in the public interest to take better care of the environment, or reduce poverty, or end a war. Of course, other citizens may believe the public interest lies in oil drilling not recycling, in the incentives that come with inequality, or in waging war. In this view, the essence of freedom lies in the right of people to form such self-organized efforts, with a presumption that where these are not in harmony with each other they will at least each be limited by respect for the others. What distinguish civil society from the state in this view is pluralism and the absence of any master plan for progress.

A fourth view of civil society suggests that it is at best incomplete without a state to secure cohesion and provide a mechanism for concerted public action. While early theories of civil society generally emphasized its distinction from the state, most also saw the two as

necessarily complementary and closely connected. The state gave society its form, even if civil society produced most of its internal web of relationships. The state offered laws that were enabling for civil society, providing a framework for the contracts central to market relationships and the judgments that balanced the agendas and interests of different actors in civil society – those who want more parks, for example, with those who want more housing or more jobcreating industries. Some – notably Hegel – stressed the extent to which the state constituted society as an integrated whole, greater than the sum of its parts. This meant overcoming the 'bifurcation' between family-life, which he saw as guided by universal ethics but integrating only at the level of personal relations, and markets, which he recognized could be more general in their reach, but were based on particularistic self-interest. This distinction became basic to theories of social integration that contrasted the directly interpersonal relationships of family, community, and voluntary association to the impersonal and large-scale systems of market transactions. Without the state, on such a view, the market basis of civil society would always be disruptive to forms of social integration like the family, and would always be insulated from ethics by precisely the automatic, systemic character that Adam Smith celebrated as its invisible hand – good for generating wealth but not social integration or justice. The fifth view of civil society focuses on culture. A key eighteenth-century pioneer was Montesquieu (1748) who emphasized not just laws but the 'spirit' that lay behind laws and mediated among the material conditions in different societies, the interests of individuals, and the institutions they formed. Montesquieu's specific ideas about how this mediation works are today followed less than his more general argument that laws and other conscious measures to organize social relations depend on the culture in which they are situated (Alexander 2006). At about the same time, David Hume (1739-40) developed an influential argument that keeping promises depends not just on good intentions – say at the moment a contract is signed - and cannot be explained simply by reference to nature (since human nature is all too compatible with evading obligations). Rather, promises and contracts are honored because failure to honor them is subject to widespread disapproval based not just

on instrumental interests but on cultural traditions and norms. Moreover, the expectation of disapproval (or conversely respect as someone who honors his obligations) is not just a matter of conscious calculation but internalized into habit. To say 'I promise' is thus a performative action that is only intelligible against a background of common culture that both recognizes what a promise means and provides for appropriate reinforcement – which in turn makes promise-keeping habitual most of the time and prudent when people think consciously about it. Culture is thus crucial to the capacity for agreements among individuals that is important to other conceptions of civil society. Culture also links the members of a society. This need not mean only a lowest common denominator of cultural uniformity; it may mean overlapping fields of cultural participation. Common religion may connect speakers of different languages (or vice versa). A shared business culture may connect people from different political cultures or with different musical tastes and so forth. Importantly, culture is not simply a matter of inheritance but of continued creativity, and processes of reproduction incorporate novelty, allow some practices to fade, and shift patterns of meaning – as languages add and lose words and adapt to new contexts. Smith's account of the market was complemented, for Hume and for Edmund Burke, by the notion that there was another kind of invisible hand of historical trial and error that preserved useful customs and let others fade. More radical thinkers like Rousseau challenged this idea of cultural selection just as Marx would challenge Smith's account of markets. But each held that relations of power and property both kept practices in place that were not conducive to the public good, and drove cultural change in ways that served specific interests. Antonio Gramsci (1929- 35) made the analysis of hegemonic culture basic to a theory of civil society. Society is held together not only by markets, formal agreements, and the power of the state but by common culture that underwrites consent. As Gramsci suggested, of course, hegemonic culture can also be contested. Thinking about nature as resources to be exploited may be dominant in a capitalist society but it is not impossible for Christians to contest this by expounding a view of nature as a gift of God demanding stewardship. The very organization of civil society is

also shaped by culture. As Benedict Anderson (1983) has shown, we would be less likely to conceive of society as 'nation' absent representations in novels, in museums, and on maps. Charles Taylor (2004) calls attention to modern social imaginaries like voting – that depend on a cultural notion of what actions mean and what to expect of others - or the market as it is represented in the news and treated as a kind of collective reality. Similarly, the place and even reality of a business corporation depends on its cultural recognition, not just on laws or contracts.

9.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Some eighteenth and nineteenth century writers argued, contrary to Adam Smith and Edmund Burke, that the visible hand of the state was better suited to providing public benefits than either the invisible hand of the market or cultural tradition that changed only incrementally and mostly unconsciously. Jeremy Bentham (1789) founded utilitarianism on the notion that the greatest good of the greatest number depended on wise laws effectively administered. While some laws should provide for the vitality and liberty of civil society – for example by guaranteeing freedom of the press – others should put state administration to work in improving society. Bentham was a pioneer in both prison and educational reform. Over the ensuing centuries, states have been called on to build highways, run schools and health care systems, and generally advance the welfare of citizens. But there is recurrent public debate over what should be managed by states and what by markets or charities. The public sphere is crucial to identifying the public good and to shaping both public and private strategies for pursuing it. This is not a matter of critical argumentation alone; it is also a matter of public culture that is shaped by creative and communicative processes as well as debate. Environmental discourse, for example, addresses the market choices of individuals, nongovernmental organizations developing alternative energy sources, and government agencies – and it addresses each with mixtures of rational-critical debate, attempts to change culture through art, and demonstrations of solidarity and commitment. To engage such

questions, individuals refer not only to their private interests but also to ideas about the public good. The scope given to the public sphere is smallest in the market-centered idea of civil society. Choices are made by individuals and connect to each other through markets, which have their own logics like supply and demand. But though these are in principle individual decisions, they are nonetheless influenced by public communication – like advertising – and by the tastes and customs of specific communities and social groups. Such social influences on decisions can extend to ideas of the public good, like buying environment-friendly products or avoiding pollution. Markets themselves operate on the basis of public institutions and public knowledge – for example publishing their financial results so that investors can make informed decisions, and course there are various ways in which the government may intervene to try to make markets perform for the public good: forming a central bank to insure financial stability, for example, or passing laws making bribery illegal. The public sphere is also important where civil society is seen mainly in terms of the direct action of citizens - organized informally in communities or more formally in voluntary associations. Public communication shapes what civil society organizations form, from health clinics to Girl Scout troops, and what issues they address, from poverty to the environment. Not only do issues go in or out of fashion, the very forms and strategies of civil society organizations are matters of public knowledge, circulating in the media and first-hand reports, and offering a repertoire of models to each new organizing effort. Public discussion is also vital to evaluating the extent to which different civil society organizations – or social movements – do in fact serve the public good.

Urban sociability and public culture each evoke a public life that is not specifically political. Urban public spaces anchor face-to-face interaction, and promote serendipitous contact – and simple visibility - among people of diverse backgrounds. Many of Europe's cities, especially older ones, were distinctive in their pedestrian character and their scale. Both suburbanization and larger-scale urban designs have changed the character of public interaction. Sennett (1977) argues that where eighteenth- and nineteenth-century urban life was vibrant and

highly varied, 20th century development often reduced occasions for interaction across lines of difference. Citizens retreated into both privacy and the conformity of mass culture. This has negative implications for democracy. As Mumford (1938: 483) wrote, "One of the difficulties in the way of political association is that we have not provided it with the necessary physical organs of existence: we have failed to provide the necessary sites, the necessary buildings, the necessary halls, rooms, meeting places…" As directly interpersonal relations organize proportionately less of public life, mediations of various kinds become increasingly important (Calhoun 1988, Thompson 1995). The nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries were the heyday of great urban newspapers; since then, media that transcend locality have become increasingly important. First radio and then television fundamentally altered the public sphere. They contributed to a shift in what was publicly visible as well as in how public discourse was organized (Meyrowitz 1985). New media shared both information and emotionally powerful images widely. Critics charged broadcast media with debasing reason by substituting powerful images for sustained analysis, appealing to a lowest common denominator in audiences, blurring the lines between entertainment and critical discourse, and centralizing control over messages in the hands of a few corporations. At the same time, however, formations of public culture expanded dramatically, stretching across the boundaries of nation-states. With films, music, and new media, public culture is increasingly global, though no version of it is universal. Much of it is centrally consumed as entertainment, but some also puts issues like human rights or humanitarian emergencies onto the public agenda. The public sphere takes on its most specifically political import when civil society is seen as centrally related to the state. Whether the issue is waging war or financing health care or strengthening education, public discussion is the way in which ordinary citizens gain knowledge, form opinions, and express them – potentially influencing the state. Obviously some of these citizens have more knowledge than others; some have access to media platforms that give them greater influence. And some citizens grow quickly bored by political arguments and change their TV channel. Public discourse reflects the inequalities of civil society, but it

also, at least potentially, compensates for them. Its very openness is an invitation to all citizens and a recognition that the opinions – and emotions - of citizens matter. As Hannah Arendt emphasized, politics includes not just petty struggles over power but public action that forms enduring institutions like the US Constitution. Affirming the classical republican tradition, she suggested that it was a strange trend that treated civil society first and foremost as a realm of freedom from politics rather than freedom in politics: "to understand by political freedom not a political phenomenon, but on the contrary, the more or less free range of non-political activities which a given body politic will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it" (1990: 30).

9.4 THE IDEAL OF PUBLICNESS

Without a vital public sphere, civil society is not inherently democratic. Certainly civil society organizations are not always constituted in democratic ways. They are usually more accountable to those who pay for them and work in them than to the general public. Nor do civil society organizations always pursue the public good, even by their own potentially competing definitions. While some are philanthropic in the sense that they exist to provide benefits to those who are neither members nor backers, others focus on serving specific interests – those of business groups, for example, or those of neighborhoods that use private security services to maintain their exclusivity. Many, like private clubs, simply serve their members. Only some civil society organizations exist mainly to serve public purposes. These include social movements that campaign on broad agendas like equal rights for women; service organizations that provide benefits for strangers like soup kitchens or homeless shelters; political parties, charitable foundations, and public information services. Only some work primarily in public ways, however, making their internal operations transparent and open, and inviting strangers to join. Many organizations in civil society take on what they regard as public purposes but remain 'ingroups' of people knit together by personal relationships. Publics, by contrasts, are forged in sociability and communication among strangers (Warner 2001). The public sphere is public first and foremost because it is open to all, not

only in the sense that all can see and hear but also that all can participate and have a voice. In any modern large-scale society, this means that the public sphere is a matter of communications and other connections among strangers as well as among those networked by old school ties, church membership, or community. One may talk about politics or issues like climate change inside the family, but this becomes a public conversation only when it is open to, and informed by, others. This may happen in face-to-face meetings but also by reading newspapers or websites, by writing a blog or calling a talk-radio show. A protest march is part of public communication – it is an effort to make a statement and show that many people are behind it. So is a petition. But publicness is not just a matter of large numbers. It is a matter of openness. Writing an article in a small journal still counts: it is available to strangers and through them may inform further conversations. Although openness is basic to the ideology and theory of the public sphere, various forms of exclusion are basic to actually-existing publics. Gender exclusion has been widespread – even in the ostensible golden age of the public sphere (Landes 1988; Ryan 1992). A state religion may exclude non-believers from public life, or a secular public sphere may limit the expression of religious views in public. Workers were largely excluded from the classical public sphere that Habermas analyzed (Calhoun 2010). Immigrants may be in a similar position today. Those who are excluded, or who disagree with the dominant organization of the public sphere, often build their own media and networks of communication and with them a counterpublic. Workers created a proletarian public sphere (Negt and Kluge 1972). The women's movement formed its own counter-public and this enabled it to contest the terms of the hegemonic public sphere (Fraser 1992). Counter-publics challenge the apparent neutrality of more mainstream publics and reveal that hegemonic public culture reflects power relations (Eley, 1992, but as Warner (2001) suggests, claiming unfair treatment in the public sphere is a strategy, and one even powerful groups deploy. Not all public communication is about weighty matters of politics or institutions. To the frustration of some, there may be more debate over the Academy Awards than over public policy. Such opinions may not matter much for the fate of democracy, but an open

space in which to express and contest opinions does. Any effort to police the boundary between opinions that matter and those that don't potentially restricts the public sphere and political freedom. This is one reason why the US and other constitutions protect free speech and freedom of expression as such, and why limits on such freedoms – say to restrict public obscenity – are serious and consequential matters. Some have argued, for example, that because family matters are essentially private issues like spousal violence should not be on the public agenda. This view has changed for some publics but not all.

Not only must it always be possible for people to raise new issues or challenge dominant opinions, it must be possible for people to gain the information they need for informed discussion. This lies behind arguments for transparency in government and business dealings, and also conflicts over censorship of the Internet, like that by the Chinese government. Chinese civil society is more and more active in response; and this brings greater public communication as well as state efforts to limit it (Yang 2009). Some matters of national security or trade secrets might legitimately by kept out of the public view, but for the public sphere to work effectively on behalf of democracy and citizens' rights to shape their own societies, it is important that information be accessible. A government that does not make it easy for citizens to get access to data it collects is trying to limit democracy by limiting public communication. Of course, the public sphere is limited not just by official secrets but also by lazy citizens. The ideal of publicness stresses active communication. In this sense it is at odds with reducing public opinion to the answers of separate individuals to questions on opinion polls (Splichal 2000). Charles Horton Cooley (1909) argued that this debased the notion of public opinion, which ought to be conceived as "no mere aggregate of individual opinions, but a genuine social product, a result of communication and reciprocal influence".

The public sphere matters most for democracy to the extent that it is able to identify and constitute agreement about the public good and motivate people to seek it together. On Habermas's account, public opinion matters because it is achieved by reasoned, critical debate. But how to ensure that communication would be rational and critical is unclear.

Hannah Arendt (1958) theorized 'public' in terms of creative action, the making of a world shared among citizens, and saw the founding of the United States as a crucial example. Habermas idealized eighteenth-century English parliamentarianism, newspapers, and coffee house conversation. He presented the public sphere as a realm of civil society in which private citizens could communicate openly about matters of public concern, transcending their particular statuses and addressing the state without becoming part of it. Such idealization commonly underwrites narratives of decline. In Habermas's classic Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, for example, nineteenth and twentieth-century public discourse is analyzed in terms of the loss of rational-critical capacity that followed the expansion of scale and the rise of public relations management that incorporated the public into the realm of administered society. Schudson (1998) has accordingly cautioned against such golden age concepts, arguing that the ideal of the good citizen as an active participant in the public sphere has long been contrasted with the failings of actual citizens. Walter Lippman (1922) famously argued that most of the time citizens failed to educate themselves in public debate, and the effusions of opinion called forth in times of excitement were not to be trusted. John Dewey (1927) defended the capacity for reason in large-scale communication, arguing that participating in public argument was itself educative. As Iris Marion Young (2000) argued, the inclusion of diverse people in public discourse is not only an entitlement of membership in a democratic polity but also a tool for improving the quality of that discourse. Yet Young also calls attention to the extent to which reliance on sophisticated reasoning in public debates privileges the sophisticated. And democratic participation in the public sphere is not only a matter of rational-critical argumentation but of opportunities to participate in shaping the formation of public culture. Debates and institutions are public in their substance insofar as they extend beyond the simple sum of private interests to the fabric of shared concerns and interdependent processes that enable citizens to live together and pursue common projects. The topic can be banal. Traffic regulations, for example, affect each of us in our private efforts to get from home to work or to a stadium for a sports event. Where we drive our cars is primarily a

matter of our private interests. But both the building of roads and the establishment of rules – including which side of the road to drive on – are matters of public interest. We cannot accomplish our private goals without public investments and public decisions; moreover, roads literally connect us to each-other. In a democracy therefore, speed limits, fuel efficiency, and pollution controls are not merely technical decisions for transportation experts; they are matters of debate among citizens. The same goes for the infrastructure of communication in electronic media - or for that matter whether to continue a war or create a national health-care system. In the nineteenth century, much political thought emphasized the fragility and limitations of the liberal democratic conception of the public. Tocqueville (1840, 1844), most famously, argued that the democratization of society tended to eliminate the intermediary public bodies that traditionally refined opinion and furnished individuals with a collective social identity outside the state. Engaged, politicized publics composed of distinct views and interests could be reshaped over time into mass publics—passive, conformist, and atomized before the state. Tocqueville's fear of the unmediated state would resonate with generations of critics of mass society. In a similar way, Arendt (1972: 232) suggested, also speaking of America, "since the country is too big for all of us to come together and determine our fate, we need a number of public spaces within it". This issue comes even more clearly into the forefront as one considers civil society and the public sphere on a transnational scale. The globalization of civil society has created both connections among distant people and issues that cannot be resolved readily in national public spheres. Much of this is a matter of market structures that are seldom subjected to collective choice. Flows of goods, information, and people often linked global cities as much to each-other as to their national hinterlands. More of public culture is transnational and more voluntary organizations purse transnational agendas. Yet national states retain most of the capacity to act on public concerns, and they remain crucial arenas in which public discourse can influence public power.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. What do you know about the Five Visions of Civil Society?

……

……

……

2. Discuss the Importance of the Public Sphere.

……

……

……

3. What do you know the Ideal of Publicness?

……

……

……

9.5 THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF HABERMAS'S INTEREST IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND REASON

Born outside Düsseldorf in 1929, Habermas came of age in postwar Germany. The Nuremberg Trials were a key formative moment that brought home to him the depth of Germany's moral and political failure under National Socialism. This experience was later reinforced when, as a graduate student interested in Heidegger's existentialism, he read the latter's reissued Introduction to Metaphysics, in which Heidegger had retained (or more accurately, reintroduced) an allusion to the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism (Heidegger 1959, 199). When Habermas (1953) publicly called for an explanation from Heidegger, the latter's silence confirmed Habermas's conviction that the German philosophical tradition had failed in its moment of reckoning, providing intellectuals with the resources neither to understand nor to criticize National Socialism. This negative experience of the relation between philosophy and politics subsequently motivated his search for conceptual resources from Anglo-American thought, particularly its pragmatic and democratic traditions. In moving outside the German tradition, Habermas

joined a number of young postwar intellectuals such as Karl-Otto Apel (for Habermas's autobiographical sketch, see 2005b, chap. 1; also Wiggershaus 2004).

Habermas completed his dissertation in 1954 at the University of Bonn, writing on the conflict between the absolute and history in Schelling's thought. He first gained serious public attention, at least in Germany, with the 1962 publication of his habilitation, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; English ed., 1989), a detailed social history of the development of the bourgeois public sphere from its origins in the 18th century salons up to its transformation through the influence of capital-driven mass media. In his description of the salons we clearly see his interest in a communicative ideal that later would provide the core normative standard for his moral-political theory: the idea of inclusive critical discussion, free of social and economic pressures, in which interlocutors treat each other as equals in a cooperative attempt to reach an understanding on matters of common concern. As an ideal at the center of bourgeois culture, this kind of interchange was probably never fully realized; nonetheless, it "was not mere ideology" (1989, 160, also 36). As these small discussion societies grew into mass publics in the 19th century, however, ideas became commodities, assimilated to the economics of mass media consumption. Rather than give up on the idea of public reason, Habermas called for a socioinstitutionally feasible concept of public opinion-formation "that is historically meaningful, that normatively meets the requirements of the social-welfare state, and that is theoretically clear and empirically identifiable." Such a concept "can be grounded only in the structural transformation of the public sphere itself and in the dimension of its development" (ibid., 244). His concluding sketch of such a concept (ibid., 244–48) already contains in outline the two-level model of democratic deliberation he later elaborates in his mature work on law and democracy, Between Facts and Norms (1996b; German ed., 1992b).

Habermas's interest in the political subsequently led him to a series of philosophical studies and critical-social analyses that eventually appeared in English in his Toward a Rational Society (1970) and Theory and Practice (1973b). Whereas the latter consists primarily of reflections on

the history of philosophy, the former represents an attempt to apply his emerging theory of rationality to the critical analysis of contemporary society, in particular the student protest movement and its institutional target, the authoritarian and technocratic structures that held sway in higher education and politics.

Habermas's critical reflection takes a nuanced approach to both sides of the social unrest that characterized the late sixties. Although sympathetic with students' demand for more democratic participation and hopeful that their activism harbored a potential for positive social transformation, he also did not hesitate to criticize its militant aspects, which he labeled self-delusory and "pernicious" (1970, 48). In his critique of technocracy—governance by scientific experts and bureaucracy—he relied on a philosophical framework that anticipates categories in his later thought, minus the philosophy of language he would work out in the 1970s. Specifically, Habermas sharply distinguished between two modes of action, "work" and "interaction," which correspond to enduring interests of the human species (ibid., chap. 6). The former includes modes of action based on the rational choice of efficient means, that is, forms of instrumental and strategic action, whereas the latter refers to forms of "communicative action" in which actors coordinate their behaviors on the basis of "consensual norms" (ibid., 91–92). Habermas's distinction in effect appropriates the classical Aristotelian contrast between techne and praxis for critical social theory (1973b, chap. 1). The result is a distinctively Habermasian critique of science and technology as ideology: by reducing practical questions about the good life to technical problems for experts, contemporary elites eliminate the need for public, democratic discussion of values, thereby depoliticizing the population (1970, chap. 6). The legitimate human interest in technical control of nature thus functions as an ideology—a screen that masks the value-laden character of government decisionmaking in the service of the capitalist status quo. Unlike Herbert Marcuse, who regarded that interest as specific to capitalist society, Habermas affirmed the technical control of nature as a genuinely universal species-interest; pace Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, the technical interest did not necessitate social domination.

Habermas defended this philosophical anthropology most fully in his Knowledge and Human Interests (1971b; German ed., 1968b), the work that represents his first attempt to provide a systematic framework for an interdisciplinary critical social theory. As Habermas conceived his task, he had to establish critical social theory as a respectable, distinct form of knowledge, in large measure through a methodological critique of the then-dominant positivist philosophy of science and historicist hermeneutics. He thus develops a theory of "knowledge-constitutive interests" that are tied both to "the natural history of the human species" and to "the imperatives of the socio-cultural form of life," but are not reducible to them (ibid., 168).

There are three knowledge-constitutive interests, each rooted in human existence and expressed in a particular type of scientific or scholarly inquiry. The first is the "technical interest," the "anthropologically deep-seated interest" we have in the prediction and control of the natural environment. This interest structures modes of inquiry and knowledge-production in the "empirical-analytic" sciences, that is, the natural sciences and types of social science that aim at testable general explanations (in contrast to the interpretive social sciences, which aim at cultural understanding, and the "normative-analytic" sciences, such as rational choice theory, which rely on formal modeling and deduction based on counterfactual axioms; see 1988a, 43ff). As a deep-seated structure constitutive of knowledge, the technical "interest" refers not to the motivations of scientists or specific disciplinary aims, but rather to a way of approaching nature and society as objects of possible knowledge: in tying knowledge-production to controlled observation and methodical experimentation, the empirical-analytic sciences deploy basic species-capacities to master the natural world via feedback-monitored instrumental action. To be sure, Habermas's analysis relies heavily on a hypothetico-deductive model that was in serious trouble even as he wrote. But his core idea is arguably broader in scope: the empirical-analytic sciences are distinguished by their treatment of the object domain as governed by predictable law-like regularities that allow for certain types of methodologically controlled techniques of inquiry that would be inappropriate for the interpretive sciences. Thus the technical

interest applies not only to sciences that promise technological benefits, but also to sciences like paleontology.

The interpretive, or cultural-hermeneutic sciences, rest on a second, equally deep-seated "practical interest" in securing and expanding possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life. These sciences presuppose and articulate modes of action-orienting (inter)personal understanding that operate within socio-cultural forms of life and the grammar of ordinary language. Human societies depend on such understanding, and the interpretive competences that go with it, just as much as they depend on mastering the natural environment. The hermeneutic sciences, then, bring methodical discipline to features of everyday interaction, and in that sense are on a par with the empirical-analytic sciences, which elevate everyday instrumental action to experimental method. By making these first two cognitive interests explicit, Habermas seeks to go beyond positivist accounts of the natural and social sciences. On his view, those accounts tend to ignore the role that deep-seated human interests play in the constitution of possible objects of inquiry.

In making cognitive interests explicit, Habermas also engages in a kind of critical self-reflection, more precisely a methodological reflection that aims to free science from its positivist illusions. Such reflection exemplifies the third cognitive interest, the emancipatory interest of reason in overcoming dogmatism, compulsion, and domination. For scientific expressions of this interest, he looked to Freudian psychology and a version of Marxist social theory. The status of the emancipatory interest, however, was problematic from the start, for it conflated two kinds of critical reflection. Whereas his critique of positivism and theory of cognitive interests involve reflective articulation of the formal structures of knowledge, Freudian and Marxist critique aim to unmask concrete cases of personal self-deception and social-political ideology (1973cd). Nor was it clear that psychoanalysis provided an apt model of liberatory reflection in any case, as critics pointed out how the asymmetries between patient and analyst could not represent the proper intersubjective form for emancipation. These and other deficits of his analysis posed a challenge for Habermas that would guide a decade-long

search for the normative and empirical basis of critique. Whatever the best path to the epistemic and normative basis for critique might be, it would have to pass a democratic test: that "in Enlightenment there are only participants" (1973b, 44). Habermas will not resolve this methodological issue until a series of transitional studies in the 1970s culminates in his mature systematic work, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984a/1987; German ed., 1981; hereafter cited as TCA).

That said, we can discern enduring features in Habermas's early attempt at a comprehensive model of social criticism. As a theory of rationality and knowledge, his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests is both pragmatic and pluralistic: pragmatic, inasmuch as human interests constitute knowledge; pluralistic, in that different forms of inquiry and knowledge emerge from different core interests. In Knowledge and Human Interests we can thus see the beginnings of a methodologically pluralistic approach to critical social theory, more on which below. Besides the problems described above, however, the analysis was hampered by a framework that still relied on motifs from a "philosophy of consciousness" fixated on the constitution of objects of possible experience—an approach that cannot do justice to the discursive dimensions of inquiry (1973cd; 2000; also Müller-Doohm 2000). In the 1970s Habermas set about a fundamental overhaul of his framework for critical theory (see McCarthy 1978).

9.6 IMPORTANT TRANSITIONAL WORKS

In the period between Knowledge and Human Interests and The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas began to develop a distinctive method for elaborating the relationship between a theoretical social science of modern societies, on the one hand, and the normative and philosophical basis for critique, on the other. Following Horkheimer's definition of Critical Theory, Habermas pursued three aims in his attempt to combine social science and philosophical analysis: it must be at once explanatory, practical, and normative. This meant that philosophy could not, as it did for Kant, become the sole basis for normative reflection.

Rather, Habermas argued, adequate critique requires a thoroughgoing cooperation between philosophy and social science. This sort of analysis is characteristic of Legitimation Crisis (1975; German ed., 1973e), in which Habermas analyzes the modern state as subject to endemic crises, which arise from the fact that the state cannot simultaneously meet the demands for rational problem solving, democracy, and cultural identity. Here the social science to which Habermas appeals is more sociological and functional. Similarly, in this work and in Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979), Habermas begins to develop a distinctive conception of rational reconstruction, which models societal development as a learning process. In these works, Habermas begins to incorporate the results of developmental psychology, which aligns stages of development with changes in the kinds of reasons that the maturing individual considers acceptable. Analogously, societies develop through similar changes in the rational basis of legitimacy on the collective level. At this point in his theorizing, Habermas's appropriation of the social sciences has become methodologically and theoretically pluralistic: on his view, a critical social theory is not distinctive in light of endorsing some particular theory or method but as uniting normative and empirical inquiry.

In this transitional phase from Knowledge and Human Interests to The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas's basic philosophical endeavor was to develop a more modest, fallibilist, empirical account of the philosophical claim to universality and rationality. This more modest approach moves Critical Theory away from its strong transcendental framework, exemplified in the theory of cognitive interests with the unmistakably Kantian language of object-constitution. In setting that earlier project aside, Habermas adopts a more naturalistic, "postmetaphysical" approach (1992a), characterized by the fallible hermeneutic explication or "reconstruction" of shared competences and normative presuppositions that allow actors to engage in familiar practices of communication, discourse, and inquiry. In articulating presuppositions of practice, reconstructive analysis remains weakly transcendental. But it also qualifies as a "weak naturalism" inasmuch as the practices it aims to articulate are consistent with the natural evolution

of the species and located in the empirical world (2003a, 10-30, 83ff); consequently, postmetaphysical reconstruction links up with specific forms of social-scientific knowledge in analyzing general conditions of rationality manifested in various human capacities and powers.

Habermas's encounter with speech act theory proved to be particularly decisive for this project. In speech act theory, he finds the basis for a conception of communicative competence (on the model of Chomsky's linguistic competence). Given this emphasis on language, Habermas is often said to have taken a kind of "linguistic turn" in this period. He framed his first essays on formal pragmatics (1976ab) as an alternative to Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. Habermas understands formal pragmatics as one of the "reconstructive sciences," which aim to render theoretically explicit the intuitive, pretheoretical know-how underlying such basic human competences as speaking and understanding, judging and acting. Unlike Kant's transcendental analysis of the conditions of rationality, reconstructive sciences yield knowledge that is not necessary but hypothetical, not a priori but empirical, not certain but fallible. They are nevertheless directed to invariant structures and conditions and raise universal, but defeasible claims to an account of practical reason.

With the turn to language and reconstructive science, Habermas undermines both of the traditional Kantian roles for philosophy: philosophy as the sole judge in normative matters and as the methodological authority that assigns the various domains of inquiry to their proper questions. In Habermas's view, philosophy must engage in a fully cooperative relationship with the social sciences and the empirical disciplines in general. This step is completed in The Theory of Communicative Action, to which we now turn.

9.7 MATURE POSITIONS

To understand Habermas's mature positions, we must start with his Theory of Communicative Action (TCA), a two-volume critical study of the theories of rationality that informed the classical sociologies of Weber, Durkheim, Parsons, and neo-Marxist critical theory (esp. Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno). In TCA we find Habermas's conception of the task of philosophy and its relation to the social sciences—a conception

that still guides much of his work. While TCA defends the emphasis on normativity and the universalist ambitions found in the philosophical tradition, it does so within a framework that includes particular sorts of empirical social research, with which philosophy must interact. Philosophers, that is, must cooperate with social scientists if they are to understand normative claims within the current historical context, the context of a complex, modern society that is characterized by social and systemic modes of integration. By recognizing both modes of integration, one avoids the pessimism associated with theories of modernity whose one-sided, primarily instrumental conception of rationality misses the cultural dimension of modernization.

9.7.1 The Theory of Communicative Action

Starting with Marx's historical materialism, large-scale macrosociological and historical theories have long been held to be the most appropriate explanatory basis for critical social science. However, such theories have two drawbacks for the critical project. First, comprehensiveness does not ensure explanatory power. Indeed, there are many such large-scale theories, each with their own distinctive and exemplary social phenomena that guide their attempt at unification. Second, a close examination of standard critical explanations, such as the theory of ideology, shows that such explanations typically appeal to a variety of different social theories (Bohman 1999). Habermas's actual employment of critical explanations bears this out. His criticism of modern societies turns on the explanation of the relationship between two very different theoretical terms: a micro-theory of rationality based on communicative coordination and a macro-theory of the systemic integration of modern societies through such mechanisms as the market (TCA, vol. 2). In concrete terms, this means that Habermas develops a two-level social theory that includes an analysis of communicative rationality, the rational potential built into everyday speech, on the one hand; and a theory of modern society and modernization, on the other (White 1989). On the basis of this theory, Habermas hopes to be able to assess the gains and losses of modernization and to overcome its one-sided version of rationalization.

Comprehensive critical theories make two problematic assumptions: that there is one preferred mode of critical explanation, and that there is one preferred goal of social criticism, namely a socialist society that fulfills the norm of human emancipation. Only with such a goal in the background does the two-step process of employing historical materialism to establish an epistemically and normatively independent stance make sense. The correctness or incorrectness of such a critical model depends not on its acceptance or rejection by its addressees, but on the adequacy of the theory to objective historical necessities or mechanisms (into which the critical theorist alleges to have superior insight). A pluralistic mode of critical inquiry suggests a different norm of correctness: that criticism must be verified by those participating in the practice and that this demand for practical verification is part of the process of inquiry itself.

Although Habermas's attitude toward these different modes of critical theory is somewhat ambivalent, he has given good reasons to accept the practical, pluralist approach. Just as in the analysis of modes of inquiry tied to distinct knowledge-constitutive interests, Habermas accepts that various theories and methods each have "a relative legitimacy." Indeed, like Dewey he goes so far as to argue that the logic of social explanation is pluralistic and eludes the "apparatus of general theories." In the absence of any such general theories, the most fruitful approach to social-scientific knowledge is to bring all the various methods and theories into relation to each other: "Whereas the natural and the cultural or hermeneutic sciences are capable of living in mutually indifferent, albeit more hostile than peaceful coexistence, the social sciences must bear the tension of divergent approaches under one roof" (1988a, 3). In TCA, Habermas casts critical social theory in a similarly pluralistic, yet unifying way. In discussing various accounts of societal modernization, for example, he argues that the main existing theories have their own "particular legitimacy" as developed lines of empirical research, and that Critical Theory takes on the task of critically unifying the various theories and their heterogeneous methods and presuppositions. "Critical social theory does not relate to established lines of research as a competitor; starting from its concept of the rise of modern societies, it

attempts to explain the specific limitations and the relative rights of those approaches" (TCA, 2: 375).

To achieve these theoretical and methodological ends, Habermas begins this task with a discussion of theories of rationality and offers his own distinctive definition of rationality, one that is epistemic, practical, and intersubjective. For Habermas, rationality consists not so much in the possession of particular knowledge, but rather in "how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge" (TCA, 1: 11). Any such account is "pragmatic" because it shares a number of distinctive features with other views that see interpreters as competent and knowledgeable agents. Most importantly, a pragmatic approach develops an account of practical knowledge in the "performative attitude," that is, from the point of view of a competent speaker. A theory of rationality thus attempts to reconstruct the practical knowledge necessary for being a knowledgeable social actor among other knowledgeable social actors. As already mentioned, Habermas's reconstruction attempts to articulate invariant structures of communication, and so qualifies as a "formal pragmatics."

What is the "performative attitude" that is to be reconstructed in such a theory? From a social-scientific point of view, language is a medium for coordinating action, although not the only such medium. The fundamental form of coordination through language, according to Habermas, requires speakers to adopt a practical stance oriented toward "reaching understanding," which he regards as the "inherent telos" of speech. When actors address one another with this sort of practical attitude, they engage in what Habermas calls "communicative action," which he distinguishes from strategic forms of social action. Because this distinction plays a fundamental role in TCA, it deserves some attention.

In strategic action, actors are not so much interested in mutual understanding as in achieving the individual goals they each bring to the situation. Actor A, for example, will thus appeal to B's desires and fears so as to motivate the behavior on B's part that is required for A's success. As reasons motivating B's cooperation, B's desires and fears are only contingently related to A's goals. B cooperates with A, in other words, not because B finds A's project inherently interesting or worthy, but because of what B gets out of the bargain: avoiding some threat that A

can make or obtaining something A has promised (which may be of inherent interest to B but for A is only a means of motivating B).

In communicative action, or what Habermas later came to call "strong communicative action" in "Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality" (1998b, chap. 7; German ed., 1999b), speakers coordinate their action and pursuit of individual (or joint) goals on the basis of a shared understanding that the goals are inherently reasonable or merit-worthy. Whereas strategic action succeeds insofar as the actors achieve their individual goals, communicative action succeeds insofar as the actors freely agree that their goal (or goals) is reasonable, that it merits cooperative behavior. Communicative action is thus an inherently consensual form of social coordination in which actors "mobilize the potential for rationality" given with ordinary language and its telos of rationally motivated agreement.

To support his conception of communication action, Habermas must specify the mechanism that makes rationally motivated agreement possible. Toward that end, he argues for a particular account of utterance meaning as based on "acceptability conditions," by analogy to the truth-conditional account of the meaning of sentences. But rather than linking meaning with representational semantics, Habermas takes a pragmatic approach, analyzing the conditions for the illocutionary success of the speech act. According to the core principle of his pragmatic theory of meaning, "we understand a speech act when we know the kinds of reasons that a speaker could provide in order to convince a hearer that he is entitled in the given circumstances to claim validity for his utterance—in short, when we know what makes it acceptable" (1998b, 232). With this principle, Habermas ties the meaning of speech acts to the practice of reason giving: speech acts inherently involve claims that are in need of reasons—claims that are open to both criticism and justification. In our everyday speech (and in much of our action), speakers tacitly commit themselves to explaining and justifying themselves, if necessary. To understand what one is doing in making a speech act, therefore, one must have some sense of the appropriate response that would justify one's speech act, were one challenged to do so. A speech act succeeds in reaching understanding when the hearer takes up "an affirmative

position" toward the claim made by the speaker (TCA 1: 95–97; 282; 297). In doing so, the hearer presumes that the claims in the speech act could be supported by good reasons (even if she has not asked for them). When the offer made by the speaker fails to receive uptake, speaker and hearer may shift reflexive levels, from ordinary speech to "discourse"—processes of argumentation and dialogue in which the claims implicit in the speech act are tested for their rational justifiability as true, correct or authentic. Thus the rationality of communicative action is tied to the rationality of discourse, more on which in section 3.2.

What are these claims that are open to criticism and justification? In opposition to the positivist fixation on fact-stating modes of discourse, Habermas does not limit intersubjectively valid, or justifiable, claims to the category of empirical truth, but instead recognizes a spectrum of "validity claims" that also includes, at the least, claims to moral rightness, ethical goodness or authenticity, personal sincerity, and aesthetic value (TCA 1: 8–23; 1993, chap. 1). Although Habermas does not consider such claims to represent a mind-independent world in the manner of empirical truth claims, they can be both publicly criticized as unjustifiable and defended by publicly convincing arguments. To this extent, validity involves a notion of correctness analogous to the idea of truth. In this context, the phrase "validity claim," as a translation of the German term Geltungsanspruch, does not have the narrow logical sense (truth-preserving argument forms), but rather connotes a richer social idea—that a claim (statement) merits the addressee's acceptance because it is justified or true in some sense, which can vary according to the sphere of validity and dialogical context.

By linking meaning with the acceptability of speech acts, Habermas moves the analysis beyond a narrow focus on the truth-conditional semantics of representation to the social intelligibility of interaction. The complexity of social interaction then allows him to find three basic validity claims potentially at stake in any speech act used for cooperative purposes (i.e., in strong communicative action). His argument relies on three "world relations" that are potentially involved in strongly communicative acts in which a speaker intends to say something to someone about something (TCA 1: 275ff). For example, a constative

(fact-stating) speech act (a) expresses an inner world (an intention to communicate a belief); (b) establishes a communicative relation with a hearer (and thus relates to a social world, specifically one in which both persons share a piece of information, and know they do); and (c) attempts to represent the external world. This triadic structure suggests that many speech acts, including non-constatives, involve a set of tacit validity claims: the claim that the speech act is sincere (non-deceptive), is socially appropriate or right, and is factually true (or more broadly: representationally adequate). Conversely, speech acts can be criticized for failing on one or more of these scores. Thus fully successful speech acts, insofar as they involve these three world relations, must satisfy the demands connected with these three basic validity claims (sincerity, rightness, and truth) in order to be acceptable.

We can think of strong communicative action in the above sense as defining the end of a spectrum of communicative possibilities. At that end, social cooperation is both deeply consensual and reasonable: actors sincerely agree that their modes of cooperation can be justified as good, right, and free of empirical error. Given the difficulties of maintaining such deep consensus, however, it makes sense, particularly in complex, pluralistic societies, to relax these communicative demands for specified types of situations, allowing for weaker forms of communicative action (in which not all three types of validity claims are at stake) or strategic action (in which actors understand that everyone is oriented toward individual success).

Habermas distinguishes the "system" as those predefined situations, or modes of coordination, in which the demands of communicative action are relaxed in this way, within legally specified limits. The prime examples of systemic coordination are markets and bureaucracies. In these systemically structured contexts, nonlinguistic media take up the slack in coordinating actions, which proceeds on the basis of money and institutional power—these media do the talking, as it were, thus relieving actors of the demands of strongly communicative action. The term "lifeworld," by contrast, refers to domains of action in which consensual modes of action coordination predominate. In fact, the distinction between lifeworld and system is better understood as an analytic one that

identifies different aspects of social interaction and cooperation (1991b). "Lifeworld" then refers to the background resources, contexts, and dimensions of social action that enable actors to cooperate on the basis of mutual understanding: shared cultural systems of meaning, institutional orders that stabilize patterns of action, and personality structures acquired in family, church, neighborhood, and school (TCA 1: chap. 6; 1998b, chap. 4).

Habermas's system-lifeworld distinction has been criticized from a number of perspectives. Some have argued that the distinction oversimplifies the interpenetrating dynamics of social institutions (e.g., McCarthy 1991, 152–80). Others attacked the distinction as covertly ideological, concealing forms of patriarchal and economic domination (e.g., Fraser 1985). Habermas's attempt to clarify the analytic character of the distinction only goes partway toward answering these criticisms (1991b).

TCA has also encountered rather heavy weather as a theory of meaning. In the analytic philosophy of language, one of the standard requirements is to account for the compositionality of language, the fact that a finite set of words can be used to form an indefinite number of sentences. From that perspective, Habermas's theory falls short (Heath 2001, chap. 3). But perhaps we would do better to assess Habermas's theory of meaning from a different perspective. The compositionality requirement is important if one wants to explain grammatical competence. But early on Habermas (1976b) expressed a greater interest in explaining communicative, rather than grammatical, competence: the ability of speakers to use grammatically well-formed sentences in social contexts. Although Habermas often presents his pragmatics as a further development in analytic theories of meaning, his analysis focuses primarily on the context-sensitive acceptability of speech acts: acceptability conditions as a function of formal features that distinguish different speech situations. This suggests his theory of meaning involves a quite different sort of project: to articulate the "validity basis" of social order.

The significance of this conception of reaching understanding and of rationally motivated agreement can also be seen by contrasting this account with other conceptions of understanding and interpretation, such

as Gadamer's hermeneutics. Given Habermas's conception of speech acts and their relation to validity claims, it is not surprising that he argues that "communicative actions always require interpretations that are rational in approach" (TCA 1: 106), that is, ones that are made in the performative attitude by an interpreter. In general, Habermas agrees with hermeneutics that the whole domain of the social sciences is accessible only through interpretation, precisely because processes of reaching understanding already at work in the social sciences have antecedently constituted them (ibid., 107). But he draws a distinctive conclusion. Although social scientists are not actors, they must employ their own pretheoretical knowledge to gain interpretive access through communicative experience. As a "virtual participant," the social scientist must take a position on the claims made by those he observes: he has access through communicative experience only "under the presupposition that he judges the agreement and disagreement, the validity claims and potential reasons with which he is confronted" (ibid., 116). There is then no disjunction between the attitude of the critic and the interpreter as reflective participants. Social scientists may withhold judgments, but only at the cost of impoverishing their interpretation and putting out of play their pretheoretical, practical knowledge that they have in common with others who are able to reach understanding. Thus, various forms of rationality become essential to the social sciences, because of the nature of the social domain.

Objecting to Habermas's line of argument, McCarthy and others have argued that it is not a necessary condition that interpreters take a position in order to understand reasons, even if we have to rely on our own competence to judge the validity and soundness of reasons and to identify them as reasons at all. Nonetheless, Habermas uses this conception in his social theory of modernity to show the ways in which modern culture has unleashed communicative rationality from its previous cultural and ideological constraints. In modern societies, social norms are no longer presumed to be valid but rather are subjected to critical reflection, as for example when the ethical life of a specific culture is criticized from the standpoint of justice. In a sense consistent with the Enlightenment imperative to use one's own reason, the everyday

"lifeworld" of social experience has been rationalized, especially in the form of discourses that institutionalize reflective communicative action, as in scientific and democratic institutions.

The rationalization of the lifeworld in Western modernity went hand-in-hand with the growth of systemic mechanisms of coordination already mentioned above, in which the demands on fully communicative consensus are relaxed. If large and complex modern societies can no longer be integrated solely on the basis of shared cultural values and norms, new nonintentional mechanisms of coordination must emerge, which take the form of nonlinguistic media of money and power. For example, markets coordinate the collective production and distribution of goods nonintentionally, even if they are grounded in cultural and political institutions such as firms and states. Modernization can become pathological, as when money and power "colonize the lifeworld" and displace communicative forms of solidarity and inhibit the reproduction of the lifeworld (e.g., when universities become governed by market strategies). "Juridification" is another such pathological form, when law comes to invade more and more areas of social life, turning citizens into clients of bureaucracies with what Foucault might call "normalizing" effects. This aspect of TCA has less of an impact on Habermas's current work, which returns to the theme of improving democratic practice as a means of counteracting juridification and colonization. Democratic institutions, if properly designed and robustly executed, are supposed to ensure that the law does not take this pathological form but is subject to the deliberation of citizens, who thus author the laws to which they are subject (see sec. 3.4).

After TCA, then, Habermas begins to see law not as part of the problem, but as part of the solution, once he offers a more complete discourse-theoretical account of law and democracy. Nonetheless the theory of modernity still remains in his continued use of systems theory and its understanding of nonintentional integration. By insisting upon popular sovereignty as the outcome of the generation of "communicative power" in the public sphere, Habermas tries to save the substance of radical democracy. The unresolved difficulty is that in a complex society, as Habermas asserts, "public opinion does not rule" but rather points

administrative power in particular directions; or, as he puts it, it does not "steer" but "countersteers" institutional complexity (1996b, chapter 8). That is, citizens do not control social processes; they exercise influence through particular institutionalized mechanisms and channels of communication. However successful democracy is in creating legitimacy, it cannot gain full control over large-scale complex societies, nor even of the necessary conditions for its own realization. In this sense, Habermas's emphasis on the limiting effect of complexity on democracy and his rejection of a fully democratic form of sociation continue the basic argument of the necessity of systems integration, even with its costs. Radical democracy may no longer be the only means to social transformation, though it is clear that it remains "the unfinished project of modernity": realizing and transforming democracy is still a genuine goal even for complex and globalizing societies.

9.7.2 Habermas's Discourse Theory

Habermas's theory of communicative action rests on the idea that social order ultimately depends on the capacity of actors to recognize the intersubjective validity of the different claims on which social cooperation depends. In conceiving cooperation in relation to validity claims, Habermas highlights its rational and cognitive character: to recognize the validity of such claims is to presume that good reasons could be given to justify them in the face of criticism. TCA thus points to and depends on an account of such justification—that is, on a theory of argumentation or discourse, which Habermas calls the "reflective form" of communicative action.

As mentioned above, Habermas proposes a multi-dimensional conception of reason that expresses itself in different forms of cognitive validity: not only in truth claims about the empirical world, but also in rightness claims about the kind of treatment we owe each other as persons, authenticity claims about the good life, technical-pragmatic claims about the means suitable to different goals, and so on. As he acknowledges, the surface grammar of speech acts does not suffice to establish this range of validity types. Rather, to ground the multi-dimensional system of validity claims, one must supplement semantic

analysis with a pragmatic analysis of the different sorts of argumentative discourse—the different "logics of argumentation"—through which each type can be intersubjectively justified (TCA 1: 8–42). Thus, a type of validity claim counts as distinct from other types only if one can establish that its discursive justification involves features that distinguish it from other types of justification. Whether or not his pragmatic theory of meaning succeeds, the discursive analysis of validity illuminates important differences in the argumentative demands that come with different types of justifiable claims. To see how Habermas identifies these different features, it is first necessary to understand the general structures of argumentation.

The pragmatic analysis of argumentation in general. Habermas's discourse theory assumes that the specific type of validity claim one aims to justify—the cognitive goal or topic of argumentation—determines the specific argumentative practices appropriate for such justification. Discourse theory thus calls for a pragmatic analysis of argumentation as a social practice. Such analysis aims to reconstruct the normative presuppositions that structure the discourse of competent arguers. To get at these presuppositions, one cannot simply describe argumentation as it empirically occurs; as we already saw in TCA, one must adopt the performative attitude of a participant and articulate the shared, though often tacit, ideals and rules that provide the basis for regarding some arguments as better than others. Following contemporary argumentation theorists, Habermas assumes one cannot fully articulate these normative presuppositions solely in terms of the logical properties of arguments. Rather, he distinguishes three aspects of argument-making practices: argument as product, as procedure, and as process, which he loosely aligns with the traditional perspectives on argument evaluation of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric. Pragmatically, each of these perspectives functions as a "level of presupposition" involved in the assessment of the cogency—the goodness or strength—of arguments. Habermas seems to regard these perspectives, taken together, as constituting the pragmatic idea of cogency: "at no single one of these analytic levels can the very idea intrinsic to argumentative speech be adequately developed" (TCA 1: 26).

At the logical level, participants are concerned with arguments as products, that is, sets of reasons that support conclusions. From this perspective, arguers aim to construct "cogent arguments that are convincing in virtue of their intrinsic properties and with which validity claims can be redeemed or rejected" (ibid., 25). Following work by Stephen Toulmin and other informal logicians, Habermas regards most if not all argumentation as ultimately resting on ampliative arguments whose conclusions do not follow with deductive certainty but only as more or less plausible or probable. The logical strength of such arguments depends on how well one has taken into account all the relevant information and possible objections. Thus the term "logical" has a broad sense that includes not only formal but also informal logics, in which strength depends on the interrelated meanings of terms and background information that resists complete formalization: induction, analogy, narrative, and so on.

Given the ampliative character of most arguments, logical assessment presupposes the dialectical adequacy of argumentative procedures. That is, we may regard the products of our argument-making practices as logically strong only if we presume, at the dialectical level, that we have submitted arguments and counterarguments to sufficiently severe procedures of critical discussion—as Habermas (TCA 1: 26) puts it, a "ritualized competition for the better arguments." Dialectical treatments of argumentation typically spell out the "dialectical obligations" of discussants: that one should address the issue at hand, should respond to relevant challenges, meet the specified burden of proof, and so on.

However, robust critical testing of competing arguments depends in turn on the rhetorical quality of the persuasive process. Habermas conceives the rhetorical level in terms of highly idealized properties of communication, which he initially presented as the conditions of an "ideal speech situation" (1973a; also 1971/2001). That way of speaking now strikes him as overly reified, suggesting an ideal condition that real discourses must measure up to, or at least approximately satisfy—motifs that Habermas himself employed until rather recently (cf. 1993, 54–55; 1996b, 322–23). He now understands the idea of rhetorically adequate

process as a set of unavoidable yet counterfactual "pragmatic presuppositions" that participants must make if they are to regard the actual execution of dialectical procedures as a sufficiently severe critical test. Habermas (2005b, 89) identifies four such presuppositions as the most important: (i) no one capable of making a relevant contribution has been excluded, (ii) participants have equal voice, (iii) they are internally free to speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and (iv) there are no sources of coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse. Such conditions, in effect, articulate what it would mean to assess all the relevant information and arguments (for a given level of knowledge and inquiry) as reasonably as possible, weighing arguments purely on the merits in a disinterested pursuit of truth. These conditions are counterfactual in the sense that actual discourses can rarely realize—and can never empirically certify—full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality. At the same time, these idealizing presuppositions have an operative effect on actual discourse: we may regard outcomes (both consensual and non-consensual) as reasonable only if our scrutiny of the process does not uncover obvious exclusions, suppression of arguments, manipulation, self-deception, and the like (2003a, 108). In this sense, these pragmatic idealizations function as "standards for a self-correcting learning process" (2005b, 91).

As an understanding of the rhetorical perspective, Habermas's highly idealized and formal model hardly does justice to the substantive richness of the rhetorical tradition. One can, however, supplement his model with a more substantive rhetoric that draws on Aristotle's account of ethos and pathos (Rehg 1997). In that case, the rhetorical perspective is concerned with designing arguments for their ability to place the particular audience in the proper social-psychological space for making a responsible collective judgment. Yet the "space of responsible judgment" still remains an idealization that may not be reduced to any observable actual behavior, but can at most be defeasibly presumed. The same probably holds for dialectical procedures. Although the dialectical perspective draws on the tradition of public debate, dialectical norms, when understood as pragmatic presuppositions, are not identical with institutionalized rules of debate (1990a, 91). A neutral observer can

judge whether interlocutors have externally complied with institutional procedures, whereas engaged participants must judge how well they have satisfied the dialectical presupposition of severe critical testing.

The differentiation of argumentative discourses. If the different validity claims require different types of argumentation, then the relevant differences must emerge through a closer analysis of the ways the above aspects of argumentative practice adjust to different sorts of content, that is, the different validity claims at issue (cf. 2008, chap. 3). To be sure, Habermas does not regard every validity claim as open to discourse proper. Sincerity claims (or "truthfulness claims," as it is sometimes translated) are the prime example. These are claims an actor makes about his or her interior subjectivity: feelings, moods, desires, beliefs, and the like. Such claims are open to rational assessment, not in discourse but by comparison with the actor's behavior: for example, if a son claims to care deeply about his parents but never pays them any attention, we would have grounds for doubting the sincerity of his claim. Note that such insincerity might involve self-deception rather than deliberate lying.

Truth and rightness claims, by contrast, are susceptible to argumentative justification in the proper sense, through what Habermas calls "strict discourses." As he first analyzed the discourses connected with these two types of validity (1973a), they had much in common. Although the types of reasons differed—moral discourse rested primarily on need interpretations, empirical-theoretical discourse on empirical inductions—in both cases, the relevant reasons should, in principle, be acceptable to any reasonable agent. In the case of empirical truth claims, this process-level presupposition of consensus rests on the idea that the objective world is the same for all; in the case of moral rightness, it rests on the idea that valid moral rules and principles hold for all persons. In both cases, the appropriate audience for the testing of claims is universal, and in making a truth or rightness claim one counterfactually presupposes that a universal consensus would result, were the participants able to pursue a sufficiently inclusive and reasonable discourse for a sufficient length of time. Although his early statements are somewhat unclear, on one reading Habermas defined not only moral rightness but also empirical truth in terms of such ideal consensus (similar to C. S. Peirce).

He now further distinguishes truth from moral rightness by defining the latter, but not the former, in terms of idealized consensus. More on that below.

Authenticity claims, unlike truth and rightness claims, do not come with such a strong consensual expectation. Habermas associates this type of claim with "ethical" discourse. Unlike moral discourse, in which participants strive to justify norms and courses of action that accord due concern and respect for persons in general, ethical discourses focus on questions of the good life, either for a given individual ("ethical-existential" discourse) or for a particular group or polity ("ethical-political" discourse). Consequently, the kind of reasons that constitute cogent arguments in ethical discourse depend on the life histories, traditions, and particular values of those whose good is at issue. This reference to individual- and group-related particularities means that one should not expect those reasons to win universal consensus (1993, 1–18; 1996b, 162–68). However, Habermas (2003b) seems to recognize one class of ethical questions that do admit of universal consensus. Choices of technologies that bear on the future of human nature, such as genetic enhancement engineering, pose species-wide ethical issues. Such issues concern not merely our self-understanding as members of this or that particular culture or tradition, but how we should understand our basic human dignity. In his view, the core of human dignity, and thus the basis for a human-species ethics, lies in the capacity of human beings for autonomous self-determination.

In sum, Habermas's discourse theory aligns different types of validity claim with different types of justificatory discourse. At the logical level, cogent arguments must employ somewhat different sorts of reasons to justify different types of claims. Although some sorts of reasons might enter into each type of discourse (e.g., empirical claims), the set of relevant considerations that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for making logically strong arguments will differ. Thus, claims about what human beings need are relevant reasons in moral arguments about welfare obligations, but not for supporting the truth claim that quarks exist. At the dialectical level, one must meet different burdens of proof by answering different types of challenges. For example, in

defending the ethical authenticity of Tom's pursuit of a career in medicine, one need not show that medicine is a career everyone must follow, but only that such a career makes sense, given Tom's personal background, talents, and desires. One can also examine Tom's career choice from a moral perspective, but in that case one need only show that anyone in his circumstances is morally permitted to pursue medicine. At the rhetorical level, finally, the scope and depth of agreement differs according to the type of claim. Moral rightness claims and empirical truth claims are justified by reasons that should be acceptable to a universal audience, whereas ethical claims are addressed to those who share a particular history and tradition of values.

Having differentiated types of discourse, Habermas must say something about how they interrelate. Clearly, some discourses depend on other types: most obviously, moral and ethical discourses partly depend on empirical claims, and thus depend on the outcome of empirical discourses about the circumstances and consequences of behavioral rules and the collective pursuit of the good life. The question of interrelationship becomes especially urgent in the political sphere, where different discourses intertwine and lead to competing conclusions, or when issues arise in which discourse types cannot be cleanly separated, so that the standards of cogency become obscure or deeply contested (McCarthy 1991, chap. 7; 1998). Because Habermas (1996c, 1534f) rejects the idea of a metadiscourse that sorts out these boundary issues, he must answer this challenge in his democratic theory. Before taking up that topic, Habermas's theory of truth deserves a closer look.

9.7.3 Habermas's Theory of Truth and Knowledge

In his various essays on empirical truth, Habermas usually regards propositions as the truth-bearer: in making an assertion, “I am claiming that the proposition [Aussage] that I am asserting is true” (1971/2001, 86; cf. 2003a, 249ff). In his early treatment, however, he immediately equated empirical truth with ideal justifiability—the consensus theory of truth mentioned above. According to that theory, the “truth condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others”; thus “the universal-pragmatic meaning of truth…is determined by the demand of reaching a

rational consensus" (1971/2001, 89; cf. 86). Such formulations suggest that Habermas equated the meaning of truth with the outcome of a universal, rational consensus, which he understood in reference to the ideal speech situation (ibid., 97–98). However, he soon saw the difficulties with consensus theory, and he never allowed "Wahrheitstheorien" (1973a), his main essay on the consensus theory of truth, to appear in English. Like the "epistemic" theories of truth that link truth with ideal warranted assertibility (e.g., Hilary Putnam, Crispin Wright), consensus theory downplays the justification-transcendent character of truth (2003a, 250–52).

Habermas now proposes instead a "pragmatic epistemological realism" (2003a, 7; 1998b, chap. 8). His theory of truth is realist in holding that the objective world, rather than ideal consensus, is the truth-maker. If a proposition (or sentence, statement) for which we claim truth is indeed true, it is so because it accurately refers to existing objects, or accurately represents actual states of affairs—albeit objects and states of affairs about which we can state facts only under descriptions that depend on our linguistic resources. The inescapability of language dictates the pragmatic epistemological character of his realism. Specifically, Habermas eschews the attempt to explicate the relationship between proposition and world metaphysically (e.g., as in correspondence theories). Rather, he explicates the meaning of accurate representation pragmatically, in terms of its implications for everyday practice and discourse. Insofar as we take propositional contents as unproblematically true in our daily practical engagement with reality, we act confidently on the basis of well-corroborated beliefs about objects in the world. What Habermas (1971/2001, 94; TCA 1: 23) calls "theoretico-empirical" or "theoretical" discourse becomes necessary when beliefs lose their unproblematic status as the result of practical difficulties, or when novel circumstances pose questions about the natural world. Such cases call for an empirical inquiry in which truth claims about the world are submitted to critical testing. Although Habermas tends to sharply separate action and discourse, it seems more plausible to regard such critical testing as combining discourse with experimental actions—as we see in scientific

inquiry, which combines empirical arguments with practical actions, that is, field studies and laboratory experimentation.

To date Habermas has not drawn out the implications of his discourse theory for a detailed account of truth-oriented discourses, which we find most highly developed in the sciences (but see Rehg 2009, chaps. 4–6). As an argumentation theory, such an account would probably have to take the following broad lines: at the logical level, the discursive justification of problematic truth claims heavily relies on empirical reasons: observation reports, results of experimental tests, and the like. Similarly for the dialectical level: the chief challenges arise from theories and observations that seemingly conflict with the claim at issue or with its supporting reasons. At the rhetorical level, one seeks the agreement of a potentially universal audience, given that truth claims are about an objective world that is the same for all human beings. This sketch, however, leaves out precisely the details that would make a discourse theory of science interesting. For example, how do epistemic and aesthetic values (scope, accuracy, simplicity, etc.) affect the logical construction of scientific arguments? Must not the presupposition of a universal audience be attenuated, given that scientists investigate aspects of the world (e.g., subatomic particles) that are inaccessible to all but a small group of trained experts? How does the cogency of scientific arguments depend on or involve various institutional structures and mechanisms, such as peer review, assignment of credit, distribution of grant money, and so on?

9.7.4 Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality, Politics, and Law

Habermas's two enduring interests in political theory and rationality come together in his discourse theory of deliberative democracy. There we see him struggling to show how his highly idealized, multi-dimensional discourse theory has real institutional purchase in complex, modern societies. In that context, argumentation appears in the form of public discussion and debate over practical questions that confront political bodies. The challenge, then, is to show how an idealized model

of practical discourse connects with real institutional contexts of decision-making.

Habermas summarizes his idealized conception of practical discourse in the "discourse principle" (D), which we might state as follows: A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse. Although he first understood (D) as a principle of moral discourse, he now positions it as an overarching principle of impartial justification that holds for all types of practical discourse (cf. 1990a, 66, 93; 1996b, 107). As such, it simply summarizes his argumentation theory for any question involving the various "employments of practical reason" (1993, chap. 1). (D) thus applies not only to moral rightness and ethical authenticity, but also to the justification of technical-pragmatic claims about the choice of effective means for achieving a given end. Each type of practical discourse then involves a further specification of (D) for the content at issue. In developing his democratic theory, Habermas has been especially concerned with two such specifications: moral discourse and legal-political discourse. In distinguishing these two types of discourse, Habermas tackles the traditional problem of the relationship between law and morality. He also shows how to bring ethereal discursive idealizations down to institutional earth. We start with his account of moral discourse.

Habermas's discourse ethics. Habermas's discourse theory of morality generally goes by the name "discourse ethics," a somewhat misleading label given that "ethics" has a distinct non-moral sense for him, as noted above. The idea of a discourse ethics was anticipated by G. H. Mead (1962, 379–89) and has been pursued by a number of philosophers (e.g., see Apel 1990, Benhabib 1992; Wingert 1993; Forst 2012). Habermas's version is heavily indebted to the Kantian tradition. Like Kant, he considers morality a matter of unconditional moral obligations: the prohibitions, positive obligations, and permissions that regulate interaction among persons. The task of moral theory is to reconstruct the unconditional force of such obligations as impartial dictates of practical reason that hold for any similarly situated agent. Also like Kant, Habermas links morality with respect for autonomous agency: in

following the dictates of impartial reason, one follows one's own conscience and shows respect for other such agents. Unlike Kant, however, Habermas takes a dialogical approach to practical reason, as his discourse theory requires. Kant assumed that in principle each mature, reflective individual, guided by the Categorical Imperative, could reach the same conclusions about what duty requires. This assumption has long been recognized as problematic, but in pluralistic and multicultural settings it becomes entirely untenable: one may plausibly claim to take an impartial moral point of view only by engaging in real discourse with all those affected by the issue in question.

Habermas's (D)-Principle articulates this dialogical requirement. If one assumes this requirement, then one can arrive at Habermas's specific conception of reasonable moral discourse by working out the implications of his argumentation theory for the discursive testing of unconditional moral obligations. What one gets is a dialogical principle of universalization (U): "A [moral norm] is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion" (i.e., in a sufficiently reasonable discourse) (1998a, 42; trans. amended). Habermas maintains that (U) can be deduced from statements articulating the pragmatic implications of argumentative discourse over moral norms (1990a, 86–93; 1998a, 39–45). More precisely, a successful deduction probably depends on three assumptions: (D), a statement of the semantics of unconditional norms, and an articulation of the pragmatics of discourse (Rehg 2011; cf. Ott 2004). If we accept (D) and if we accept Habermas's explication of the rhetorical presuppositions of the discursive justification required by (D), then (U) would have to follow as an implication of what is required for discursively justifying norms with the specific content of moral norms, namely obligations that bind persons in general and whose acceptance thus affects each person's pursuit of interests and the good life. From the standpoint of argumentation theory, (U) seems to state the burden of proof that structures an adequate process and procedure of justification.

Notes

The (U)-Principle assumes that valid moral rules or norms allow for an egalitarian community of autonomous agents—as Kant put it, a "systematic union of different rational beings" governed by "common laws" (1785, Ak. 433; also 431). However, the (U)-Principle has been a site of controversy among discourse theorists, and not everyone considers it necessary for a discourse ethics (Benhabib and Dallmayr 1990; Wellmer 1991; Gottschalk-Mazouz 2000). Some feminist proponents of an "ethics of care" have worried that Habermas's neo-Kantian model of universalization screens out morally relevant particularities of concrete situations and persons (Young 1990; Benhabib 1992, chap. 5).

Whether or not the argument for (U) goes through, Habermas's discourse ethics depends on some very strong assumptions about the capacity of persons for moral dialogue. Given that his discourse theory in general, and thus (U) in particular, rests on counterfactual idealizations, one might be tempted to regard (U) as a hypothetical thought experiment, analogous to what we find in other neo-Kantian or contractualist theories like those of John Rawls and T. M. Scanlon. To some extent this is correct: to regard a moral norm as valid, one must presume it would hold up in a fully inclusive and reasonable discourse. But Habermas takes a further step, insisting that (U) is a principle of real discourse: an individual's moral judgment counts as fully reasonable only if it issues from participation in actual discourse with all those affected. Moreover, (U) requires not simply that one seek the input of others in forming one's conscience, but that one gain their reasonable agreement.

To bring such strong idealizations down to earth, one must connect them with conscientious judgment in everyday moral practice. One way to do this is through an account of the appropriate application of moral rules in concrete circumstances. In response to ethics-of-care objections (and following Günther 1993), Habermas has acknowledged the need for such an account (1993, 35–39). In moral discourses of application, one must test alternative normative interpretations of the particular situation for their acceptability before the limited audience of those immediately involved, on the assumption that one is applying valid general norms. But even at the level of application, discourse cannot always include all

the affected parties (e.g., when the issue concerns the fate of a comatose patient). Habermas's discourse ethics thus implies that for many, if not most, of our moral rules and choices, the best we can achieve are partial justifications: arguments that are not conclusively convincing for all, but also are not conclusively defeated, in limited discourses with interlocutors we regard as reasonable (cf. Rehg 2003, 2004).

Habermas has also attempted to give discourse ethics some empirical foothold by looking to moral psychology and social anthropology (1990a, 116–94). The psychological line of argument draws on the theory of communicative action to reconstruct theories of moral development such as Lawrence Kohlberg's. According to Habermas, moral maturation involves the growing ability to integrate the interpersonal perspectives given with the system of personal pronouns; the endpoint of that process coincides with the capacity to engage in the mutual perspective-taking required by (U). The anthropological line of argument focuses on identity formation, drawing on the social psychology of G. H. Mead. In broad agreement with Hegelian models of mutual recognition, Mead understands the individual's development of a stable personal identity as inextricably bound up with processes of socialization that depend on participation in relationships of mutual recognition. Habermas extends this analysis to respond to feminist and communitarian criticisms of impartialist, justice-based moralities (ibid., 195–215; 1990b). Such moralities, critics allege, assume an implausibly atomistic view of the self. Thus they fail to appreciate the moral import of particularity and cultural substance: particular relationships between unique individuals, on the one hand, and membership in particular cultural communities or traditions, on the other (for feminist critiques, see Benhabib 1992; Meehan 1995; for a communitarian argument, see Taylor 1989). Mead's analysis shows that the critics are on to an important point: if individuation depends on socialization, then any anthropologically viable system of morality must protect not only the integrity of individuals but also the web of relationships and cultural forms of life on which individuals depend for their moral development. Discourse ethics, Habermas claims, meets this two-fold demand in virtue of the kind of mutual perspective-taking it requires. If we examine (U),

we see that it requires participants to attend to the values and interests of each person as a unique individual; conversely, each individual conditions her judgment about the moral import of her values and interests on what all participants can freely accept. Consequently, moral discourse is structured in a way that links moral validity with solidaristic concern for both the concrete individual and the morally formative communities on which her identity depends.

These arguments are certainly ambitious, and they raise as many questions as they answer. It is hardly surprising, then, that many commentators have not been persuaded by discourse ethics as a normative ethics. Rather, they regard it as plausible only in the context of democratic politics, or as a model for the critical evaluation of formal dialogues (e.g., environmental conflict resolution, medical ethics committees, and the like). Other critics have targeted discourse ethics at a metaethical level. In fact, Habermas first unveiled his moral theory in answer to moral non-cognitivism and skepticism (1990a, 43–115). In this context, (U) explicates a moral epistemology: what it means for moral statements to count as justified. If moral statements are justifiable, then they have a cognitive character in the sense that they are correct or not depending on how they fare in reasonable discourse. However, Habermas proposes (U) not merely as articulating a consensus model of moral justification, but as an explication of the meaning of rightness itself. Unlike truth, the rightness of a moral norm does not consist in reference to an independently existing realm of objects, but rather in the worthiness of the norm for intersubjective recognition. Thus rightness, unlike truth, means ideal warranted assertibility (2005b, 93; 2003a, chap. 6). This antirealist interpretation of discourse ethics has been challenged, however, with some critics advocating a realist interpretation of rightness, others a deflationary approach (Lafont 1999, chap. 7; Heath 1998).

Habermas's discourse theory of law and politics. The central task of Habermas's democratic theory is to provide a normative account of legitimate law. His deliberative democratic model rests on what is perhaps the most complex argument in his philosophical corpus, found in his Between Facts and Norms (1996b; German ed., 1992b; for

commentary, see Baynes 1995; Rosenfeld and Arato 1998; vom Schomberg and Baynes 2004). Boiled down to its essentials, however, the argument links his discourse theory with an analysis of the demands inherent in modern legal systems, which Habermas understands in light of the history of Western modernization. The analysis thus begins with a functional explanation of the need for positive law in modern societies. This analysis picks up on points he made in TCA (see sec. 3.1 above).

Societies are stable over the long run only if their members generally perceive them as legitimate: as organized in accordance with what is true, right, and good. In premodern Europe, legitimacy was grounded in a shared religious worldview that penetrated all spheres of life. As modernization engendered religious pluralism and functional differentiation (autonomous market economies, bureaucratic administrations, unconstrained scientific research), the potentials for misunderstanding and conflict about the good and the right increased—just as the shared background resources for the consensual resolution of such conflicts decreased. When we consider this dynamic simply from the standpoint of the (D)-principle, the prospects for legitimacy in modern societies appear quite dim.

Sociologically, then, one can understand modern law as a functional solution to the conflict potentials inherent in modernization. By opening up legally defined spheres of individual freedom, modern law reduces the burden of questions that require general (society-wide) discursive consensus. Within these legal boundaries, individuals are free to pursue their interests and happiness as they see fit, normally through various modes of association, whether that pursuit is primarily governed by modes of strategic action (as in economic markets), by recognized authority or consensual discourse (e.g., within religious communities; in the sciences), or by bureaucratic rationality (as in hierarchically organized voluntary enterprises). Consequently, modern law is fundamentally concerned with the definition, protection, and reconciliation of individual freedoms in their various institutional and organizational contexts.

The demands on the legitimation of law change with this functional realignment: to be legitimate, modern law must secure the private

autonomy of those subject to it. The legal guarantee of private autonomy in turn presupposes an established legal code and a legally defined status of equal citizenship in terms of actionable basic rights that secure a space for individual freedom. However, such rights are expressions of freedom only if citizens can also understand themselves as the authors of the laws that interpret their rights—that is, only if the laws that protect private autonomy also issue from citizens' exercise of public autonomy as lawmakers acting through elected representatives. Thus, the rights that define individual freedom must also include rights of political participation. As Habermas understands the relation between private and public autonomy, each is "co-original" or "equiprimordial," conceptually presupposing the other in the sense that each can be fully realized only if the other is fully realized. The exercise of public autonomy in its full sense presupposes participants who understand themselves as individually free (privately autonomous), which in turn presupposes that they can shape their individual freedoms through the exercise of public autonomy. This equiprimordial relationship, Habermas believes, enables his discourse theory to combine the best insights of the civic republican and classical liberal traditions of democracy, which found expression in Rousseau and Locke, respectively (1998a, chap. 9).

Habermas (1996b, chap. 3) understands these rights of liberty and political participation as an abstract system of basic rights generated by reflection on the nature of discursive legitimation (articulated in the D-Principle) in contexts shaped by the functional demands on modern law (or the "form" of positive law). Because these rights are abstract, each polity must further interpret and flesh them out for its particular historical circumstances, perhaps supplementing them with further welfare and environmental rights. In any case, the system of rights constitutes a minimum set of normative institutional conditions for any legitimate modern political order. The system of rights, in other words, articulates the normative framework for constitutional democracies, within which further institutional mechanisms such as legislatures and other branches of government must operate.

The idea of public autonomy means that the legitimacy of ordinary legislation must ultimately be traceable to robust processes of public

discourse that influence formal decisionmaking in legislative bodies. Habermas summarizes this requirement in his democratic principle of legitimacy: “only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted” (1996b, 110). As he goes on to explain, this principle articulates the core requirement for “externally” institutionalizing the different types of practical discourse that are relevant for the justification of particular laws. Decisions about laws typically involve a combination of validity claims: not only truth claims about the likely consequences of different legal options, but also claims about their moral rightness (or justice), claims about the authenticity of different options in light of the polity's shared values and history, and pragmatic claims about which option is feasible or more efficient. Legitimate laws must pass the different types of discursive tests that come with each of these validity claims. Habermas also recognizes that many issues involve conflicts among particular interests that cannot be reconciled by discursive agreement on validity but only through fair bargaining processes.

This strong orientation toward cognitive validity qualifies Habermas's version of deliberative democracy as an “epistemic” theory. This puts his democratic principle in a rather puzzling position. On the one hand, it represents a specification of the discourse principle for a particular kind of discourse (legal-political discourse). This makes it analogous to the moral principle (U), which specifies (D) for moral discourse. As a specific principle of reasonable discourse, the democratic principle seems to have the character of an idealizing presupposition insofar as it presumes the possibility of consensual decisionmaking in politics. For Habermas, reasonable political discourse must at least begin with the supposition that legal questions admit in principle of single right answers (1996c, 1491–95), or at least a set of discursively valid answers on which a fair compromise, acceptable to all parties, is possible. This highly cognitive, consensualist presumption has drawn fire even from sympathetic commentators. One difficulty lies in Habermas's assumption that in public discourse over controversial political issues, citizens can separate the moral constraints on acceptable solutions, presumably open

to general consensus, from ethical-political and pragmatic considerations, over which reasonable citizens may reasonably disagree. As various critics have pointed out, this distinction is very hard to maintain in practice and perhaps in theory as well (Bohman 1996; McCarthy 1998; Warnke 1999).

On the other hand, the democratic principle lies at a different level from principles like (U), as Habermas himself emphasizes (1996b, 110). The latter specify (D) for this or that single type of practical discourse, in view of internal cognitive demands on justification, whereas the former pulls together all the forms of practical discourse and sets forth conditions on their external institutionalization. From this perspective, the democratic principle acts as a bridge that links the cognitive aspects of political discourse (as a combination of the different types of idealized discourse) with the demands of institutional realization in complex societies. As such, the democratic principle should refer not to consensus, but rather to something like a warranted presumption of reasonableness. In fact, in a number of places Habermas describes democratic legitimacy in just such terms, which we might paraphrase as follows: citizens may regard their laws as legitimate insofar as the democratic process, as it is institutionally organized and conducted, warrants the presumption that outcomes are reasonable products of a sufficiently inclusive deliberative process of opinion- and will-formation (2008, 103). The presumption of reasonable outcomes thus rests not so much on the individual capacities of citizens to act like the participants of ideal discourse, but rather on the aggregate reasonableness of a "subjectless communication" that emerges as the collective result of discursive structures—the formal and informal modes of organizing discussion (1996b, 184–86, 301, 341). This means that democracy is "decentered," no longer fully under control of its own conditions and no longer based on a congruent subject of self-legislating discourse.

Habermas dubs his position an "epistemic proceduralism." The position is proceduralist because collective reasonableness emerges from the operation of the democratic process; it is epistemic insofar as that process results in collective learning. The latter presupposes a fruitful interplay of three major discursive arenas: the dispersed communication of citizens in

civil society; the “media-based mass communication” in the political public sphere; and the institutionalized discourse of lawmakers. When these arenas work well together, civil society and the public sphere generate a set of considered public opinions that then influence the deliberation of lawmakers (2009). In light of the above ambiguity in the status of (D), however, one might want to take a more pragmatic approach to democratic deliberation. Such an approach (e.g., Bohman 1996; McCarthy 1998) understands deliberation as less a matter of settling disputes over the cognitive validity of competing proposals than a matter of developing legal frameworks within which citizens can continue to cooperate despite disagreements about what is right or good.

9.7.5 Habermas's Cosmopolitanism

Habermas's discourse theory also has implications for international modes of deliberation—hence for the debate about a potential cosmopolitan political order. To understand his position in this debate, it helps to sketch a typology of the main theories. The current discussion moves along four main axes: political or social, institutional or noninstitutional, democratic or nondemocratic, and transnational or cosmopolitan. Theories are informed by background assumptions about the scope of cosmopolitanism: whether it is moral to the extent that it is concerned with individuals and their life opportunities, social to the extent that it makes associations and institutions central, or political to the extent that it focuses on specifically legal and political institutions, including citizenship. Habermas's position in this debate is moderate. It is not minimal in the sense of Rawls's law of peoples, which denies the need for any strong international legal or political order, much less a democratic one. Nor is it a strongly democratic position, such as David Held's version of cosmopolitan order. However, both Held and Habermas share a common emphasis on the emergence of international public law as central to a just global political order.

In his essay “Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years' Historical Remove” (1998a, chap. 7; German ed., 1996a, chap. 7), Habermas was optimistic about the prospects for a global political order as the continuation of the form of democracy based on human rights

typical of nation states. Democracy on the nation-state model connects three central ideas: that the proper political community is a bounded one; that it possesses ultimate political authority; and that this authority enables political autonomy, so that the members of the demos may freely choose the conditions of their own association and legislate for themselves. The normative core of this conception of democracy lies in the conception of freedom articulated in the third condition: that the subject of legal constraints is free precisely in being the author of the laws. Earlier we introduced Habermas's argument for "decentering" democracy under the conditions of pluralism and complexity. If this applies to the modern state, then it would seem that cosmopolitan democracy would take this trend even further. Yet, when discussing "postnational" legitimacy, Habermas clearly makes self-determination by a singular demos the fundamental normative core of the democratic ideal. For Held (1995), cosmopolitan democracy is clearly continuous with democracy, at least in form, as it is realized within states. Not only does Held show how international society is already thickly institutionalized well beyond the systems of negotiation that Habermas makes central, he further recognizes that "individuals increasingly have complex and multilayered identities, corresponding to the globalization of economic forces and the reconfiguration of political power." Such potentially overlapping identities provide the basis for participation in global civil society, in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and in other transnational civil associations, movements, and agencies that create opportunities for political participation at the global level. Held's approach thus has three enormous advantages: an emphasis on a variety of institutions; a multiplicity of levels and sites for common democratic activity; and a focus on the need for organized political actors in international civil society to play an important role in a system of global democracy. For all these advantages, the self-legislating demos reappears in Held's explicitly Lockean insistence that "the artificial person at the center of the modern state must be reconceived in terms of cosmopolitan public law." In order to reconstitute the community as sovereign, Held argues that the demoi must submit to the will of the global demos:

"cosmopolitan law demands the subordination of regional, national and local sovereignties to an overarching legal framework."

Contrary to his earlier essay on Kant's Perpetual Peace, Habermas has now pulled back from Held's strong conception of cosmopolitanism. In The Postnational Constellation (2001a; German ed., 1998c) and more recent essays on the European Union, Habermas seeks to accommodate a wider institutional pluralism. Still, he cannot have it both ways. When considering various disaggregated and distributed forms of transnational political order, he describes them in nondemocratic terms, as a "negotiating system" governed by fair bargaining. This is because he clearly, and indeed surprisingly, makes self-determination through legislation the deciding criterion of democracy. Consequently, at the transnational level, the fundamental form of political activity is negotiation among democracies. This demos is at best a civic, rather than political, transnational order. Nonetheless, Habermas links the possibility of a "postnational democracy" to a shared and therefore particular political identity, without which, he contends, we are left with mere "moral" rather than "civic" solidarity. According to Habermas, even if such a political community is based on the universal principles of a democratic constitution, "it still forms a collective identity, in the sense that it interprets and realizes these principles in light of its own history and in the context of its own particular form of life" (2001a, 117, 107). Without a common ethical basis, institutions beyond the state must look to a "less demanding basis of legitimacy in the organizational forms of an international negotiation system," the deliberative processes of which will be accessible to various publics and to organizations in international civil society (ibid., 109).

More recently, he argues that regulatory political institutions at the global level could be effective only if they take on features of governance without government, even if human rights as juridical statuses must be constitutionalized in the international system (2004, 130–31). As in the case of Allen Buchanan's minimalism, this less demanding standard of legitimacy does not include the capacity to deliberate about the terms governing the political authority of the negotiation system itself. This position is transnational, but ultimately nondemocratic, primarily because

it restricts its overly robust deliberative democracy to the level of the nation state. The stronger criteria for democracy are not applied outside the nation state, where governance is only indirectly democratic and left to negotiations and policy networks. Furthermore, the commitment to human rights as legal statuses pushes Habermas in the direction of Held's fundamentally legal form of political cosmopolitanism. At the moment, Habermas's view of cosmopolitan politics is not yet fully stable. But it is clear that he thinks that a cosmopolitan order must be political (and not merely juridical); institutional (and not merely organized informally or by policy networks); transnational (to the extent that it would be like the European Union, an order of political and legal orders); and in some sense democratic or at least subject to democratic norms. However, in order for him to fully adopt this last characteristic of the international system, he will have to rethink his conception of democracy as self-legislation. If he does not do so, it seems impossible to fit democracy onto a transnational rather than fully Kantian cosmopolitan order.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. Discuss the Early Development Of Habermas's Interest In The Public Sphere And Reason.

……

……

……

2. What do you know Important Transitional Works?

……

……

……

3. Discuss Mature Positions.

……

……

……

9.8 LET US SUM UP

A vibrant public sphere is the dimension of civil society most essential to democracy. It helps to constitute the demos itself – "the people" - as a collectivity able to guide its own future. The public sphere works by communication, combining cultural creativity, the selective appropriation of tradition, and reasoned debate to inform its members and potentially to influence states and other institutions. The public sphere is vibrant to the extent that engagement is lively, diverse, and innovative; its value is reduced when it is passive, or when it simply reacts to government actions or failures, or when mutually-informing communication is sacrificed to the mere aggregation of private opinions. Public communication does not simply flow in an undifferentiated fashion. Whether at a national or a transnational level, a public sphere is composed of multiple partially overlapping publics and counter-publics. These bring forward different conceptions of the public good and sometimes of the larger, inclusive public itself. They may be judged by their openness, creativity, or success in bringing reason to bear of public issues. The stakes lie in the double question of to what extent social life can be self-organizing, and to what extent the social self-organization can be achieved by free human action. The public sphere is vital to that possible freedom, and to its exercise in pursuit of public good.

This unit argues that Jürgen Habermas's commitment to a deliberative form of democracy, the foundational importance of the lifeworld for healthy human existence, and civil society as the pre-eminent learning domain can help the global adult education movement to understand its potentialities and limitations in a rapidly changing world. The article explicates Habermas's recent articulation of civil society and the public sphere in Between Facts and Norms. We turn to Habermas to learn more about civil society in order to construct an adequate theoretical framework towards the achievement of a learning society that encourages active citizenship, nurtures people-centred work and fosters public spaces that engage a significant minority of citizens in deliberative processes committed to the common weal.

9.9 KEY WORDS

Civil Society: Civil society can be understood as the "third sector" of society, distinct from government and business, and including the family and the private sphere.

Transitional: relating to or characteristic of a process or period of transition.

9.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know about the Five Visions of Civil Society?
2. Discuss the Importance of the Public Sphere.
3. What do you know the Ideal of Publicness?
4. Discuss the Early Development Of Habermas's Interest In The Public Sphere And Reason
5. What do you know Important Transitional Works?
6. Discuss Mature Positions.

9.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. 2006 The Civic Sphere. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Anderson, Benedict 1983 Imagined Communities. London: Verso, new edition 2006.
- Arendt, Hannah 1958 The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, Hannah 1972 Crises of the Republic. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
- Arendt, Hannah 1990 On Revolution. New York: Penguin.
- Bentham, Jeremy 1789 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (this ed.
- Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988).
- Calhoun, Craig, ed. 1992 Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Calhoun, Craig 2010 “The Public Sphere in the Field of Power,” Social Science History 34 (2): Cooley, Charles Horton 1909 Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind. New York:Scribner’s.

- Dewey, John 1927 The Public and its Problems. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Edwards, Michael 2004 Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity.
- Ezrahi, Yaron 1990 The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Fraser, Nancy 1992 "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
- Existing Democracy," in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 109-42.
- Gramsci, Antonio 1929-35 Prison Notebooks. New York: Columbia University Press, 3 vols.1991-2007.
- Habermas, Jürgen 1962 The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Thomas Burger, trans. USA: MIT Press,1991.
- Hegel, Georg W.F. 1821 The Philosophy of Right. Trans. T.M. Knox.
- Hohendahl, Peter Uwe 1982 The Institution of Criticism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hume, David. 1739/40 A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
- Landes, Joan 1988 Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution. Ithaca:Cornell University Press.
- Lippman, Walter 1960 Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan.
- Locke, John 1690 Second Discourse on Civil Government. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo 1513 The Discourses. London: Penguin,1975.
- Meyrowitz, Joshua 1985 No Sense of Place. New York: Oxford.

9.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 9.2

2. See Section 9.3
3. See Section 9.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 9.5
2. See Section 9.6
3. See Section 9.7

UNIT 10: CITIZENSHIP: CHANGING PERSPECTIVE

STRUCTURE

10.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit you would be able to

- To define global and dual citizenship
- To outline the rights and duties as a citizen
- To describe the nation of civil liberty
- To know the Historical Perspective
- To find out Definition
- To know the Global Citizenship
- To discuss the Dual Citizenship
- To describe State and the Citizen
- To know Nation-state and the Citizenship
- To know Rights and Duties of the Citizen
- To discuss about Civil Society

- To know Multiculturalism and the Citizenship

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Citizenship is one of the most commonly used terms in a democracy. It is used at all levels of politics; in formal legal documents, in laws, in constitutions, in party manifestoes and in speeches. But what is citizenship? Or, who is a citizen? A citizen is not anyone who lives in a nation-state. Among those who live in a nation-state, there are citizens and aliens. A citizen is not just an inhabitant. He or she does not merely live in the territory of a state. A citizen is one who participates in the process of government. In a democratic society, there must be a two-way traffic between the citizens and the government. All governments demand certain duties from the citizens. But, in return, the state must also admit some demands of the citizens on itself. These are called rights. A citizen must have political rights. A person who is ruled by laws but who has no political rights is not a citizen. It is not possible to have citizens under all types of governments. Governments, which are not democratic, cannot, strictly speaking, have citizens. They have only rulers and subjects. In governments which are not democratic, people who live in the country often have only obligations towards the state and no rights. The government expects them to perform their duties, to pay taxes, to obey laws, to do whatever else the government wants of them. But they cannot question their rulers or ask them to explain their actions. Politics in these societies is like a one-way traffic. The government tells the people what to do and what not to, but does not listen to them. Only the rulers have rights. The ruled or the subjects have duties laid down for them by the governors. Such undemocratic governments have been much more common than democratic ones. Feudal states were terribly undemocratic. There have been thoroughly undemocratic states in modern times, too. Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy are examples of the most brutal authoritarian state. So were the most colonial states. Democratic governments are not necessarily associated with the advanced industrial societies of the West. The British were reputed for their democratic system of governance. But they maintained the worst autocratic governments in their colonies. France is a democratic country,

but fought a savage colonial war in Algeria. Most colonial states practiced democracy at home but authoritarianism abroad. Industrial societies like Germany and Italy produced most brutal fascist governments during inter war period. Historically, the term citizenship was linked with the rise of democracy. The demand for democratic government came up first in the western societies like England, France, and the United States of America. Democracy means that everybody should have political rights. When one has political rights, the right to vote, the right to participate in deciding about important questions facing one's society, one is a citizen. Universal suffrage is a recent phenomenon. The ideas of democracy made people fight for their rights. Many of the ideas which democracy is made up were accepted after the great revolutions. For instance, after the revolution France became a republic. All citizens were made equal and had the same rights. The revolutionaries published a declaration of the rights of man. This became a symbol of democratic revolutions in Europe. Initially, very few people had the right to vote, or stand for election. But people fought for the universal adult franchise. Finally, universal adult suffrage was accepted and everybody came to have the right to vote. The word citizen was made popular by the French Revolution in 1789. Later on, this word was used whenever democratic governments were constituted. At present it is common usage to treat people in democratic societies as citizens. It means, above all, that in relation to his government, the individual is active, not simply passive. He does not only obey and listen to what the government says. The government must also listen to him in turn. He has the right to express his views freely, to be consulted and to be involved in the politics of his country. The citizen does not only enjoy rights. He also has some duties towards his country, society and fellow citizens. A citizen is a person who enjoys rights that the constitution provides; and enjoyment of rights also imposes some duties upon him. A good citizen is one who is conscious of his rights and duties. One essential thing for a democratic state is that citizens must participate in the governing process. The quality of democracy improves if citizens from all walks of life can participate in its activities and if they take interest in the basic processes of making important decisions for their society. Democracy implies that

the decisions affecting the whole society should be taken as far as possible by the whole society. Participation of ordinary citizens makes the government more responsive, and the citizens more responsible. Citizens' participation is the basis of responsible, limited and constitutional government.

Box 10.1: Idea of Citizenship The idea of citizenship means that not only the government has some claims on the citizen, the citizen too has some claims on the government. A government is an association like many others in society. But it is an association of a special kind, an association that one simply cannot escape or be indifferent about. Democrats rightly feel that since the government control the people, it is good that people must have some kind of control over the government. The best government is one in which the largest number of people participate in making decisions for the whole society. This participation of ordinary people is precisely what is called citizenship. The idea of citizenship is closely linked to participation of people in government. This is how the ideas of democracy and citizenship are linked to each other.

10.2 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In modern times, three major issues have dominated the world. First, the place of the church and various religions within the nation-state. Second the admission of the lower strata, particularly the workers, to full political and economic 'citizenship' through universal suffrage and the right to bargain collectively. And third, the struggle for the equitable distribution of the national income among the people. The place of the church in society was fought through and resolved in most of the nations in the 18th and 19th centuries. The citizenship issue has also been resolved in various ways. The United States and Britain gave the workers suffrage in the 19th century. In countries like Sweden, which resisted until the first part of the 20th century, the struggle for citizenship became combined with socialism as a political movement, thereby producing a revolutionary socialism. In other words, where the workers were denied both economic and political rights, their struggle for redistribution of income and status was superimposed on a revolutionary ideology. Where the economic and status struggle developed outside of this context, the

ideology with which it was linked tended to be that of gradualist reform. The workers in Prussia, for example, were denied free and equal suffrage until the revolution of 1918 and thereby clung to revolutionary Marxism. In southern Germany, where full citizenship rights were granted in the late 19th century, reformist, democratic, and non-revolutionary socialism was dominant. In France, the workers won the suffrage but were refused basic economic rights until after World War II. The workers have won their fight for full citizenship in the Western nation-states. Representatives of the lower strata are now part of the governing groups. The basic political issue of the industrial revolution, the incorporation of the workers into the legitimate body politic, has been settled. The key domestic issue today is collective bargaining over differences in the division of the total product within the framework of a welfare state. In the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa the situation is somewhat different from the Western nation-state. In Western nations the workers were faced with the problem of winning citizenship from the dominant aristocratic and business strata. In Asia and Africa the long-term presence of colonial rulers has identified conservative ideology and the more well to do classes with subservience to colonialism, while leftist ideologies have been identified with nationalism. The trade unions and workers' parties of Asia and Africa have been a legitimate part of the political process from the beginning of the democratic system.

10.3 DEFINITION

Since antiquity, citizenship has been defined as the legal status of membership in a political community. Under Roman jurisprudence, citizenship came to mean someone free to act by law, free to ask and expect the law's protection. This legal status signified a special attachment between the individual and the political community. In general, it entitled the citizenship to whatever prerogatives and responsibilities that were attached to membership. With the creation of the modern state, citizenship came to signify certain equality with regard to the rights and duties of membership in the community. The modern state began to administer citizenship; it determines who gets citizenship, what the associated benefits are, and what rights and privileges it entails.

As a legal status, citizenship has come to imply a unique, reciprocal, and unmediated relationship between the individual and the political community. Citizenship, in short, is nothing less than the right to have rights. Complete participation of the members in the activities of a territorial state is citizenship. The term implies a universal basis: either all adults or some general category of them, for instance males or property holders, are citizens. It is a predominantly western concept, originating in Greece and Rome, current in small city-states in medieval Europe, then expanding enormously in capitalist societies of the 19th and 20th centuries. Given a central place by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall in Citizenship and Social Class, an analysis of the development of class conflict in modern states, which is a combination of Marxian and Weberian insights. Capitalism increased the pervasiveness of class conflict in modern societies; citizenship in the territorial state represented not its elimination, but its institutionalisation, and the conversion of national into nation-states. In Britain this occurred in three stages. (1) In the 18th century, civil citizenship: equality before the law, personal liberty, freedom of speech, thought and religion, the right to own property and make contracts. (2) In the 19th century, political citizenship: electoral and office-holding rights. (3) In the 20th century, social citizenship: a basic level of economic and social welfare, the welfare state, and full participation in national culture. Subsequent research has supported the general applicability of the model to advanced capitalist nationstates, though with many particular qualifications. Bendix in Nation-Building and Citizenship attempted to apply the model to third world countries. In political and legal theory, citizenship refers to the rights and duties of the members of a nation-state or city. In some historical contexts, a citizen was any member of a city; that is an urban collectivity, which was relatively immune from the demands of a monarch or state. In classical Greece, citizenship was limited to free men, who had a right to participate in political debate because they contributed, often through military service, to the direct support of the city-state. Historians argue that citizenship has thus expanded with democratisation to include a wider definition of the citizen regardless of sex, age, or ethnicity. The concept was revived in the context of the

modern state, notably during the French and American Revolutions, and gradually identified more with rights than obligations. In modern times citizenship refers conventionally to the various organisations which institutionalise these rights in the welfare state. In sociology, recent theories of citizenship have drawn their inspiration from T.H. Marshall, who defined citizenship as a status, which is enjoyed by a person who is a full member of a community. Citizenship has three components: civil, political, and social. Civil rights are necessary for individual freedoms and are institutionalised in the law courts. Political citizenship guarantees the right to participate in the exercise of political power in the community, either by voting, or by holding political office. Social citizenship is the right to participate in an appropriate standard of living; this right is embodied in the welfare and educational systems of modern societies. The important feature of Marshall's theory was his view that there was a permanent tension or contradiction between the principles of citizenship and the operation of the capitalist market. Capitalism inevitably involves inequalities between social classes, while citizenship involves some redistribution of resources, because of rights, which are shared equally by all. Marshall's theory has given rise to many disputes. Critics argue that it is a description of the English experience only, and it is not a comparative analysis of citizenship. It has an evolutionary and teleological view of the inevitable expansion of citizenship, and does not examine social processes, which undermine citizenship. It does not address gender differences in the experience of citizenship. It fails to address other types of citizenship, such as economic citizenship; and it is not clear about the causes of the expansion of citizenship. Some sociologists believe that Marshall's argument can be rescued from these criticisms if the original theory is modified. There are very different traditions of citizenship in different societies. Active citizenship, which is based on the achievement of rights through social struggle, is very different from passive citizenship, which is handed down from above by the state. There are also very different theoretical approaches to understanding the structure of the public and private realm in conceptions of citizenship. For some sociologists, such as Talcott Parsons, the growth of citizenship is a measure of the modernisation of

society because it is based on values of universalism and achievement. These different theoretical traditions are primarily the product of two opposite views of citizenship. It is either viewed as an aspect of bourgeois liberalism, in which case it involves a conservative view of social participation, or it is treated as a feature of radical democratic politics. It is either dismissed as a mere reform of capitalism, or it is regarded as a fundamental plank of democracy. Recently, sociologists have gone beyond these traditional theories of democracy, liberalism, and civil society, to ask questions about the changing relationships between individuals, communities, and states, in a world in which the nation-state is increasingly subject to influences from supranational institutions. Will globalisation replace state citizenship with a truly universal conception of human rights?

10.4 GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is an obsolete concept since its cause, the nation state, itself has become obsolete. In a globalised world where technology and trade are creating transnational communities, global citizenship is the beginning of a process that will obliterate boxed identities defined by blood and soil. This will not just expand our consciousness as citizens of the world but also help us tide over tensions that have been the product of ethnic and national histories. Nation states have the tendency to influence the course of history by imposing it on feuds and rivalries from the past. These impulses of history have been responsible for large-scale bloodshed. The holocaust was a result of the Nazi quest for a racially pure national identity. Similar state-sponsored mass murders have occurred in the Balkans and Africa in the twentieth century. The long standing wars and border disputes all over the world— Palestine, Kashmir, Rwanda, Chechnya— are all a result of our inability to traverse the faultlines of regionalism, religion and ethnicity. Citizenship has been the passport to partake in this dance macabre of violence. It does not offer one the choice of identity but imposes an identity that brings with it a history of prejudice and violence. Any measure that attempts to dilute the influence of a narrow, national identity is welcome.

Box 10.2: The Information Age Marshall McLuhan predicted the global village in the 1960's. That is now a reality. As sociologists like Manuel Castells argue, we are in the information age. Aided by the flow of people and capital, new social networks are emerging. These seek to imagine a world without borders. Such a world is obviously too cosmopolitan to entertain constricted visions of nationalism. What is needed today is the option to explore multiple identities without creating a hierarchy of them. Global citizenship endorses this view. It allows people to be stakeholders in the future of more than one country and culture. It takes us closer to the Upanishadic vision of vasudaiva kutumbakam (entire world is a one family).

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. What do you know the Historical Perspective?

……
……
……

2. How do you find out Definition of the state?

……
……
……

3. What do you know the Global Citizenship?

……
……
……

10.5 DUAL CITIZENSHIP

Assimilation of a migrant community into their adoptive society is not about giving up your own ethnic or cultural identity. Assimilation is all about making your host country more comfortable with you, and you with it, to the mutual benefit of both. The concept of dual citizenship is an anachronism in today's globalised world. It is contrary to the process of assimilation of the migrant community into the host society. Those

aspiring for it show a parochial mindset. Such a mindset stands in the way of merging with the mainstream and results in social and cultural ghettoisation. More importantly, it is something that is likely to be resented by the locals of the adoptive country and could lead to a backlash. Dual citizenship is also likely to cause heartburn among the local residents, who might feel that the migrants are being rewarded for having deserted the homeland for greener pastures. In the context of India, the dual citizenship gives the emigrant Indian the unfair advantage of having his cake and eating it too. Indians who migrate should accept all that goes with migration. Especially those who left India after independence and who are the main beneficiaries of the dual citizenship scheme of the Government of India. Unlike indentured labourers, they were not forced to migrate. They were well-educated, well-off professionals who chose to go elsewhere because it was more comfortable and lucrative. Why then should they continue to seek a foothold in their country of origin? If it is the business in which they are interested in, then why can not they trade and invest like other foreigners? The truth is, dual citizenship is all about material benefit and convenience. It confers the right and ability to non-resident Indians to travel, study, work, Citizenship 46 and buy property anywhere in India. There is no emotional attachment to homeland in it.

10.6 STATE AND THE CITIZEN

The state is an important political organisation that exists within society. However, it is not the only social organisation. There are many other organisations which exist in society, e.g., family, religious, cultural economic and other organisations. All these organisations are established for the achievement of some consciously defined objectives and thus limited purposes. So, the purposes for which the state stands are not all the purposes which man seeks in society. All the organisations pursue their goals in different ways. The state pursues its objectives mainly through law and the coercive force behind it. But that is only one of the ways in which men strive to achieve their desired ends. There is no doubt, however, that the state plays a exceedingly important and increasingly decisive role in the lives of the individuals. One of the

reasons for its pervasive impact is its universality. All the people in a territorial society come under the jurisdiction of the state. In their relationship with the state, they are known as citizens. Another reason for the predominant role of the state in the lives of the citizens is the expanding scope of its activities. Still another reason is the use of coercive force, which only the state can employ in the pursuit of its objectives. The police and defence forces are coercive structures of the state. Another is bureaucracy, a well organised army of government officials who in their dealings with citizens, stand as organs of authority. Because of its universality, the state's dealings with the citizens become peculiarly impersonal; as expressed in the bureaucracy. Since the state includes all men, its prescriptions apply to all men without the many actual distinctions of value-systems and separate interests. The same law applies to all. So, whatever policies a government may pursue, there would be many citizens and groups of citizens who would be opposed to the existing laws and policies because they believe that a particular law or a particular policy does not serve their interests but those of others. Sometimes a law may compel a person to do what his conscience forbids him to do and vice versa. And because the law is enforced by coercive power, the citizen may carry the impression that the state or government is an external force denying them the freedom and liberty which they value. There may be issues of morality, private sentiments, high social values or interests of mankind as a whole coming in conflict with the prescriptions of the state. When the state extends its sphere of activity to hitherto excluded areas of social life, this may be regarded as an expropriating attempt by the state and, therefore, resented and opposed. Thus the issues of relationship between the state and the citizen have been matters of genuine concern and endless controversy.

Reflection and Action 10.1

Distinguish between State and Citizens. In what way is each the reflection of the other?

10.7 NATION-STATE AND THE CITIZENSHIP

Of late, assertion of ethno-religious identities has emerged as a dominant global reality. This has, in turn, questioned the basic premises of the nationstate, which was conceived as the most authentic expression of group life and all encompassing political community. The strong faith reposed in the idea of nation-state and citizenship as means of striking equality, protecting liberty and promoting fraternity among the people of diverse socio-economic groups stands shattered. The neutrality of the state and disjunction between ethnicity and state is under question. The basic assumptions of the hyphenated concept of nation-state are contested by the emergent global reality of ethno-national movements, assertion of minorities for their identity and rights, and a strong politics of identity and politics of representation. Now minority and disadvantaged groups are demanding their space in the structure of governance. Autonomy and self-governing rights are major agenda of the new social movements across the world. This has resulted into compounding ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world. Nation-state is Euro-centric construct, and in many situations and conditions state has been conflated with nation in their conceptualisation. The conflation of state and nation has given rise to many wrong policies of the state towards its ethnic groups and minorities. The occurrences of ethnic violence are not unconnected with the approach of the state towards different ethnic groups. This is not confined only to the case of the developing world which have attempted to emulate the model of the West for building their own structure of state and society but also in the developed world of the West which have been regarded as the citadels of the idea of nation-state. The politics of identity and ethnicity has emerged very forceful. The concept of nation and state has been the part of the grand narratives of modernity. Consequently, the project of nation and state building in third world countries has not been congruent with the European experience, for the societies in these countries have been traditional and diverse. Multiple allegiances have not been co-terminus with the loyalties to the nation-state of the western construct. Language and territory are the main basis of nation formation. There are strong

tendencies to conflate state to nation and state building as the nation building. This conflation has given rise to multiple and compounded problem of programmes and policies of the state towards the ethnic groups. Religion cannot provide authentic basis of nation formation and national identity. Therefore, any effort to espouse nationalism by invoking religious exclusivity is not only alienating but also exclusionary. Any such effort in the past has not succeeded and it is bound to fail in the future also.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. Discuss the Dual Citizenship.

……
……
……

2. Describe State and the Citizen.

……
……
……

3. How do you know Nation-state and the Citizenship?

……
……
……

10.8 RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE CITIZEN

Harold J. Laski asserts that every state is known by the rights that it maintains. The state is not merely a sovereign organisation which is entitled to the citizen's allegiance and which has the power to get its will obeyed. The citizen owes, and normally renders allegiance to the state and carries out its commands. However, the citizen does not render allegiance and obedience to the state merely for their own sake. On the contrary, he does so because of his conviction that the state exists and functions for the achievement of common welfare, which includes his

own welfare. The citizen has his obligations to the state. At the same time, the state has an obligation towards the citizen, namely, the obligation to provide and maintain those conditions and opportunities, which facilitates the fullest development of his physical, mental and moral faculties. The citizen is entitled to these conditions and opportunities. In other words, they are his rights. Rights are closely related to duties. Rights imply duties. Rights and duties are two aspects of the same coin. Rights represent a man's 'claims' on society while duties indicate what he owes to society so as to be able to enjoy his rights. Thus, while society guarantees security and well being to the citizen, the citizen owes to society the duty to make his contribution to the security and well being of the community as a whole. In other words, the citizen owes to society as much as he claims from it. His rights are not independent of society. He cannot act unsocially. There is a twofold relationship between rights and duties. In the first place, every right implies a corresponding duty. A right belonging to one individual imposes on others the duty to respect his right. His right, therefore, is their duty. In the second place, a right is not only a means to the individual's self-development; it is also a means to the promotion of general welfare. Every right of a citizen is accompanied by the duty that he should use it for the common good. Rights, valuable and indispensable as they are, are not absolute or unlimited. Rights and duties are correlative. As a citizen, man owes some obligations and duties to his fellow citizens and to society is universally recognised. As in the case of rights, the obligations of citizenship are also equally applicable to all alike.

10.9 CIVIL SOCIETY

The term 'civil society' was used by writers such as Locke and Rousseau to describe civil government as differentiated from natural society or the state of nature. The Marxist concept derives from Hegel. In Hegel, civil or bourgeois society, as the realm of individuals who have left the unity of the family to enter into economic competition, is contrasted with the state, or political society. For Hegel it is only through the state that the universal interest can prevail, since he disagrees with Locke, Rousseau or

Adam Smith that there is any innate rationality in civil society, which will lead to the general good. Marx uses the concept of civil society in his critique of Hegel. Marx uses civil society in his early writing as a yardstick of the change from feudal to bourgeois society. Civil society arose, Marx insists, from the destruction of medieval society. Previously individuals were part of many different societies, such as guilds or estates each of which had a political role, so that there was no separate civil realm. As these partial societies broke down, civil society arose in which the individual became all-important. The old bonds of privilege were replaced by the selfish needs of atomistic individuals separated from each other and from the community. The only links between them are provided by the law, which is not the product of their will and does not conform to their nature but dominates human relationships because of the threat of punishment. The fragmented, conflictual nature of civil society with its property relations necessitates a type of politics, which does not reflect this conflict but is abstracted and removed from it. The modern state is made necessary and at the same time limited by the characteristics of civil society. The fragmentation and misery of civil society escape the control of the state, which is limited to formal, negative activities and is rendered impotent by the conflict, which is the essence of economic life. The political identity of individuals as citizens in modern society is severed from their State Society 49 civil identity and from their function in the productive sphere as tradesman, day-labourer, or landowner.

Box 10.3: Ideal of the State In Marx's analysis two divisions grow up simultaneously, between individuals enclosed in their privacy, and between the public and private domains, or between state and society. Marx contrasts the idealism of universal interests as represented by the modern state and the abstractness of the concept of a citizen who is moral because he goes beyond his narrow interest, with the materialism of the real, sensuous man in civil society. The irony according to Marx is that in modern society the most universal, moral, social purposes as embodied in the ideal of the state are at the service of human beings in a partial, depraved state of individual egotistical desires, of economic necessity. It is in this sense that the essence of the modern state is to be found in the

characteristics of civil society, in economic relations. For the conflict of civil society to be truly superseded and for the full potential of human beings to be realised, both civil society and its product, political society, must be abolished, necessitating a social as well as a political revolution to liberate mankind.

Although Gramsci continues to use the term to refer to the private or nonstate sphere, including the economy, his picture of civil society is very different from that of Marx. It is not simply a sphere of individual needs but of organisations, and has the potential of rational self-regulation and freedom. Gramsci insists on its complex organisation, as the 'ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private' where 'hegemony' and 'spontaneous consent' are organised. He argues that any distinction between civil society and the state is only methodological, since even a policy of non-intervention like laissez-faire is established by the state itself. The metaphors he uses to describe the precise relationship between the state and civil society vary. A fully developed civil society is presented as a trench system able to resist the incursions of economic crises and to protect the state. Whereas Marx insists on the separation between the state and civil society, Gramsci emphasises the inter-relationship between the two. The state narrowly conceived as government is protected by hegemony organised in civil society while the coercive state apparatus fortifies the hegemony of the dominant class. Yet the state also has an ethical function as it tries to educate public opinion and to influence the economic sphere. In turn, the very concept of law must be extended, Gramsci suggests, since elements of custom and habit can exert a collective pressure to conform in civil society without coercion or sanctions. In any actual society the lines of demarcation between civil society and the state may be blurred, but Gramsci argues against any attempt to equate or identify the two. And while he accepts a role for the state in developing civil society, he warns against perpetuating statolatry or state worship. Gramsci redefines the withering away of the state in terms of a full development of the self-regulating attributes of civil society. In Marx's writings civil society is portrayed as the terrain of individual egotism. Gramsci refers to Hegel's discussion of the estates and corporations as organising elements, which

represent corporate interests in a collective way in civil society, and the role of the bureaucracy and the legal system in regulating civil society and connecting it to the state.

A reading of the concept of civil society in both Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers leads to an examination of the concept of politics itself. It involves the relationship between individuals, and between individuals and the community, a view of society as organised or not, the delineation of public and private.

Reflection and Action 10.2 Distinguish between multiculturalism and pluralism in social culture.

10.10 MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CITIZENSHIP

The problem of multicultural accommodation is high on the global political agenda. Accommodation refers to a wide range of state measures designed to facilitate identity groups' practices and norms. Due to the anti-ancient regime legacy of standard conceptions of citizenship, individual rights generally are prioritized over assertions of legal entitlements based on sub-national group affiliation. Thus liberal, civic-republican, and ethno-cultural models of membership all share in common a basic mistrust of 'identity groups' as a relevant component of citizenship theory. The term 'identity groups' here refers to a range of cultural, religious, or ethnic groups that are recognisable by virtue of their nomos. 'Identity groups' are distinguishable by a unique history and collective memory; a distinct culture or set of social norms, customs, and traditions; or perhaps an experience of maltreatment by mainstream society. Proponents of a multicultural understanding of citizenship are concerned with the power of the state and dominant social groups to erode identity groups. This concern derives from a philosophical position that stresses the role of culture in constituting a person's understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being. Charles Taylor in his famous essay The Politics of Recognition, argues that we form our identities and our conceptions of ourselves as free and equal agents through a dialogical process, using certain given cultural scripts. Culture, under this view, is not just something that we

use to understand and evaluate the world; it also is a fundamental part of us. Membership in an identity group combined with active participation in its cultural expressions as distinct from mere blood ties can provide individuals with an intelligible context of choice and a secure sense of identity and belonging. This emphasis on the links among culture, identity, and group membership stands at the core of the quest for a new multicultural understanding of citizenship. Under this new understanding, persons stand forth with their differences acknowledged and respected, and they participate in the public sphere without shedding their distinct identities. This approach departs from blindness to difference ideal and aims to carve out a philosophical and legal rationale for recognising identity groups as deserving of special or differentiated rights. The multicultural understanding of citizenship therefore departs from the perception of all citizens as individuals who are merely members of a larger political community. Instead it views them as having equal rights as individuals while simultaneously meriting differentiated rights as members of identity groups. Hence in legal terms, the move toward a multicultural citizenship model raises potential conflicts among three components: the identity group, the state, and the individual.

Check Your Progress 3

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. What do you know about Rights and Duties of the Citizen?

……

……

……

2. Discuss about Civil Society.

……

……

……

3. How do you know Multiculturalism and the Citizenship?

……

……

……

10.11 LET US SUM UP

In this unit, we have discussed the various aspect of citizenship. The concept of citizenship has been defined in the legal and historical perspectives. Its evolution has been delineated from Greek city-states to modern nationstate. Earlier it was a rare privilege of few, now it is the legal political rights of every human being residing in a territory called state. Citizenship refers to the relationship between individuals and the state. Citizenship confers certain legal and political rights and it is the duty of state to enforce and protect these rights. Not only states, citizens also have certain duties towards their fellow being, society, and the state. The concept of citizenship is closely linked to the concept of democracy. In non-democratic societies we have subjects but no citizens. Citizenship means active participation of the people in the decision-making, and the process of governance. With the emergence of globalisation, the concept of nation-state has become obsolete and with it the concept of citizenship has also lost its sheen. Now, in place of state citizenship, there is talk of global citizenship. Upanishadic vision of vasudhaiva kutumbkam is on the verge of realisation. There is also greater demand for dual citizenship in view of large-scale migration of population from one country to another. India has recently granted dual citizenship to people of Indian origin living in some countries. Modern society has been described as civil or bourgeois society by Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers. Civil society refers to the realm of private sphere of an individual. The economic competition and the independence of the individual characterise civil society. Unity of the family and other medieval associations is absent in the civil society. Civil society has emerged from the destruction of medieval society. For non-Marxist thinkers, it is a rational system, which ensures the social welfare. Marxist thinkers, however, don't agree with this thesis. Contemporary society is a multicultural society characterised by the diverse cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Multiculturalism aims at accommodating diverse identity groups into a homogeneous society, without eroding their distinct identity. Multiculturalism promotes unity in diversity and is opposed to assimilation of distinct identity groups. There exists a link

among culture, identity, and group membership. This is at the core of the quest for a new multicultural understanding of citizenship.

10.12 KEY WORDS

Multiculturalism: The term multiculturalism has a range of meanings within the contexts of sociology, of political philosophy, and of colloquial use.

Citizenship: Citizen is the status of a person recognized under the custom or law as being a legal member of a sovereign state or belonging to a nation. The idea of citizenship has been defined as the capacity of individuals to defend their rights in front of the governmental authority. A person may have multiple citizenships.

10.13 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know the Historical Perspective?
2. How do you find out Definition of the state?
3. What do you know the Global Citizenship?
4. Discuss the Dual Citizenship.
5. Describe State and the Citizen.
6. How do you know Nation-state and the Citizenship?
7. What do you know about Rights and Duties of the Citizen?
8. Discuss about Civil Society.
9. How do you know Multiculturalism and the Citizenship?

10.14 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1950)
- R. Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (1964)
- Jack Barbalet, Citizenship (1988)
- Bryan S. Turner (ed.), Citizenship and Social Theory (1993)
- M. Bulmer and A.M. Rees (eds.), Citizenship Today: The Contemporary
- Relevance of T.H. Marshall (1996)

- Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", in Amy Gutmann ed.,
- Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (1994)

10.15 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 10.2
2. See Section 10.3
3. See Section 10.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 10.5
2. See Section 10.6
3. See Section 10.7

Check Your Progress 3

1. See Section 10.8
2. See Section 10.9
3. See Section 10.10

UNIT 11: 'NEW' SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

STRUCTURE

11.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To discuss about New Social Movements: The Background
- To know New Social Movement: Concepts and Features
- To find out Distinguishing Old from the New
- To know the New Social Movements and Quest for New Identity
- To discuss the Autonomy of New Identity
- To describe New Social Movement and Resistance against Domination

11.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the middle of the last century 'social movements have moved from noninstitutionalized margins of society to its very core'. The manifestation of new forms of organised collective actions since 1950s

has added several new dimensions to the issues of social movement. In this context this unit will examine the social background of the emergence of new social movements. There are several new features of these movements. We have discussed these features at length in this unit. We have also tried to distinguish the new from the old social movements. The validity of these distinctions is also critically examined. The issues of new identity and autonomy of new social movements have been high lighted by several scholars. There issues are also examined in this unit.

11.2 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: THE BACKGROUND

Since last five decades, especially after the proliferation of the Black Civil Rights Movement in the West in 1950s and 1960s, students movements in 1960s and 1970s, Women's Movement, anti-nuclear protests, gay rights, animal rights, minority nationalism etc. ethnic movements in 1970s and thereafter, social movements has emerged to be an area of special attention. There have been sincere efforts by the social scientists to redefine social movements from a critical and cognitive perspective. In this effort the prevalent schemes of analysis were questioned and many of the elements were identified in these social movement and at times several marginal issues were emphasized in a new contexts. The emergence of new forms of collective action especially in Western Europe and North America posed serious challenges to the social movement theorists to conceptualize this phenomena in terms of the prevailing discourse on social movement studies Till 1950s the workers movements, peasants and tribal movements, at times caste, race, or linguistic and ethnic movements or other varieties of collective mobilisations are mostly explained within the Marxian framework of class struggle and the functionalist framework of mal functioning of the social order. It was however realized in the backdrop of the proliferation of these movements that these perspectives of studying social movements were deterministic. Within these conventions, social movements were analyzed mostly in terms of the ideological and organizational orientations. The Marxist scholars highlighted the class ideology of the collective mobilization. It

emphasized on the role ideology that provided the legitimacy to such mobilizations. It focused on the unequal access to and control over the means of production between the two antagonistic classes that led to conflict in the society. In the functional analysis on the other, the organizational aspect of social movement articulated. For the Functionalist social movements were sources of potential disruption to an 219 organisation. Organized collective actions are viewed as dysfunctional aspect of the society. Here only by assigning a marginal position to social movement 'integrity of the functional theoretical system was ensured. On the other hand, though the Marxist analysis is concerned with social transformation, this has identified the 'classes' to be the sole agents of social transformation. Non-class movements are viewed critically, and sometimes with contempt or hostility' (Scott, A. 1990: 2). Significantly both the Marxism and Functionalism provided single order explanation of the social movement. However the proliferation of these social movements in the 50s and 60s asked for a new perspective for analysis as there were new orientations. Most of the old movements are oriented to achieve in some form or the other materialistic goal. The new social movements on the other, are oriented to be non-materialistic, resort to plural, multiple and wide varieties of collective mobilisation, highlight the issues which cut across the boundaries of state, class, societies, culture and the nation. We shall be discussing these aspects of social movements in greats details in the next section.

11.3 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT: CONCEPTS AND FEATURES

It was indeed difficult to conceptualize the essence of all new forms of collective action within the paradigm of ideology or the rationally organised interest group. The practices of these new form of collective actions social movements are essentially non-violent, pragmatic, non-integrated, non-hierarchical, noncoercive, cross-class, cross-ideology, cross age in their constituencies (Hegedus, 1990: 63). Larana, Johnston and Guesfield (1994) suggest that the analysis of new social movements be advanced cross-culturally and by contrasting them with the class

based movements of the past. They suggest the following characteristic features of the new social movement: a) There is no clear structural role of the participants of the new social movement as, very often than not, they have diffuse social status as youth, student, women, minority, professional groups etc. b) Ideologically these movements posited in sharp contrast to the Marxian concept of ideology of the working class movement. It is difficult to characterize new social movements as conservative or liberal, right or left, capitalist or socialist. These movements exhibit plural ideas and values. c) Mobilisations are linked to issues of symbolic and cultural identities than to economic issues. d) Action within these movements is a complex mix of the collective and individual confirmation of identity. Indeed the relation between the individual and the collective is blurred in these movements. e) These movements involve personal and intimate aspects of human life, e.g. eating, dressing enjoying, loving etc habits and patterns. f) Non-violence and civil disobedience etc. are the dominant patterns of collective mobilisation to challenge the dominant-norms of conduct. g) The proliferation of these movements are caused by the credibility crisis of the conventional channels for political participation. h) The new social movements are segmented diffused and decentralized (Ibid. :6-15). Alan Scott identified the following prominent characteristics of these movements: a) These movements are primarily social and are more concerned with cultural sphere and mobilisation of civil society on socio-cultural issues, than with the political issues like seizure of power. b) These movements are 220 to be located within civil society and these are little concerned to challenge the state directly. These movements rather defend the civil societies against encroachment from increasingly technocratic state or from 'inner colonialisation' by society's technocratic sub-structure. c) These social movements attempt to bring about change through changing values and developing alternative life-styles. These social movements are concerned with cultural innovations and creation of new life-styles. These also pose a challenge to the traditional values. 'The focus on symbols and identities is viewed as the source of new social movement's significance'. The new social movements bring about changes by challenging values and identities of

the social actors rather than by more conventional and direct political actions. The processes of transformation of values, personal identities and symbols can be achieved through creation of alternative life-style and the discursive reformation of individual and collective wills. The main characteristics of new social movements organization are summarized by Scott as follows: i) locally based or centered on small groups ii) organised around specific, often local and single issue iii) cycle of movement activity and mobilisation; i.e. vacillation between periods of high and low activity, iv) often loose systems of authority, v) shifting membership, vi) 'common social critique' as the ideological frame of reference (Scott, 1990: 18).

11.4 DISTINGUISHING OLD FROM THE NEW

However, it is problematic to use organizational form as a criterion to distinguish new social movements from that of old ones. First, there is a continuum from loose to tight organization. and, because there may be a progress within the movements towards the more formal and hierarchical end of this continuum over a period of time. To Scott (1990), there are important continuities between the new and older social movements. 'Thus the claim the new movements needs to be understood in a way which is qualitatively different from traditional approaches can not be sustained on empirical grounds alone. It is rather through the underlying social changes the distinctiveness be identified (Ibid: 35). Irrespective of the distinction between the old and the new social movements we may identify the crucial roles played by social movements to develop a critic of the society. In the process of globalisation when the state is emerging to be more and more technocratic and all-powerful the voices and views of the individual citizen against the discontent of various forms remain mostly unheard. Again in the countries where the state represent the dominant section of the population, and the state machinery is involved in the corrupt practices, the access of the marginalised people even to the minimum need of the life remained unrealized. Social movements provide a framework to develop a critic of the society. It brings the institutional arrangements of the society under close scrutiny. The

organising mechanisms, collective activism and the leadership of social movement provide the required space not only to develop a critic of the society but also for a transformative politics within the given structure. It also provides the space for the emergence of plural social structure with representative civil bodies to function as watchdog in a liberal democracy. Through this critic social movement produces a new collective identity. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) have tried to define social movements as processes in the formation by which individuals create new kind of social identity. To them all social life can be seen as a combination of action and construction whose meaning is deprived from the context and the understanding of the actors derive form it. They emphasize the creative role of consciousness and cognition in human action, what they call the cognitive praxis, which transforms groups of individual into social movement. Thus the cognitive praxis gives social movement particular meaning and consciousness.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. Discuss about New Social Movements: The Background.

   ……

   ……

   ……

2. How do you know New Social Movement: Concepts and Features?

……

……

……

3. Please find out Distinguishing Old from the New.

……

……

……

11.5 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND QUEST FOR NEW IDENTITY

In the last unit we have mentioned about the significance of the process identity formation in a social movement, which has always played crucial roles to provide a sense of 'togetherness', 'we' feeling and a sense of 'belonging to' a group in all the critical stages progression of the movement. It not only develops linkages among the members of a group but also establishes linkages with the wider social processes. The process of collective identity formation not only redefines old identities, but also generates new identities with new perspective(s). In recent decades in the efforts to identify 'newness' in emerging social movements of the 1960s and there after, there has also been a genuine to have a fresh look on the issue of identity in social movements. In the structural functional analysis of the society empirical categories (e.g. tribe, caste, race, aged, etc) has got a place of prominence while describing collective identities of these categories. In the Marxian analysis, on the other hand economic position has got a place of prominence in defining collectivities as 'class'. In this paradigm social identity has been reduced to class identity, which undergoes a process of formation/ transformation from 'class in itself' to 'class for itself. We shall highlight this formation/transformation little later. However, since late 1960s and onward, especially after the proliferation of the students, Green Peace, Black Civil Rights, women's etc movements in the United States and Western Europe efforts are made to comprehend and analyze the emerging processes of new collective identify formation in these social movements and the guiding principles towards these formations. It has been widely realized that it is not merely the empirical and the economic class position, but rather the issue of values, culture, subjectivity, morality, empowerment etc played crucial roles towards the formation of new collective identities in these movements. For example, after studying students' movement in Europe and America, Bertaux (1990) adds the view that "subjectivity" and "idealism" are essential elements of social movement and must be taken seriously. To quote him: subjectivity is central to an understanding of action and especially in the context of social movements, where action is not just norm abiding behaviour, but innovative and risky. Such concept

as 'attitudes' or 'values' denote only one fraction of the personality while subjectivity refers to the subject in its totality." Indeed, Bertaux talks about the collective subjectivity: "it concerns with the drastic change in the fabric of social life that takes place when a new movement is born." Regarding idealism, citing example from the first developing western societies, he observes that people who started social movements "were moved by a strong moral feelings—by idealism, rather than by a drive towards self interest" (1990:153). Social movements help generate a sense of collective identity and new ideas that recognizes the reality itself. This reality is indeed context, culture, historicity and group specific. Melucci has emphasized on collective identity formation "which is an achieved definition of a situation, constructed and negotiated through the constitution of social networks which then connect the members of a group or movement through collective action to provide distinctive meaning to collective action. To him, what holds individual together as a 'we' can never be completely translated into the logic of means-ends calculation or political rationality, but always carries with it margins of nonnegotiability in the reasons for an ways of acting together' (Melucci 1992). To him, social movements grow around relationship of new social identity that are voluntarily conceived "to empower" members in defense of this identity (1992, 1996). Eyerman and Jamison (1991) assert that 'by articulating consciousness, social movement provides public spaces for generating new thoughts, activating new actors, generating new ideas. Thus by producing new knowledge, by reflecting on their own cognitive identity, by saying what they stand for, by challenging the dominant assumptions of the social order, social movements develop new ideas those are fundamental to the process of 222 human creativity. Thus social movements develop worldviews that restructure cognition, that re-cognize reality itself. The cognitive praxis of social movements is an important source of new social images and transformation of societal identities (1991: 161-166). Hegedus (1990) asserts that social movements involve actions for 'doing'. 'The involvement in an action is a matter of conscience and emotion, of responsibility and intention, of reflection and (com) passion, it is basically moral, global and individual (1990: 266). Thus social

movements are framed based on a collective identity of various groups viz., women, environmentalists, students, peasant, worker etc. who are organised on the basis of common identity and interests. To Allan Scott (1991), in a social movement the actor's collective identity is linked to their understanding of their social situation. To him 'a social movement is a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common interest, and at least some significant part of their social existence, a common identity' (1991: 6)

Transformation of Identity Social movements not only help generating new collective identity these also provide a broad field for the transformation of social identity [e.g. transforming Serie into groups en fusion, (Sartre 1960), 'class-in-itself' to 'class-for-itself', (Marx 1974) etc.]. Sartre calls serie the normal state of crowds; that is, series of atomized individuals, each one seen as isolated in his or her inner world going his or her own way and not caring about the other's ways. What Sartre is pointing out, however, is that, whenever and wherever this figure is actually doing or even walking in the street, it has a silent companion: 'social control'. "The public space is wholly under the control of the established power. Every individual, whatever she or he thinks of the manifest public discourse 'All is well' and its latent content 'Noting can be changed', whether he or she accepts the rule of this power or rejects it, does so secretly, thus behaving as if accepting it. Therefore each one, looking at all the others who work, comply and keep quiet, thinks they are alone in secretly rejecting this social order. When, however, frustration mounts in each person individually, it takes only a small event to trigger an instantaneous and massive change of state, from serie to groupe en fusion. As soon as each person in a serialized mass realizes that some others contest the established power, as he or she takes one step forward to openly express support, a chain reaction spreads through the atomized series and transforms it into a fluid group (sartre's groupe en fusion) which instantly moves from the status of subordinated passive object to that of subject capable of action." (cf. Bertaux. 1990: 155-156). Indeed, new social movements provide the required platform for such transformation. In the Marxian analysis transformation in the collective identity has been viewed as transformation of the class

identities from that of 'class-in 'itself' to 'class-for-itself'. In this analogy, however, transformation of societal identity is viewed in terms of the transformation of class identities only. It is important that in the context of transformation of a social movements new identities do emerge from within the old ones. For example in the process of sustained moblisation of the peasantry in West Bangal and Andhra Pradesh new identities have emerged in these peasant societies in the form of gender, ethnicity and caste identities. We shall be discussing this issue in the last section of this unit.

11.6 AUTONOMY OF NEW IDENTITY

Can new identity as formed out of collective action be autonomous of the ideology and organisation of the movement? Scholars have identified new social movement's ideology with freedom and life. In this context the notion of autonomy is crucial. There are several dimensions to this issue. 223 1) Personal autonomy: 'Psycho-social practices, such as consciousness arising within the women's movement, have had at least one of their aims - the liberation of individual women from personal and ideological barriers to personal freedom through the reconstruction of their life histories and by making them aware of personal oppressions, while at the same time stressing their potential power as women'. 2) Extension of Personal and Group Autonomy: 'The narrowly defined political aims of these movements are comprehended as an extension of personal and group autonomy by challenging several restrictions on freedom'. Thus the arguments for free abortions on demand can be viewed as a way of increasing a women's freedom to make choices concerning her own body, of removal or gender or racial discrimination at work as extending of range of individual or collective freedom enjoyed by group members' 3) Autonomy struggle: Autonomy struggle of the new social movements demands that the representatives of these movements be allowed to fight their own "without interference from other movements and without subordinating their demands to other external priorities'. These aspects of autonomy are closely linked (Scott, 1990:18-20). However, any attempt to conceptualize new social movements exclusively in terms of autonomy may be confusing. The

distinction between personal and political is not very clean. The issue of personal autonomy, freedom etc. are political in nature" (Scott, 90: 23). The assumption that new social movement is autonomous of political interference and is essentially concerned with cultural issues is also not valid. Many of the new social movements are concerned with the political questions, for example 'citizens' rights; representations, civil rights movements. All these are oriented towards political and legal institutions. Thus the issue of autonomy is to be circumscribed specifically in the context of the social movement under study.

11.7 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND RESISTANCE AGAINST DOMINATION

Actors in subordinate positions are never wholly dependent and are often very adept at converting whatsoever resources they possess into some degree of control over the conditions of reproduction of the system (Giddens (1982). Thus 'compliance of the subordinate within the power relations may be explained not by lack of resistance, but by the absence of the means to implement such resistance' (Mann 1985). The structure of the domination thus, is not free from contestation. There have been resistance and struggle in various forms against this domination. To J.C. Scott even in the large-scale structures of domination the subordinates have a fairly extensive social existence outside the immediate control of the dominant. It is in such settings that a shared critique of domination develops by way of 'creating a 'hidden transcript' that represents a critique of power as spoken behind the back of the dominant.' He suggests that rumours, gossip, folktales, songs, gestures, jokes and the theater of the powerless function as a mechanism to indirectly develop a critique of power (1990: viii). Let us examine the ways, new collective identities have emerged in India as a language of resistance against domination. New Collective Identities: Identity is a social construction. 'It is a continually shifting description of ourselves' (Hall 1990). Identities are emerged based on the probability of choice, plurality of options and reasons. And to 'to deny plurality, choice and reasoning in identity can be a source of repression' (Sen 1999: 22). Identities are self-cognition tied to roles, through roles, to positions in organized social

relationships. That a given identity can be invoked in a variety of situations or it 'can be defined as differential probability.' Here ' we may reflect on the multiple identities of the contemporary subject, that is the 224 weaving of the patterns of identity from the discourses of class, race, nation gender, etc.(Stryker 1990:873–74). The construction of identity also involves the social production of boundaries reflecting the process of inclusion and exclusion (Cerutti 2001). As collective identity is a matter of social construction, it gets reconstructed in multiple ways in the process of transformation of social movements. Social movements not only help generate new collective identity , but also provide a broad field for the transformation of this identity. Sustained grassroots mobilizations have paved the way for the articulation and rejuvenation of gender, caste, farmer, citizen, and ethnic etc identities. In West Bengal peasants have been part of the Kamtapuri Movement as in North Bengal, and limited NGO activism and in Andhra Pradesh the anti-Arrack (prohibition) movement, Maadigaa and Thudum Debba, Telangana statehood movement civil liberties, farmers etc movements. The Kamtapur movement for regional, cultural, ethnic autonomy of the Rajbanshi (a Scheduled caste) has started gaining ground in north Bengal with the demand of a separate state comprising the six districts of Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling, North Dinajpur, South Dinajpur and Malda. To initiate this movement, a regional party by the name of Uttarakhand Dal was formed in 1980. Now this movement has got momentum under the leadership of the Kamtapur People's Party (KPP). Through this movement the Rajbanshis are putting up resistance against the gradual erosion of their cultural and linguistic identity, and their economic marginalization in society. They allege that north Bengal has been economically neglected and politically dominated by the Kolkata centered state administration of West Bengal. This movement has taken a new turn with the formation of an extremist group called the Kamtapuri Liberation Organisation (KLO) which has initiated frontal attack on the Left activists in various parts of North Bengal. A section of the Rajbanshis, who are now growing more and more identity conscious in terms of history, language, traditional social structure, occupation and land rights has become part of this movement. Unemployed educated

youth and school dropouts are more open in expressing their adherence to this movement than others. A young men from Naxalbari (who preferred to remain unidentified in the wake of police action against KLO activists), says: "We are deprived of all opportunities in our own land. The outsiders own the tea gardens. All government services are taken away and manned by the bhatias (Bengali migrants from other part of the state). … Marwaris and Punjabis who look down upon us, own all the businesses. They laugh at our language, our food habits, and our dress. We have to speak in their language in our own land…….". Though the separate Telangana statehood movement in the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh has a long history, it has got a momentum in recent years with the formation of the Telangana Rastriya Samithi (TRS) and its electoral success in the last election. Several issues have been raised pertaining to Andhra domination over the Telangana region in the economic, cultural and political terms. Most important among these have been that of the exploitation of the natural resources of Telangana for the benefits of the other parts of the state, appointment of more and more Andhra-speaking people in the government jobs in the Telangana region, and persisting agricultural backwardness, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, etc., of the people of Telangana. The economic miseries of Telangana are explained in terms of Andhra domination over Telangana. 'The wholesale exploitation of the resources of Telangana for the benefit of the Andhra region is accompanied by attacks on the way of life of the Telangana people. …The Andhra rulers are never tired of saying that the people of Telangana are uncultured. Thus the suicidal attempt to subjugate Telangana permanently continues' (Jadhav 1997) Again Maadigaa Reservation Porata Samithi movement of the Scheduled Castes 225 and Thudum Debba movement of the Scheduled Tribes are demanding recategorization of each of the Scheduled castes and tribes of Andhra Pradesh into A, B, C, and D categories based on their levels of economic, educational and political advancement for the purpose of getting benefits of reservation. Again there have been the cotton growers' and anti-suicide movements of the farmers in the Telangana region. The anti-arrack movement led by peasant women has had its strong impact all over Andhra Pradesh. Poor peasants have been parts of most of these

movements. For example, Rajeeramma, the female sarpanch of Malla Reddy Palle, was associated with the anti-arrack movement. She is also a strong advocate of the Maadigaa reservation movement, and a participant in the cotton growers and anti-suicide movements. She is also part of the separate Telangana state movement. She says, 'the life of a peasant women in Telangana is full of struggle and we are all part of the struggle in Telangana'. The Left political parties have tried both ideologically and strategically to inculcate the 'class for itself' identity of the peasantry. However, over the years, in the process of ideological modification and strategic class alliance with the landed gentry for electoral politics, the basis of class-based politics has widely eroded among the peasantry (Bhattacharyya 1999). Again as the class identity has not looked many of the micro issues. Thus in alongside the old actors of the class, groups, political parties and the state with all its instruments, new actors have emerged' in the form of caste, gender, ethnicity and religion (Webster 1999).

Autonomy of Identity: The process of transformation peasant movements from radicalization to institutionalization has exhibited a trend of transition from the so-called 'old' to 'new' social movements. It has been highlighted that new social movements do not bear a clear relation to the structural role of the participants, that their social base transcends class structures, that they exhibit plural ideas and values, that their ideological characteristics stand in sharp contrast to the Marxist concept of ideology as a unifying and totalizing element for collective action, and that they involve the emergence of new collective identities. 'These characteristics of the new social movements however are not independent of their links with the past. Nor is there any absence of continuity with the old, although that varies with each movement … Even movements with old histories have emerged in new forms with more diffuse goals and different modes of mobilization and conversion. It is both the newness of expression and extension as well as the magnitude and saliency of such movements that constitutes the basis for revised frameworks of understanding' (Larana, Johnston and Guesfield 1984: 8–9). The social agenda of the new social movements are 'based on local movements with multiple identities located in civil society, stressing new ways of social

communication (solidarity and mutual understanding) and a new harmonic relationship with nature (Schuurman 1993: 189). In the context of West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh, it is observed that the old mass movements that advocated the emancipatory projects for the proletariat through seizure of political power have given birth to various local movements of multiple identities in the process of transformation of these movements and sustenance of these mobilisations. These have started exhibiting a plurality of ideas, values, ideological orientations and collective action. The process of formation of new collective identities frequently and explicitly transcends the pre-defined process of class identity formation as most of the new collective identities, namely, gender, caste, region and ethnicity, are autonomous of the given aims and objectives of the movement of the Left parties. It would however be problematic to describe the autonomy of the evolved patterns of identity in terms of the new social movements alone, as the substantive issues involved in mobilization do not purely belong to the cultural 226 domain alone. There are several political and economic issues involved in these mobilizations rather. Through their everyday experiences of struggle and prolonged participation in collective action the peasantry has been trained to defend their identity and to articulate the strategy of their resistance against domination. These everyday life experiences of resistance form the basis of the praxis of peasantry against domination whereby they have also got alternative choices to express their resistance against domination In the context of new social movements, the notion of autonomy has been used as the expression of personal autonomy, extension of personal and group autonomy and as an expression of autonomy struggle whereby social movements are allowed to grow without interference from the outside (Scott. 1990). Subaltern studies have, on the other hand, visualized the autonomy of the peasant struggle in terms of their localized manifestations. Ranajit Guha argues that during the colonial period, subaltern constituted an autonomous domain with wide variety of generally autonomous modes of thought and action expressed through rebellions, riots and popular movements. To him ‘rebellion was not, therefore, merely some automatic reflex action to external economic or political stimulus; it was ‘peasant praxis’, the

expression through peasant action of the collective consciousness of the peasantry (Guha 1983). According to Sumit Sarkar, the spontaneous unrest like the looting of hats, tribal movements, kisan movements, and so on often tended to remain autonomous, scattered and remained mostly outside the ambit of the mainstream nationalist movement in colonial India. He also points out that the poor man typically outmatches his oppressor not through any kind of joint action but through an individual battle of wits and often at a great cost to himself (Sarkar 1985: 51– 62). Partha Chatterjee is of the view that the 'dominant groups, in their exercise of domination do not consume or destroy the dominated classes for there would be no relation of power and hence no domination. Without their autonomy the subalterns would have no identity of their own (Chatterjee 1998: 166). The new identities as have been evolved and constructed in the peasant societies of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are in their own ways autonomous of the organizational, ideological and pre-defined boundaries of collectivities as propagated in the class discourse. However these multiple identities of caste, gender, region, ethnicity, etc., have defined boundaries of inclusion and exclusion—and also at times use the organizational linkages and ideologies of wider society as guiding principles for their actions. For example, the ethnic movements in north Bengal and in the Telangana region, the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes reservation movements, civil liberties women's groups etc have formed their own organizations at the regional and the state level. Likewise, is the process of formation of NGOs, which is linked with the emerging social development discourse of 'development with empowerment'. The self-assertion of, say, a scheduled caste labourer, and a tribal woman are also linked to the resurgence of the Dalit and women's movements at the grassroots. But all these identities, and linkages of these identities to the wider world, are not sudden manifestations. Nor are they imposed from outside by the intervention of outside agencies. Rather, peasantry has articulated their issues through their everyday experiences, and the new identities are formed from within in the process of responding to the emerging challenges they regularly face. Sustained mobilizations have made the peasantry aware of the various bases of their oppression and

subordination in society, be it caste, class, ethnicity, regionalism, gender, etc. Hence they are to articulate accordingly the art of their resistance both individually and collectively; if needed by reconstructing parallel, and at times alternative, identities. Here linkages with outside agencies come at a later stage through increasing interactivity with the larger world around. Pulla Ravindran) a scheduled caste leader from Warangal 227 in Andhra Pradesh, recollects his experience: We have been oppressed and exploited in various ways. At times we are exploited as the Maadigaa scheduled caste. Our women are exploited as women, labourers, and as scheduled caste members. We are also exploited and discriminated against as Telanganites … As we have been aware of the various situations of our oppression, we resist it in all possible ways. Our oppression however does not end. If we resist from one direction, it appears from the other.. We try to resist oppression from all possible directions now. In spite of transformation of the peasant movements from the phase of radicalization to institutionalization, and sustenance of the mobilizations, the peasantry continues to be marginalized. Though their identity has been reconstructed over the years, the elements of marginality—both in the socioeconomic and the political sense—remain attached to them. The issue of livelihood security is of crucial significance to the peasantry. They tend to use the available channels of political mobilization and activism to ensure the daily livelihood. They are to compromise at times with the structure of domination for their livelihood security. In this context, their participation in routinized collective mobilization, even if it contributes to their domination, is a matter of their rational calculation. Indeed, through sustained mobilization, peasants have been able to carve out a space for the articulation of their interests and formation of new identities that look for liberation from the coercive bases of dependency and domination. Through these identities they try to gain legitimacy of their praxis against domination.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. What do you know the New Social Movements and Quest for New Identity?

……

……

……

2. Discuss the Autonomy of New Identity.

……

……

……

3. Describe New Social Movement and Resistance against Domination.

……

……

……

11.8 LET US SUM UP

In this unit we have discussed the socio-political background of the emergence of new social movements in the West. Scholars have identified several new features of these social phenomena. We have briefly highlighted these features. The distinguishing features between the new and the old social movement are also discussed here. Formation of new collective identity and autonomy of these identities have been subjects of critical query in the social movement studies. There issues have also been discussed here. In the last section we have discussed the process emergence of new collective identities with the transformation of social movements. Here articulation of language of resistance against domination as emerged within new social movements her also been discussed.

The most noticeable feature of new social movements is that they are primarily social and cultural and only secondarily, if any, political. Departing from the worker's movement, which was central to the political aim of gaining access for the working class with the extension of citizenship and representation, new social movements such as youth culture movement concentrate on bringing about social mobilization through cultural innovations, development of new life-styles and

transformation of identities. It is clearly elaborated by Habermas that new social movements are the 'new politics' which is about quality of life, individual self-realisation and human rights whereas the 'old politics' focus on economic, political, and military security. This can be exemplified in the gay liberation, the focus of which broadens out from political issue to social and cultural realization and acceptance of homosexuality. Hence, new social movements are understood as new because they are first and foremost social.

New social movements also give rise to a great emphasis on the role of post-material values in contemporary and post-industrial society as opposed to conflicts over material resources. According to Melucci, one of the leading new social movement theorists, these movements arise not from relations of production and distribution of resources but within the sphere of reproduction and the life world, as a result of which, the concern has shifted from the sole production of economic resources directly connected to the needs for survival or for reproduction to cultural production of social relations, symbols and identities. In other words, the contemporary social movements are rejections of the materialistic orientation of consumerism in capitalist societies by questioning the modern idea that links the pursuit of happiness and success closely to growth, progress and increased productivity and by promoting alternative values and understandings in relation to the social world. As an example, the environmental movement that has appeared since the late 1960s throughout the world, with its strong points in the United States and Northern Europe, has significantly brought about a 'dramatic reversal' in the ways we consider the relationship between economy, society and nature.

Further, new social movements are located in civil society or the cultural sphere as a major arena for collective action rather than instrumental action in the state, which Claus Offe characterises as 'bypass the state'. Moreover, with its little concern to directly challenge the state, new movements are regarded as anti-authoritarian and resisted incorporation in institutional levels. They tend to focus on single issue, or a limited range of issues connected to a single broad theme such as peace and environment. Without the attempt to develop a total politics under a

single focus, new social movements set their stress on grass-roots in the aim of representing the interests of marginal or excluded groups. Paralleled with this ideology, the organization form of new collective actions is also locally based, centred on small social groups and loosely held by personal or informational networks such as radios, newspapers and posters. This 'local- and issue-centred' characteristic which does not necessarily require a highly agreed ideology or agreement on ultimate ends makes these new movements distinctive from the 'old' labour movement with a high degree of tolerance of political and ideological difference appealing to broader sections of population.

Additionally, if old social movements namely the worker's movement presupposed a working –class base and ideology, the new social movements are presumed to draw from a different social class base, that is, 'the new class', as a complex contemporary class structure that Claus Offe identifies as 'threefold': the new middle class, elements of the old middle class and peripheral groups outside the labour market. As stated by Offe, the new middle class in association with the old one is evolved in the new social movements because of their high levels of education and their access to information and resources that lead to the questions of the way society is valued; the group of people that are marginal in terms of labour market such as students, housewives and the unemployed participate in the collective actions as a consequence of their disposable resource of time, their position in the receiving end of bureaucratic control and disability to be fully engaged in the society based on employment and consumption. The main character in old social movements, the industrial working class, nonetheless, is absent here in the class base of new social mobilizations.

Some sociologists, like Paul Bagguley and Nelson Pichardo,criticize NSM theory for a number of reasons, including:

- the movements concerned with non-materialistic issues existed (in one extent or another) during the industrial period and traditional movements, concerned with economic well-being, still exist today,

- there are few unique characteristics of the new social movements, when compared to the traditional movements,
- differences between older and newer movements have been explained by older theories.
- there is doubt in terms of whether contemporary movements are specifically a product of postindustrial society,
- NSM focuses almost exclusively on left-wing movements and does not consider right-wing,
- the term "new middle class" is amorphous and not consistently defined, and
- might be better viewed as a certain instance of social movement theory rather than a brand new one.

11.9 KEY WORDS

Social Movement: A social movement is a type of group action. There is no single consensus definition of a social movement. They are large, sometimes informal, groupings of individuals or organizations which focus on specific political or social issues. In other words, they carry out, resist, or undo a social change.

11.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. Discuss about New Social Movements: The Background.
2. How do you know New Social Movement: Concepts and Features?
3. Please find out Distinguishing Old from the New.
4. What do you know the New Social Movements and Quest for New Identity?
5. Discuss the Autonomy of New Identity.
6. Describe New Social Movement and Resistance against Domination.

11.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Larana, E.et al.(Eds) 1984. New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity. Temple University Press: Philadelphia.

- Scott, A.C. 1991. Ideology and New Social Movements. Unwin Hyman: London.
- Buechler, Steven M. New Social Movement Theories, Sociological Quarterly Volume 36 Issue 3, Pages 441 - 464, 1995.
- Enablers, T.C., 2014. 'Informal Networks and New Social Movements'. Internet Source sighted Nov. 2014. Available: http://www.laceweb.org.au/inf.htm
- Enablers, T.C., 2014. 'The Fastest Growing New Social Movement on the Planet'. Internet Source sighted Nov. 2014. Available: http://www.laceweb.org.au/fgn.htm
- Enablers, T.C., 2014. 'Realising Human Potential'. Internet Source sighted Jan. 2015. Available: http://www.laceweb.org.au/rhp.htm
- Hawken, Paul. Blessed Unrest. Viking, 2007. ISBN 978-0-670-03852-7
- Temelini, Michael (2014). "Dialogical approaches to struggles over recognition and distribution". Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 17 (4): 423–447. doi:10.1080/13698230.2013.763517.
- Arora, N.D. (2010). Political Science for Civil Services Main Examination. Tata McGraw-Hill Education. ISBN 978-0-07-009094-1.
- Steven M. Buechler, Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 1999, ISBN 0-19-512604-1, ISBN 0195126041&id=EQdQjRQlwKEC&pg=PA46&lpg=PA46&dq=diverse+array+of+collective+actions+that+has+presumably+displaced+the+old+social+movement+of+proletarian+revolution&sig=m1A-1fv6gZZNdo-j-DxgmKjfgOg Google Print, p.46
- Byrne, Paul (1997). Social Movements in Britain. Theory and practice in British politics. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-07122-2.
- Diana Kendall, Sociology In Our Times, Thomson Wadsworth, 2005, ISBN 0-534-64629-8 ISBN 0534646298&id=kzU-gtx2VfoC&pg=PA533&lpg=PA532&printsec=8&vq=frame+analysis&dq=%22Resource+Mobilization%22&sig=aA0H4taRrVcMNzoVJ-i37FheWNo Google Print, p.533

- Nelson A. Pichardo, New Social Movements: A Critical Review, Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 23: 411-430, 1997. [1]
- Rootes, C. A. (1989). "Book review: Against the Bomb by Richard Taylor; The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament by Paul Byrne". Sociology. 23 (3): 463–465. doi:10.1177/0038038589023003021. JSTOR 42853880.
- Scott, A. (1990) Ideology and the New Social Movements London: Unwin Hyman
- Staricco (2012) The French May and the Roots of Postmodern Politics. https://www.scribd.com/doc/112409042/The-French-May-and-the-Roots-of-Postmodern-Politics
- Charles, N. (2002) Feminism, the State and Social Policy London: Macmillan
- Buechler, S, M. (1995) 'New Social Movement Theories' in The Sociological Quarterly, 36 (3): 441-64
- Castells, M. (2004) The Power of Identity (Second Edition) London: Blackwell
- Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Second Edition). London: Verso

11.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 11.2
2. See Section 11.3
3. See Section 11.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 11.5
2. See Section 11.6
3. See Section 11.7

UNIT 12: POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION

STRUCTURE

12.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know Definition of Globalization
- To understand Core Characteristics of Globalization
- To discuss the Perceptions of the Protagonists
- To know the Perceptions of the Critics
- To discuss International Relations Theory (IR) and Globalization
- To understand the Formulation of IR Theory on "Globalised" State

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Political globalization refers to the growth of the worldwide political system, both in size and complexity. That system includes national

governments, their governmental and intergovernmental organizations as well as government-independent elements of global civil society such as international non-governmental organizations and social movement organizations. One of the key aspects of the political globalization is the declining importance of the nation-state and the rise of other actors on the political scene. William R. Thompson has defined it as "the expansion of a global political system, and its institutions, in which inter-regional transactions (including, but certainly not limited to trade) are managed". Political globalization is one of the three main dimensions of globalization commonly found in academic literature, with the two other being economic globalization and cultural globalization.

Intergovernmentalism is a term in political science with two meanings. The first refers to a theory of regional integration originally proposed by Stanley Hoffmann; the second treats states and the national government as the primary factors for integration. Multi-level governance is an approach in political science and public administration theory that originated from studies on European integration. Multi-level governance gives expression to the idea that there are many interacting authority structures at work in the emergent global political economy. It illuminates the intimate entanglement between the domestic and international levels of authority.

Some people are citizens of multiple nation-states. Multiple citizenship, also called dual citizenship or multiple nationality or dual nationality, is a person's citizenship status, in which a person is concurrently regarded as a citizen of more than one state under the laws of those states.

U.S. military presence around the world in 2007. As of 2015, the U.S. still had many bases and troops stationed globally.

Increasingly, non-governmental organizations influence public policy across national boundaries, including humanitarian aid and developmental efforts. Philanthropic organizations with global missions are also coming to the forefront of humanitarian efforts; charities such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Accion International, the Acumen Fund (now Acumen) and the Echoing Green have combined the business model with philanthropy, giving rise to business organizations

such as the Global Philanthropy Group and new associations of philanthropists such as the Global Philanthropy Forum. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation projects include a current multibillion-dollar commitment to funding immunizations in some of the world's more impoverished but rapidly growing countries. The Hudson Institute estimates total private philanthropic flows to developing countries at US$59 billion in 2010.

As a response to globalization, some countries have embraced isolationist policies. For example, the North Korean government makes it very difficult for foreigners to enter the country and strictly monitors their activities when they do. Aid workers are subject to considerable scrutiny and excluded from places and regions the government does not wish them to enter. Citizens cannot freely leave the country

The prime objective of this unit is to understand the globalisationis at ion'^ both in respect of its content and significance in order that it serves as a basis to apply it or appreciate it in the study of International Relations. For, after all, most current discourse on International Relations not only quite frequently use the tern1 "globalisation" but some even point to the utility of studying contemporary international relations without references to the ramifications of the phenomenon of "globalisation". It is said that the tent1 "globalisation" was first used in French literature on International Relations dating back to the early 1950s. (The French tech for globalisation is). However, the usage of the technical in International Relations literature has come about in very recent years especially in the wake of the so-called revolution in information and communication technology. Although the then "globalisation" is widely used yet there appears to be no agreement in terms of what this phenomenon represents. In that sense, it is as popular in current use as it is contested in respect of what it signifies.

Globalization has wrought transformations of similar scale: in how people live, work, identify and aggregate, communicate and engage – locally, nationally, internationally, globally, and how they are educated. Changes are taking place in the nature of the state itself, in how states interact, and in the roles of supra- and non-state actors in organizing and affecting human behavior. At the core of contemporary globalization are

transformations in how capital flows throughout the globe and is linked to production and consumption, in how energy is harnessed and consumed, in how information and knowledge are created, transmitted and conserved, how labor is employed and deployed, and how value is created, distributed, conserved and destroyed. This chapter provides some suggestions for navigating this terrain: a set of observations, questions, propositions, perhaps even insights, into possible courses of action directed at aligning emergent education with parallel social, economic and political needs. The task is complicated if only because the processes of education are long and drawn out, whereas the pace of change associated with globalization has quickened and its consequences are far-reaching and substantial. At times it would seem as if the challenge confronting contemporary education is to prepare a generation for hoped-for successes in a world the contours of which we have only begun to glimpse (Friedman 2005).

How significant is the 'globalization' revolution of our day? Some see it as nothing of the kind, as a mere extension, albeit an important one, of ways in which the world has been integrating economically for centuries (Bentley & Ziegler 2006). Others view it as profound, a collection of changes, rapid and fundamental, that are transforming how the world works, how we perceive each other, indeed, how we make up society (Johnston et al. 2002). I confess that I adhere to the latter school. In my view contemporary globalization has brought into play a set of forces arguably as far-reaching as those that marked the history of the industrial revolution and the political and economic shifts that followed. Globalization has wrought transformations of similar scale: in how people live, work, identify and aggregate, communicate and engage - locally, nationally, internationally, globally, and how they are educated. Changes are taking place in the nature of the state itself, in how states interact, and in the roles of supra- and non-state actors in organizing and affecting human behavior. At the core of contemporary globalization are transformations in how capital flows throughout the globe and is linked to production and consumption, in how energy is harnessed and consumed, in how information and knowledge are created, transmitted and conserved, how labor is

employed and deployed, and how value is created, distributed, conserved and destroyed.

As a social enterprise, from early childhood to post-graduate, public and private, secular and religious, education is located in the very midst of these complex processes of change. In important ways - whatever its other messages - education is always about some notion of how the world works and how it should work. Through the educational process we seek to organize and convey to others, most particularly the rising generation, a sense of our collective selves, the world we live in, our aspirations, values and wisdom. In situations in which the pace and reach of social change are great, tensions surrounding education are heightened because as a social activity it is framed by its essential conservatisms of knowledge transmission and conservation, which are challenged by novelty, invention, and innovation. Educational institutions too frequently find themselves pressed to respond rapidly to changing social environments armed with insufficient resources and uncertain maps of emerging social needs. At such moments, the certitudes of what we seek to impart to the rising generation are threatened, as are those who impart them. Under these conditions social and political conflicts erupt over the disputed propriety of various forms of knowledge, belief and value. Challenged by the rapidly changing social contexts of contemporary globalization, education becomes contested terrain. This chapter provides some suggestions for navigating this terrain: a set of observations, questions, propositions, perhaps even insights, into possible courses of action directed at aligning emergent education with parallel social, economic and political needs. The task is complicated if only because the processes of education are long and drawn out, whereas the pace of change associated with globalization has quickened and its consequences are far-reaching and substantial. At times it would seem as if the challenge confronting contemporary education is to prepare a generation for hoped-for successes in a world the contours of which we have only begun to glimpse (Friedman 2005).

Globalization appears to have as many definitions as commentators. A useful definition is offered by David Held for whom globalization is:

…the product of the emergence of a global economy, expansion of transnational linkages between economic units creating new forms of collective decision making, development of intergovernmental and quasi-supranational institutions, intensification of transnational communications, and the creation of new regional and military orders. (Held 1991, p. 216) Jill Blackmore addresses other dimensions by viewing globalization as…increased economic, cultural, environmental, and social interdependencies and new transnational financial and political formations arising out of the mobility of capital, labor and information, with both homogenizing and differentiating tendencies" (Blackmore 2000 p. 133).The elements that may be extracted from these two definitions - global economy, transnational linkages, new forms of collective decision making, development of inter-government and quasi-supranational institutions, intensification of transnational communication, creation of new regional and military orders, increased economic, cultural, environmental and social interdependences, new transnational financial and political formations, the mobility or capital, labor and information and the simultaneous homogenizing and differentiating tendencies of this all - figure in some way or another in literally hundreds of other definitions of globalization.1 Utilizing these elements as a frame of reference serves us well Whatever else people may be thinking about when they speak of globalization, it is likely that they have some sense of a greater interaction between economic actors in the creation and exchange of goods and symbols and the social and cultural consequences that flow from this. In everyday life such features as Michael Jordan and Nike shoes and garments, Asian groceries in mid-western US towns, English language call centers located in Delhi, Coke signs in the multiple local languages, Japanese and Korean cars, American movies and soap operas originating from a wide variety of cultures give tangible meaning to the abstraction 'globalization' for vast numbers throughout the world. The complex dynamics of globalization produce effects that impinge significantly on how education is conducted, up to and including the transformation of education as a commodity to be exchanged in globalized markets.

Some critical elements of globalization. Fundamentally, globalization is about exchange dynamics in the contemporary world. David Harvey's early work on globalization, The Condition of Postmodernity, locates the ubiquity of change as a central feature of globalization. Increases in the kind and rate of change taking place result in the telescoping of time and space, creating a world of proximate immediacy (Harvey 1991). The world capitalist system, which he sees as continuously expanding to inscribe life throughout the globe, is itself characterized by a continued increase in the velocity of exchanges that constitute its primary dynamics. At the heart of these changes have been fundamental transformations in the world economic system.

Modern multi-national corporations, which soon came to be termed transnational corporations (TNCs) were at the forefront of this current historic wave of globalization. Related genealogically to the great international corporations that arose in the nineteenth and early

Some critical elements of globalization. Fundamentally, globalization is about exchange dynamics in the contemporary world. David Harvey's early work on globalization, The Condition of Postmodernity, locates the ubiquity of change as a central feature of globalization. Increases in the kind and rate of change taking place result in the telescoping of time and space, creating a world of proximate immediacy (Harvey 1991). The world capitalist system, which he sees as continuously expanding to inscribe life throughout the globe, is itself characterized by a continued increase in the velocity of exchanges that constitute its primary dynamics. At the heart of these changes have been fundamental transformations in the world economic system.

Modern multi-national corporations, which soon came to be termed transnational corporations (TNCs) were at the forefront of this current historic wave of globalization. Related genealogically to the great international corporations that arose in the nineteenth and early

Some critical elements of globalization. Fundamentally, globalization is about exchange dynamics in the contemporary world. David Harvey's early work on globalization, The Condition of Postmodernity, locates the ubiquity of change as a central feature of globalization. Increases in the kind and rate of change taking place result

in the telescoping of time and space, creating a world of proximate immediacy (Harvey 1991). The world capitalist system, which he sees as continuously expanding to inscribe life throughout the globe, is itself characterized by a continued increase in the velocity of exchanges that constitute its primary dynamics. At the heart of these changes have been fundamental transformations in the world economic system. Modern multi-national corporations, which soon came to be termed transnational corporations (TNCs) were at the forefront of this current historic wave of globalization. Related genealogically to the great international corporations that arose in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these corporations emerged in the post-WWII period as a new breed of powerful economic actors intent on developing economic capabilities integrated throughout the world (Barnet & Mueller 1974). Often (but not always) retaining 'brand' names that mark their countries of national origin, TNCs operate in a global marketplace, seeking profit through the production and sale of goods and services in ways that increasingly have little to do with their country of origin (including its values, culture and language). These are the attributes that encourage some authors to speak of the invention of a global corporate culture, or global culture, or even "MacCulture" (Barber 1996). Throughout the decade of the 1960s, TNCs led the relocation of manufacturing from the older 'core' industrial countries to developing countries where strategic investments of capital could combine with readily available and cheaper labor to raise returns on investment. Robert Reich (who would become Secretary of Labor under President Clinton) could write in the early 1990s that, for most important purposes, significant world manufacturing had moved away from the older industrial nations, leaving behind societies caught in the dynamics of de-industrialization and widespread economic restructuring (Reich 1991). The key to global economic restructuring has been foreign direct investment (FDI), the investment of capital from one nation directly in the ownership of enterprises in another.

12.2 TOWARDS DEFINITION OF GLOBALIZATION

Globalization or globalisation is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide. As a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, globalization is considered by some as a form of capitalist expansion which entails the integration of local and national economies into a global, unregulated market economy. Globalization has grown due to advances in transportation and communication technology. With the increased global interactions comes the growth of international trade, ideas, and culture. Globalization is primarily an economic process of interaction and integration that's associated with social and cultural aspects. However, conflicts and diplomacy are also large parts of the history of globalization, and modern globalization.

Economically, globalization involves goods, services, the economic resources of capital, technology, and data. Also, the expansions of global markets liberalize the economic activities of the exchange of goods and funds. Removal of cross-border trade barriers has made formation of global markets more feasible. The steam locomotive, steamship, jet engine, and container ships are some of the advances in the means of transport while the rise of the telegraph and its modern offspring, the Internet and mobile phones show development in telecommunications infrastructure. All of these improvements have been major factors in globalization and have generated further interdependence of economic and cultural activities around the globe.

Though many scholars place the origins of globalization in modern times, others trace its history long before the European Age of Discovery and voyages to the New World, some even to the third millennium BC. Large-scale globalization began in the 1820s. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, the connectivity of the world's economies and cultures grew very quickly. The term globalization is recent, only establishing its current meaning in the 1970s.

In 2000, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified four basic aspects of globalization: trade and transactions, capital and investment movements, migration and movement of people, and the dissemination of

knowledge. Further, environmental challenges such as global warming, cross-boundary water, air pollution, and over-fishing of the ocean are linked with globalization. Globalizing processes affect and are affected by business and work organization, economics, socio-cultural resources, and the natural environment. Academic literature commonly subdivides globalization into three major areas: economic globalization, cultural globalization, and political globalization.

The term globalization became popular in social science in the 1990s. It derives from the word globalize, which refers to the emergence of an international network of economic systems. The term 'globalization' had been used in its economic sense at least as early as 1981, and in other senses since at least as early as 1944. Theodore Levitt is credited with popularizing the term and bringing it into the mainstream business audience in the later half of the 1980s. Since its inception, the concept of globalization has inspired competing definitions and interpretations. Its antecedents date back to the great movements of trade and empire across Asia and the Indian Ocean from the 15th century onward. Due to the complexity of the concept, various research projects, articles, and discussions often stay focused on a single aspect of globalization

Sociologists Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King define globalization as "all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated into a single world society." In The Consequences of Modernity, Anthony Giddens writes: "Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa." In 1992, Roland Robertson, professor of sociology at the University of Aberdeen and an early writer in the field, described globalization as "the compression of the world and the intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole."

In Global Transformations, David Held and his co-writers state:

Although in its simplistic sense globalization refers to the widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnection, such a definition begs further elaboration. ... Globalization can be on a continuum with the local, national and regional. At one end of the continuum lie social and economic relations and networks which are organized on a local and/or

national basis; at the other end lie social and economic relations and networks which crystallize on the wider scale of regional and global interactions. Globalization can refer to those spatial-temporal processes of change which underpin a transformation in the organization of human affairs by linking together and expanding human activity across regions and continents. Without reference to such expansive spatial connections, there can be no clear or coherent formulation of this term. ... A satisfactory definition of globalization must capture each of these elements: extensity (stretching), intensity, velocity and impact.

Held and his co-writers' definition of globalization in that same book as "transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions—assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact—generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows" was called "probably the most widely-cited definition" in the 2014 DHL Global Connectiveness Index.

Swedish journalist Thomas Larsson, in his book The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization, states that globalization:

is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world.

Paul James defines globalization with a more direct and historically contextualized emphasis:

Globalization is the extension of social relations across world-space, defining that world-space in terms of the historically variable ways that it has been practiced and socially understood through changing world-time.

Manfred Steger, professor of global studies and research leader in the Global Cities Institute at RMIT University, identifies four main empirical dimensions of globalization: economic, political, cultural, and ecological. A fifth dimension—the ideological—cutting across the other four. The ideological dimension, according to Steger, is filled with a range of norms, claims, beliefs, and narratives about the phenomenon itself.

James and Steger stated that the concept of globalization "emerged from the intersection of four interrelated sets of 'communities of practice' (Wenger, 1998): academics, journalists, publishers/editors, and

librarians.":424 They note the term was used "in education to describe the global life of the mind"; in international relations to describe the extension of the European Common Market; and in journalism to describe how the "American Negro and his problem are taking on a global significance". They have also argued that four different forms of globalization can be distinguished that complement and cut across the solely empirical dimensions. According to James, the oldest dominant form of globalization is embodied globalization, the movement of people. A second form is agency-extended globalization, the circulation of agents of different institutions, organizations, and polities, including imperial agents. Object-extended globalization, a third form, is the movement of commodities and other objects of exchange. He calls the transmission of ideas, images, knowledge, and information across world-space disembodied globalization, maintaining that it is currently the dominant form of globalization. James holds that this series of distinctions allows for an understanding of how, today, the most embodied forms of globalization such as the movement of refugees and migrants are increasingly restricted, while the most disembodied forms such as the circulation of financial instruments and codes are the most deregulated.

The journalist Thomas L. Friedman popularized the term "flat world", arguing that globalized trade, outsourcing, supply-chaining, and political forces had permanently changed the world, for better and worse. He asserted that the pace of globalization was quickening and that its impact on business organization and practice would continue to grow.

Economist Takis Fotopoulos defined "economic globalization" as the opening and deregulation of commodity, capital, and labor markets that led toward present neoliberal globalization. He used "political globalization" to refer to the emergence of a transnational élite and a phasing out of the nation-state. Meanwhile, he used "cultural globalization" to reference the worldwide homogenization of culture. Other of his usages included "ideological globalization", "technological globalization", and "social globalization".

Lechner and Boli (2012) define globalization as more people across large distances becoming connected in more and different ways.

"Globophobia" is used to refer to the fear of globalization, though it can also mean the fear of balloons.

12.3 CORE CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBALIZATION



The OECD defines globalization as

"The geographic dispersion of industrial and service activities, for example research and development, sourcing of inputs, production and distribution, and the cross-border networking of companies, for example through joint ventures and the sharing of assets."

Characteristics of globalisation

1. Greater trade in goods and services both between nations and within regions
2. An increase in **transfers of capital** including the expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) by trans-national companies (TNCs) and the rising influence of sovereign wealth funds
3. The development of **global brands** that serve markets in higher and lower income countries
4. **Spatial division of labour**– for example out-sourcing and off shoring of production and support services as production supply-chains has become more international. As an example, the iPhone

is part of a complicated global supply chain. The product was conceived and designed in Silicon Valley; the software was enhanced by software engineers working in India. Most iPhones are assembled / manufactured in China and Taiwan by TNCs such as FoxConn

5. High levels of **labour migration** within and between countries
6. New nations joining the world trading system. China and India joined the WTO in 1991, Russia joined the WTO in 2012
7. A fast changing **shift in the balance of economic and financial power** from developed to emerging economies and markets – i.e. a change in the **centre of gravity in the world economy**
8. Increasing spending on investment, innovation and infrastructure across large parts of the world
9. Globalisation is a process of **making the world economy more inter-dependent**
10. Many of the industrializing countries are winning a rising share of world trade and their economies are growing faster than in richer developed nations especially after the global financial crisis (GFC)

Among the **main drivers of globalisation** are the following:

- **Containerisation** – the costs of ocean shipping have come down, due to containerization, bulk shipping, and other efficiencies. The lower cost of shipping products around the global economy helps to bring prices in the country of manufacture closer to prices in the export market, and makes markets more contestable in an international sense.
- **Technological change** – reducing the cost of transmitting and communicating information – sometimes known as “the death of distance" – a key factor behind trade in knowledge products using web technology
- **Economies of scale**: Many economists believe that there has been an increase in the minimum efficient scale (MES) associated with particular industries. If the MES is rising, a domestic market may be regarded as too small to satisfy the selling needs of these industries.

- **Opening up of global financial markets:** This has included the removal of capital controls in many countries facilitating foreign direct investment.
- **Differences in tax systems**: The desire of corporations to benefit from lower unit labour costs and other favourable factor endowments abroad and develop and exploit fresh comparative advantages in production has encouraged countries to adjust their tax systems to attract foreign direct investment (FDI)
- **Less protectionism** - old forms of non-tariff protection such as import licencing and foreign exchange controls have gradually been dismantled. Borders have opened and average tariff levels have fallen – that said in the last few years there has been a rise in protectionism as countries have struggled to achieve growth after the global financial crisis.

Globalization no longer necessarily requires a business to own or have a physical presence in terms of either owning production plants or land in other countries, or even exports and imports. Many businesses use licensing and franchising to help expand their overseas operations.

Globalisation refers to the integration of markets in the global economy, leading to the increased *interconnectedness* of national economies. Markets where globalisation is particularly significant include **financial markets**, such as capital markets, **money** and credit markets, and insurance markets, **commodity** markets, including markets for oil, coffee, tin, and gold, and product markets, such as markets for motor vehicles and consumer electronics. The globalisation of **sport** and **entertainment** is also a feature of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Why has globalisation increased?

The pace of globalisation has increased for a number of reasons:

1. Developments in IT, *transport and communications* have accelerated the pace of globalisation over the past 40 years. The internet has enabled fast and 24/7 global communication, and the use of *containerisation* has enabled vast quantities of goods and commodities to be shipped across the world at extremely low cost.

2. More recently, the rise of *social media* means that national boundaries have, in many ways become irrelevant as producers use new forms of communication and marketing, including micro-marketing, to target international consumers. The widespread use of smartphones has also enabled global shoppers to have easy access to 'virtual' global markets.
3. The rise of new electronic **payments systems**,, including e-Wallets, pre-pay and mobile pay, e-Invoices and mobile pay apps, also facilitate increased global trade.
4. Increasing em>capital mobility has also acted as a stimulus to globalisation. When capital can move freely from country to country, it is relatively straightforward for firms to locate and invest abroad, and repatriate profits.
5. The development of *complex financial products*, such as **derivatives**, has enabled global credit markets to grow rapidly.
6. Increased trade which has become increasingly free, following the collapse of communism, which has opened up many former communist countries to inward investment and global trade. Over the last 30 years, *trade openness*, which is defined as the ratio of exports and imports to national income, has risen from 25% to around 40% for industrialised economies, and from 15% to 60% for emerging economies.**[1]**.
7. The emergence of footloose *multinational* and *transnational* companies (MNCs and TNCs) and the rise in the significance of global brands such as Microsoft, Apple, Google, Sony, and McDonalds, has been central to the emergence of globalisation. The drive to reduce tax burdens and **avoid regulation** has also meant the establishment of complex international business structures.

The advantages of globalisation

Globalisation brings a number of potential benefits to international producers and national economies, including:

1. Providing an incentive for countries to specialise and benefit from the application of the principle of **comparative advantage**.

2. Access to larger markets means that firms may experience higher demand for their products, as well as benefit from **economies of scale**, which leads to a reduction in average production costs.
3. Globalisation enables worldwide access to sources of cheap raw materials, and this enables firms to be **cost competitive** in their own markets and in overseas markets. Seeking out the cheapest materials from around the world is called *global sourcing*. Because of cost reductions and increased revenue, globalisation can generate increased profits for shareholders.
4. Avoidance of **regulation** by locating production in countries with less strict regulatory regimes, such as those in many **Less Developed Countries** (LCDs).
5. Globalisation has led to increased flows of **inward investment** between countries, which has created benefits for recipient countries. These benefits include the sharing of knowledge and technology between countries.
6. In the long term, increased trade is likely to lead to the creation of more employment in all countries that are involved.

The disadvantages of globalisation

There are also several potential disadvantages of globalisation, including the following:

1. The over-standardisation of products through global branding is a common criticism of globalisation. For example, the majority of the world's computers use Microsoft's Windows operating system. Clearly, standardising of computer operating systems and platforms creates considerable benefits, but critics argue that this leads to a lack of product diversity, as well as presenting **barriers to entry** to small, local, producers.
2. Large multinational companies can also suffer from **diseconomies of scale**, such as difficulties associated with coordinating the activities of subsidiaries based in several countries.
3. The increased power and influence of multinationals is also seen by many as a considerable disadvantage of globalisation. For example, large multinational companies can switch their investments between territories in search of the most favourable **regulatory regimes**.

MNCs can operate as local **monopsonies** of labour, and push wages lower than the free market equilibrium.

4. Critics of globalisation also highlight the potential loss of jobs in domestic markets caused by increased, and in some cases, **unfair**, free trade. This view certainly accounts for the some of the rise in nationalist movements in many developed economies, along with the push for increased **protectionism**.
5. Globalisation can also increase the pace of *deindustrialisation*, which is the slow erosion of an economy's manufacturing base.
6. Jobs may be lost because of the structural changes arising from globalisation. Structural changes may lead to **structural unemployment** and may also widen the gap between rich and poor within a country.
7. One of the most significant criticisms of globalisation is the increased risk associated with the interdependence of economies. As countries are increasingly dependent on each other, a negative economic **shock** in one country can quickly spread to other countries. For example, a downturn in car sales in the UK affects the rest of Europe as most cars bought in the UK are imported from the EU. The Far East crisis of the 1990s was triggered by the collapse of just a few Japanese banks.

Most recently, the collapse of the US *sub-prime* **housing market** triggered a global crisis in the banking system as banks around the world suffered a fall in the value of their assets and reduced their lending to each other. This created a **liquidity** crisis and helped fuel a severe downturn in the global economy.

Over-specialisation, such as being over-reliant on producing a limited range of goods for the global market, is a further risk associated with globalisation. A sudden downturn in world demand for one of these products can plunge an economy into a recession. Many developing countries suffer by over-specialising in a limited range of products, such as **agriculture** and tourism.

8. Globalisation generates winners and losers, and for this reason it is likely to increase **inequality**, as richer nations benefit more than poorer ones. The awareness of rising inequality, along with job

losses, has been argued to have contributed to the rise in anti-globalisation movements.

9. Increased **trade** associated with globalisation has increased pollution and helped contribute to CO_2 emissions and global warming. Trade growth has also accelerated the depletion of non-renewable resources, such as oil.

The impact of globalisation on the UK economy

The main issues arising from globalisation for the UK are:

Growth

Assuming the UK maintains its competitiveness, globalisation is likely to increase UK growth in the long term because aggregate demand (AD) is likely to increase through increased exports (X), and aggregate supply (AS) is likely to increase because of higher levels of investment, both domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, growth in the short term may become more unstable as the global economy becomes increasingly interconnected. The recent **credit crunch** is evidence that unstable growth is a possible consequence of globalisation. Some economists have also argued that globalisation has increased the process of *deindustrialisation* in the developed countries, including the UK.

Employment

Long term, jobs may be destroyed in the manufacturing sector and created in the service sector, hence creating **structural unemployment**, which could widen the income gap within countries. The net effect of the impact on employment depends upon the speed of labour market adjustment, which itself depends upon mobility and flexibility. Improvements in labour productivity may be needed to close the **productivity gap**.

Prices

Increased **competition** is likely to reduce the price level, for traded manufactures. Because UK firms can source from around the world costs may be held down, and this may be passed on in terms of reduced domestic and export prices.

Trade

The volume of both imports and exports is likely to increase, with trade representing an increasing proportion of GDP. The effect on the **balance**

of payments is uncertain and depends upon relative growth rates, inflation, competitiveness, and the exchange rate.

12.4 PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROTAGONISTS

There is a saying in politics that "perception is everything." Even if the perception is not based on truth, it will determine how one's words and actions are received. If you want to influence people to follow you, it would be wise to always be sensitive to how we are being perceived, and make necessary adjustments when needed.

This past August, CCO unveiled its ten year vision: "Protagonists in the mission to proclaim Jesus clearly and simply." It is a very exciting and timely vision that we believe will have a lasting impact on the mission of the Church. The vision's effectiveness will be determined by how many choose to become protagonists in this mission to proclaim Jesus clearly and simply. In the early days of the soft launch of this vision, I quickly learned that we may be dealing with a perception problem. There is an impression among friends of the movement that, in our desire or commitment to be protagonists (leading characters), we are taking attention away from the real protagonist, who is Jesus. My quick response would be to say that we are protagonists in the MISSION to proclaim JESUS… Because our intention is to influence and raise up protagonists, my energy should not be focused on re-stating the obvious truth. The vision would be well served by us being aware of this perception, and with charity and humility bringing understanding and clarity to all those associated with the movement.

With this possible perception problem in mind, I intend to spend time over the next year gaining much-needed insight on this bold and intentional word "protagonist." Each week, I am going to send out a simple blog expressing what I am learning from others about the true meaning and potential of being a protagonist.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. What do you know Definition of Globalization?

……

……

……

2. How do you understand Core Characteristics of Globalization?

……

……

……

3. Discuss the Perceptions of the Protagonists.

……

……

……

12.5 PERCEPTIONS OF THE CRITICS

Perceived criticism from relatives predicts poor clinical outcomes for patients with a variety of psychological disorders. Research indicates the attributions individuals make about motives for relatives' criticism are linked to perceived criticism from this relative. Accordingly, attributions may be an important target of intervention to reduce perceived criticism and improve clinical outcomes, but this association requires testing in a clinical sample. We examined relationships among attributions of criticism, perceived criticism, and upset due to criticism among individuals with anxiety disorders (n = 53) and with no psychopathology (n = 52). Participants completed measures of global attributions, perceived criticism, and upset due to criticism regarding criticism from a romantic partner/spouse or parent. After a 10-min problem-solving interaction with their relative, they completed measures of attributions, perceived criticism, and upset with regard to this relative's critical behavior during the interaction, and observers reliably coded interactions for relatives' criticism. Results showed that negative attributions were related to greater perceived criticism and upset for both global and interaction-specific measures. In analyses of interaction-specific measures, negative attributions added to prediction of perceived criticism and upset over and above the contribution of observed criticism. Positive attributions were not significantly related to global or interaction-specific

upset in any analyses. Relationships were consistent across patients and normal controls. Our findings suggest that negative attributions of relatives' motives for their criticism are important predictors of perceived criticism and upset. Thus, interventions targeting these attributions may be helpful in mitigating the negative effect of perceived criticism for individuals with psychopathology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

12.5.1 Compromise of National Economic Interest

Special attention to the concept of economic interest has been paid within the theories of human behavior. The role of the economic interest in the activity of an individual has been considered in social-economic and political environments (A. Daune, J. Mueller, M. Olson, A. Sen, A. Hirschman, S. Holmes etc.). Great attention to investigating the economic interests has been attracted by the models of individual economic behavior within the rational choice theory (D. Miller, R. Ratner, M. Wallach, B. Schwartz, J. Elster and others). In modern concepts, the idea of the economic interest is a collectively shared ideology. The works by Ch. Barnard, W. Weber, R. Marr, J.G. March, H.A. Simon etc. have been dedicated to identifying the economic interests of employees, directly affecting their economic behavior in the company.

However, up to now, notwithstanding the great number of the investigations dedicated to economic interests, there are still a lot of poorly investigated theoretical issues, such as the role and the place of the interests in the economic system, the objective conditions forming the economic interests and the factors, stipulating their evolution. The principles of establishing, functioning and developing the system of economic interests under conditions of globalization, the structure and the specifics of their interrelations under new economic conditions, as well as the inevitably occurring contradictions, considerably affecting the development of national and of the world economy, have not been investigated properly. The functions of principal economic entities (households, companies, state), institutional environment, within which those functions are realized, and the individual economic behavior are

driven by the economic interests, and, at that, reflect their complex structure. The most important things for new political economics include determining the structure of economic interests, their relations of opposition and of alignment as the conflict-compromise relations, the mechanisms for realizing the interests in the economic behavior of individuals, households, companies, state and its officials The multidirectional nature of the subjects' interests under these conditions often results in the apparent or in the latent conflicts, in irrational costs, which all leads to the ineffective economic development. The objective character of those processes sets several new theoretical and practical tasks before the science of economics2 . One of them is to identify the genesis of the characteristic feature of the economic interests, because, notwithstanding the extensive historical heritage concerning this issue3-5, up to now, no unified scientific approach has been adopted to define the essence and the nature of the economic interests. Given the considerable number of studies, dedicated to analyzing different aspects of the economic interests, there are still many controversial, and, consequently, insufficiently investigated theoretical issues. Among them there are such issues as follows: Historical, epistemic and ontological nature of the economic interest; the predetermining factors; the forms and the conditions for realizing the interests under modern conditions; the role and the place of the interests in the economic system of the community; the principles of forming, functioning and developing the system of economic interests; trends in their transformation. It should be noted that the essence of the economic interests should be defined based on the initial cause of the subject's economic activity, in other words, based on its major objective. The majority of scientists explain the essence of such category as "economic interest" with two basic assumptions. First, the interests reflect the subject's aiming at "self-actualization", i.e. at preserving or at improving his social and economic standing, which is achieved, in its turn, by means of satisfying the needs in the optimum way. Second, the interests are directly stipulated by the standing of their bearers within the system of social and economic relations6 . That is, the multifaceted character of the ideas of "interest" and "economic interests" should be noted. The efforts to classify the

interests can be found in works by C. Helvétius7 . The fundamentals of his approach are represented by the relations between a man and the supreme intelligence. It was pointed out that if the physical world is governed by the law of movement, then the spiritual world is in the same way governed by the law of interest. The studies by C. Helvétius almost approached the thought of a close interrelation existing between the interests of personality and the public production, however, the low level of development of the productive forces did not allow for such generalization at the time. In the end of the 18th century, a qualitative abrupt change in the public production development took place, which required bringing the theoretical issues of economic interests to a new level. The founder of the classical economics, Adam Smith, considering the interests in the light of labor distribution and in the light of the associated necessity for the exchange of goods, came to a thought, that the processes of producing and exchanging the goods are based on the interests of people: "Not a single individual will think of public interests he will pursue his personal gain only, and, in this case, as in many other cases, he will be governed by the invisible hand, that leads him to his goal, which has nothing to do with his intentions"5 . However, the interrelation of the interests with the social relations has not been explained by A. Smith, because, in the first place, he did not consider this correlation from the position of the public production. A considerable contribution in developing the theory of economic interest belongs to a representative of classical German philosophy, Hegel3 , who justified the impossibility to reduce the interest to the intrinsic nature of man, that is, people would satisfy their interests, but, owing to this, something follows, something, that is hidden, that is contained within them, but is not perceived and is not intended. Based on his views of the word, Hegel directly connected the interests with the world intelligence, with the absolute idea. For quite a long period, the abovementioned assumptions used to be the fundamental ideas in determining the essence of economic interests in both domestic and foreign economic thinking. In modern studies, great attention is still paid to analyzing the economic interests. Thus, for example, academician L.I. Abalkin notes the following: "Insufficient investigations of the mechanism of applying economic laws

are, to a large degree, associated with the fact that the issues of the economic interest are underestimated by the economic science. Our knowledge of them does not go further than the conventional ideas; neither their structure nor their co-subordination is fully known"8 . Thus, it can be maintained that now the issue of identifying the essence and the characteristics of economic interest approaches the qualitatively new higher level. For instance, Professor V.V. Chekmarev notes that the economic interests, as a form of representing the needs, have become self-sufficing in the analysis. M.I. Skarzhinskiy10 pointed out that, within the system of economic interests, along with the interests of the state and those of separate individuals, there is a growing force of the interests of separate companies. The ambition to meet those needs should prospectively lead to the companies' commitment, with the support from the state, to create their own systems for training and preparing the specialist for their production processes. The classification aspect of the economic interests is ambiguous. The diversity of economic needs generates the diversity of economic interests, creating complex and dynamic system with multiple levels in the reproduction stages, in space and in time, in statics and in dynamics.

According to V.P. Kamankin, "actually, dynamics of any economic interests can be fixed quite precisely and can be scientifically analyzed by interpolating them with respect to realization of other interests. Economic interests stimulate the activity of the economic agents, unite the vital forces and actions of many people and create their new qualitative, quantitative and social organic unity. The objective basis of the economic interests consists of their being stipulated by the economic standing of the major production relations bearers and also by their functions under the conditions of historically predetermined process of production". The system of economic interests develops in line with the changes occurring within the system of needs, and in line with the transformation in relations of ownership in the direction of their more expressed socialization and alignment based on resolving the intrinsic, continuously reproduced contradictions. Thus, within the consistent pattern of the system of economic interests development the following principles become evident:

1. Economic interests represent the form of expressing the economic relations, occurring between people concerning the necessity to meet the existing needs;

2. Developing the system of economic interests is the most important element of economic development;

3. Interaction between economic interests at different levels possesses the nature of dialectic contradiction;

4. In the basis of developing the system of economic interests and, consequently, in the basis of economic development, rest the processes of the increasing needs and those of the transformation of the production means ownership;

5. The source of developing the system of economic interests and of developing the economy on the whole is the search for the ways to resolve the immanent contradiction.

12.5.2 Curtailment of National Sovereignty

Capitalism's response to the inherent contradictions of neoliberalism was financialisation and debt-based consumption. Households, faced with stagnant incomes and declining purchasing power, were encouraged to borrow more and more to make up the difference between spending and income, leading to a colossal rise in private debt, particularly in the United States but also in many European countries. This form of "privatised Keynesianism" helped fuel the unsustainable asset and credit bubbles that exploded in 2008. It also allowed a tiny proportion of the world's population to amass increasing amounts of capital and wealth without facing any significant backlash from the subordinate classes, lulled by powerful neoliberal discourses that pitted the liberatory dynamism of the 'free market' (exemplified by the garage inventor à la Steve Jobs) against the ossification and inefficiency of state bureaucracy (exemplified by the government paper-pusher).

Financialisation was able to temporarily offset the stagnationary effects of the post-1970s neoliberal policies of profit-maximisation. The inherent contradictions of this new finance-led regime of accumulation, however, exploded in 2007 to 2009, as the mountain of debt accumulated in the previous decades came crashing to the ground, threatening a meltdown of the global economy. Even though Western governments were able to avoid the worst-case scenario and to contain (for a while) the economic and political fallout from the financial crisis by re-instating – with even greater emphasis – financialisation as the main motor of the economy, this did not halt the overall stagnationary trend of advanced economies. With debt-based private consumption no longer available as a source of autonomous demand, due to the post-crisis 'liquidity trap' and the private sector deleveraging process, the inability of wage-based private consumption to sustain adequate levels of aggregate demand – due to labour's loss of purchasing power in recent decades – became apparent. In this sense, the current stagnation should be viewed as the tail-end of the long crisis that began in the 1970s. The situation was (is) further exacerbated by the post-crisis policies of fiscal austerity and wage deflation pursued by a number of Western governments, particularly in Europe, which saw the financial crisis as an opportunity to impose an even more radical neoliberal regime and to push through policies designed to suit the financial sector and the wealthy, at the expense of everyone else.

Capitalising on dissatisfaction

Amidst growing popular dissatisfaction, social unrest, and mass unemployment (in various European countries), political elites on both sides of the Atlantic responded with business-as-usual policies and discourses. As a result, the social contract binding citizens to traditional ruling is more strained today than at any other time since World War II – and in some countries has arguably already snapped, as testified by a series of electoral uprisings that, despite their differences, all share a common target: globalisation, neoliberalism, and the political establishments that have promoted them.

Many view this neo-nationalist, anti-globalisation, and anti-establishment revolt as heralding the end of the (neo)liberal era and the ushering in of a new global order. Trump has especially alarmed politicians and commentators worldwide by announcing – and implementing – a series of protectionist measures. Without minimising the symbolic and ideological value of these decisions, the truth of the matter is that globalisation was already in trouble well before Trump's election. Since 2011, world trade has grown significantly less rapidly than global GDP, and has now begun to shrink even as the global economy grows, albeit sluggishly. World financial flows are down sixty per cent since the pre-crash peak.

In this sense, Trump's victory, Brexit, and the rise of populist parties "are but epiphenomena of momentous shifts in global political economy and international geo-political alignments that have been taking place since the 1970s", as Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay write. Namely: (i) the crisis of the neoliberal economic model and ideology, which is no longer able to overcome its intrinsic stagnationary and polarising tendencies and to generate societal consensus or hegemony (in material or ideological terms), and is increasingly unable to deliver benefits even to its core supporters; (ii) the crisis of globalisation, which is no longer able to offer an escape from the inexorable pressures of overaccumulation and overproduction, largely due to increased competition from countries like China (which in turn are facing crises of overaccumulation of their own); (iii) the ecological crisis, i.e., constraints on the supply of energy and other biophysical resources that feed into the economic process and impact its functioning; and (iv) the crisis of US hegemony, which is no longer able to unilaterally enforce the global neoliberal order, neither through soft power (that is, through pro-Western multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank), as it did during the 1990s, nor through hard power (that is, through brute military force), as it did throughout the early 2000s, as demonstrated by the West's failed (so far) attempt at deposing Assad in Syria. Trump's tough stance on China and other surplus countries (such as Germany), accused of currency manipulation, and his plans for 'renationalising' US

economic policy should thus be understood in the context of the unfolding collapse of the neoliberal order.

What we are witnessing is not, of course, the end of globalisation – which will continue, although it will likely be characterised by increased tensions between the various fractions of international capital and by a combination of protectionism and internationalisation – but rather the birth of a post-neoliberal order. It is early to say what this new order will look like, since there is no new coherent ideology or accumulation regime waiting in the wings to replace neoliberalism. Antonio Gramsci famously described organic crises such as the one that we are currently going through as situations in which "the old is dying and the new cannot yet be born". "In this interregnum", he wrote, "a great variety of morbid symptoms" – such as the ones that we have described above – tend to appear.

What has allowed these "morbid symptoms" to emerge as the dominant reaction to neoliberalism and globalisation, however, is simply the fact that right-wing forces have been much more effective than left-wing or progressive forces at tapping into the legitimate grievances of the masses disenfranchised, marginalised, impoverished, and dispossessed by the forty-year-long neoliberal class war waged from above. In particular, they are the only forces that have been able to provide a (more or less) coherent response to the widespread – and growing – yearning for greater territorial or national sovereignty, increasingly seen as the only way to regain some degree of collective control over politics and society, in the absence of effective supranational mechanisms of representation. Given neoliberalism's war against sovereignty, it should come as no surprise that "sovereignty has become the master-frame of contemporary politics", as Paolo Gerbaudo notes.

After all, the hollowing out of national sovereignty and curtailment of popular-democratic mechanisms – what has been termed depoliticisation – has been an essential element of the neoliberal project, aimed at insulating macroeconomic policies from popular contestation and removing any obstacles put in the way of economic exchanges and financial flows. In this sense, neoliberalism and globalisation have not entailed a retreat of the state vis-à-vis the market, as most left analyses

contend, but rather a reconfiguration of the state, aimed at placing the commanding heights of economic policy "in the hands of capital, and primarily financial interests", as Stephen Gill writes. Given the nefarious effects of depoliticisation, it is only natural that the revolt against neoliberalism should first and foremost take the form of demands for a repoliticisation of national decision-making processes.

12.5.3 Erosion of National Identity

Globalisation influences every aspect of post-modern social reality. However, little empirical research has considered how globalisation affects people's perception of their national attachments. This study explores the interrelation between the international business environment and international business travellers' understanding and construction of their national identity. By using data from 60 qualitative interviews with British (English and Scottish) and Russian business people actively involved in international business travel, the nature of their national belonging is compared and contrasted. The research identifies what constructs are employed in the research participants' national identity claims and analyses differences and similarities in their articulations of their national belonging. Particular attention is paid to the role of the increasingly globalising international business environment in shaping the respondents' local and cosmopolitan orientations. The study suggests that globalization affects the international business travellers' perception of national self in two ways: while becoming more cosmopolitan they also grow more aware of their national belonging.

Identity and national identity

This section addresses the issue of national identity as a component of a complex organisation of human social identity (Tajfel, 1982). In this respect, it is useful to distinguish national identity from other types of social identity and to understand how identity changes depending on the context in which it is considered. Below I offer a discussion of different approaches to understanding the concepts of identity and national identity that appear in the academic literature and specifically focus on the identity work of Bloom, 1990, A.D. Smith, 1991, A.D. Smith, 1995,

Wodak et al., 1999, Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, Peters, 2002 and Mandler, 2006. The multifaceted character of identity Identity as a term originated in ancient Greece and since then has had a long history in Western philosophy. However, it acquired the more intensive social-analytical use in the United States in the 1960s. It appeared highly popular and diffused rapidly across academic disciplines and state borders. It was quickly adopted in the journalistic lexicon and the language of social and political practice and analysis. "Identity talk" continues to flourish, with many authors whose main interest lies outside the traditional "identity field" publishing extensively on identity (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000). Wodak et al. (1999) assert that identity is a topic of wide variety. Echoing this view, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) claim that as an analytical category it is "heavily burdened *and+ deeply ambiguous" (p. 8). The term is used and abused in both social sciences and humanities and this "affects not only the language of social analysis but also – inseparably – its substance".

Identity as a concept

Identity as a term can be characterised by a broad spectrum of approaches depending on the context in which it is studied, e.g. national identity and advertising (Morris, 2005), questions of Englishness and Britishness (Byrne, 2007), multiculturalism (Parekh, 2000), national identity and geopolitics (Dijkink, 1996). Identity can be accessed from different levels of enquiry, e.g. from lived and felt identities of individuals (identity at a personal level) to identities of nations and organisations (identity at a structural level), and from identities of nations or countries to group identities, such as European identity.

The concept of identity is non-static and changing, positioned in the flow of time and involved in other processes. Therefore it is wrong to assume "that people belong to a solid, unchanging, intrinsic collective unit because of a specific history which they supposedly have in common, and that as a consequence they feel obliged to act and react as a group when they are threatened" (Wodak et al., 1999: 11). Identity can be perceived as a "relational term" and thus is defined as "the relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts a sameness

or equality" (Wodak et al., 1999: 11). With the analytical complexities attached to the term, it is claimed that "identity" is harder to understand than we suppose. We all seem to have multiple identities and therefore the question arises: what determines which identity is silent at any given time? Mandler (2006). stresses that identity is not fixed and not being formed by any one particular process. In order to understand how identity is shaped we need to understand the context in which this process is taking place.

12.6 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (IR) AND GLOBALIZATION

As more nations, people, and cultures adapt to the ever changing international community, diplomats, politicians, and representatives must meet and deal with accordingly to the needs and wants of nations. Diplomacy can be exerted in many forms; through peace talks, written constitutions, field experiences, etc. Culture is a familiar term and remains unchanged by definition. However, globalization and international relations have constantly altered culture both positively and negatively. Globalization increases worldwide technology, and the readability of fast, effective communication and consumption of popular products. Globalization links cultures and international relations on a variety of levels; economics, politically, socially, etc. International relations have used globalization to reach its goal: of understanding cultures. International relations focus on how countries, people and organizations interact and globalization is making a profound effect on International relations. Understanding culture, globalization, and international relations is critical for the future of not only governments, people, and businesses, but for the survival of the human race. In today's increasingly interdependent and turbulent world, many of the leading issues in the news concern international affairs. Whether it is the continuing impact of globalization, Globalization – the process of continuing integration of the countries in the world – is strongly underway in all parts of the globe. It is a complex interconnection between capitalism and democracy, which involves positive and negative features, that both empowers and disempowers individuals and groups.

From the other hand Globalization is a popular term used by governments, business, academic and a range of diverse non-governmental organizations. It also, however, signifies a new paradigm within world politics and economic relations. While national governments for many years dictated the international political and economic scene, international organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization have now become significant role players. In this “Global Village” national governments have lost some of their importance and perhaps their powers in favour of these major international organizations. As a process of interaction and integration among people, companies and governments of different nations Globalization is a process driven by the International Trade and Investment and aided by Information technology. This process on the environment on culture, on political system, on economic development and prosperity, and on human physical well-being in societies around the world.

12.7 TOWARDS FORMULATION OF IR THEORY ON "GLOBALISED" STATE

Effects of Globalization With the roster of the mentioned disadvantages and advantages Globalization culminates also effective facts. The following are considered the Effects of Globalization; • enhancement in the information flow between geographically remote locations • the global common market has a freedom of exchange of goods and capital • there is a broad access to a range of goods for consumers and companies • worldwide production markets emerge • free circulation of people of different nations leads to social benefits • global environmental problems like cross-boundary pollution, over fishing on oceans, climate changes are solved by discussions • more trans border data flow using communication satellites, the Internet, wireless telephones, etc. • international criminal courts and international justice movements are launched • the standards applied globally like patents, copyright laws and world trade agreements increase • corporate, national and sub-national borrowers have a better access to external finance • worldwide

financial markets emerge • multiculturalism spreads as there is individual access to cultural diversity. This diversity decreases due to hybridization or assimilation • international travel and tourism increases • worldwide sporting events like the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup are held • enhancement in worldwide fads and pop culture • local consumer products are exported to other countries • immigration between countries increases • cross-cultural contacts grow and cultural diffusion takes place • there is an increase in the desire to use foreign ideas and products, adopt new practices and technologies and be a part of world culture • free trade zones are formed having less or no tariffs • due to development of containerization for ocean shipping, the transportation costs are reduced • subsidies for local businesses decrease • capital controls reduce or vanquish • there is supranational recognition of intellectual property restrictions, i.e., patents authorized by one country are recognized in another.

In conclusion I would like to state m estimation that despite all the formidable obstacles and stumbling blocks the effectiveness of the Globalization and cohesive efforts of people and the government will help to stand a positive stead prevail over the disadvantages. It will fortify to prevent migration which is inherent in third-world and back water countries and reduce social inequality which in its turn will benefit the advantages of the Globalization. All these mentioned facts are time-consuming and labour-intensive process but it will distinctly fortify and develop the Globalization.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. What do you know the Perceptions of the Critics?

……

……

……

2. Discuss International Relations Theory (IR) and Globalization.

……

……

……

3. How do you understand the Formulation of IR Theory on "Globalised" State?

……

……

……

12.8 LET US SUM UP

Globalization is the word used to describe the growing interdependence of the world's economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information. Countries have built economic partnerships to facilitate these movements over many centuries. But the term gained popularity after the Cold War in the early 1990s, as these cooperative arrangements shaped modern everyday life. This guide uses the term more narrowly to refer to international trade and some of the investment flows among advanced economies, mostly focusing on the United States.

The wide-ranging effects of globalization are complex and politically charged. As with major technological advances, globalization benefits society as a whole, while harming certain groups. Understanding the relative costs and benefits can pave the way for alleviating problems while sustaining the wider payoffs.

12.9 KEY WORDS

Globalisation: Globalization or globalisation is the process of interaction and integration among people, companies, and governments worldwide.

Politics: the activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power.

ESRC Economic and Social Research Council

GCSE General Certificate of Secondary Education

IBT International Business Traveller

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

12.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you know Definition of Globalization?
2. How do you understand Core Characteristics of Globalization?
3. Discuss the Perceptions of the Protagonists.
4. What do you know the Perceptions of the Critics?
5. Discuss International Relations Theory (IR) and Globalization.
6. How do you understand the Formulation of IR Theory on "Globalised" State?

12.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Ampuja, Marko. Theorizing Globalization: A Critique of the Mediatization of Social Theory (Brill, 2012)
- Conner, Tom, and Ikuko Torimoto, eds. Globalization Redux: New Name, Same Game (University Press of America, 2004).
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. "Globalization." in Handbook of Political Anthropology (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018).
- Frey, James W. "The Global Moment: The Emergence of Globality, 1866-1867, and the Origins of Nineteenth-Century Globalization." The Historian 81.1 (2019): 9. online, focus on trade and Suez Canal
- Gunder Frank, Andre, and Robert A. Denemark. ReOrienting the 19th Century: Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age (Paradigm Publishers, 2013);
- Hopkins, A.G., ed. Globalization in World History (Norton, 2003).
- Lechner, Frank J., and John Boli, eds. The Globalization Reader (4th ed. Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
- Leibler, Anat. "The Emergence of a Global Economic Order: From Scientific Internationalism to Infrastructural Globalism." in Science, Numbers and Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019) pp. 121-145 online.
- Mir, Salam. "Colonialism, Postcolonialism, Globalization, and Arab Culture." Arab Studies Quarterly 41.1 (2019): 33-58. online
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. Globalization and culture: Global mélange (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).

- Rosenberg, Justin. "Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem," International Politics 42:1 (2005), 2-74.
- Steger, Manfred B. Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (4th ed. Oxford University Press, 2017)
- Van Der Bly, Martha C.E. "Globalization: A Triumph of Ambiguity," Current Sociology 53:6 (November 2005), 875-893
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long-Term View of the Trajectory of the World System," International Sociology 15:2 (June 2000), 251-267.

12.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 12.2
2. See Section 12.3
3. See Section 12.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 12.2
2. See Section 12.3
3. See Section 12.4

UNIT 13: IDENTITY AND CULTURE

STRUCTURE

13.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit will examine the problems of identity among the tribes in India, the variety of cultural strategies for asserting this identity and the multiple political and personal agendas of identity. The concept of identity and the various social theories that that are used to explain cultural and social interactions will be described. After completing this module you will be able to:

- understand the different ways identity is constructed and how identity is performed;.

- be aware of various theories of identity;

- gain understanding of political processes which are involved in identity politics and be able to see these processes at work around you;

- gain a clearer understanding of your own identity and how it relates to larger social relationships; and

- understand the performative nature of identity and the disciple of performance studies.

13.1 INTRODUCTION

We will first examine different interpretations of identity, different ways in which identity is formed and expressed, and some of the sociological frameworks which seek to explain the dynamics of a society. We will then examine the relation of the state to local identities, and look at specific cultural strategies for the preservation of identity. We will employ a specific case study of the Jaunsari tribe of the Northwest Himalayas to look at these questions in depth.

When we ask for a person's identity we ask to establish the person's name and what position he occupies in the community. Personal identity of an individual means much more, it is a sense of continuous existence in the socio-cultural framework of society and also a coherent memory of it. Psycho-social identity is both subjective and objective; it implies both the individual and the social. Identity implies continuity and sameness in situations, and it is also observable and recognized by others. It is a conscious process. Freud, a very important psychologist, formulated the social foundations of identity when he spoke of an inner identity. For example, he said that the tradition of Jewry gave the capacity to the people to live and think in isolation. The psycho-social identitythus develops the traditional values of particular communities of people. This effectiveness of this process depends on the integration of the individual ego into to the group.

There is a great deal of critical theory about the formation of society and questions about cultural identity. In recent years identity and identification is a whole composite subject that is dependent on place, gender, race, history, nationality, sexual orientation, religious beliefs and ethnicity. Some critics of social identity emphasize on commonalities and features that are shared between individuals and posit that cosmopolitanism or shared social identity are also being equally important. This theory does have merit; one can see it in the Greco-Roman identity of Europe. Europe is said to have strong common links with the Greco-Roman culture. This is also demonstrated in the ancient Indian culture which had a great deal of cultural contact with ancient Egypt and China. However, one has to keep in mind the uniqueness that is maintained by the individuals that leads to a distinct and succinct identity formation. One cannot rely totally on shared features and commonalities alone while explaining tradition and culture. There are several meanings to the concept of identity. We shall now study them in greater detail. The concepts are as follows:

1) Self-concept and individuality

2) National identity

3) Social identity

4) Gender identity

13.2 THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY

The concept or the assessment of oneself as being an individual trait can be described as having a 'self individuality'. This can be described as the attitude, behaviour or the habits and beliefs of an individual that are determined by social, cultural, physical and physiological conditions. This is highly self-reflexive (meaning an inward process) and is often developed when one is reflective and insightful. Self -concept and individuality predetermines all other subjects related to it. Gender identity, social identity and national identity all stem from the generic

notions of selfhood. The concept of the individual is also socially constructed within a particular society; many societies have different concepts of self and other. Sigmund Freud studied the individual personality and his theories have had a deep impact on understanding the relation of an individual with his society. We need to discuss in this in detail. According to Freud the human personality is made up of three major systems the id, ego and superego. Human behaviour is motivated through the interaction of these three systems. The id is fundamental to these three systems and contains all the psychological instincts that are present at birth. This is the "true physic reality" as it represents the inner world of a human being. The id commands two main processes, the reflex action and the primary processes. Reflex actions are actions such as sneezing and blinking that reduce biological tension and the primary process reducestension by creating a mental picture, for example a hungry person will imagine food and reduce his tension. This also can be called 'wish fulfillment'. The ego is fulfilled when an individual deals with the objective world of reality. For example, the hungry person has to seek and find food before the tension of hunger is eliminated. This means the individual, therefore has to learn how to differentiate between the image of food and the actual perception of food. Hence the ego distinguishes between things of the mind and things in the external world. The ego thus manifests itself by the means of the secondary process to obey the reality principle. The aim of the reality principle in this case is finding food. The secondary process is realistic thinking and the plan that one individual undertakes to release tension created by unfulfilled needs and desires. The ego leads to human action. The individual selects the features in his environment and decides how his instincts will be satisfied and in what manner. It must be kept in mind that the ego is consciously separated from the id but yet carries forward the primal aims of the id. It is never completely independent of it. The last system of personality is the superego. This is the internal representation of the traditional values and ideals of society which are imposed on an individual by the systems of rewards and punishments. This is an ideal condition and is not real but rather represents the moral aim of life. The main concern of the individual is to decide whether

something is right or wrong and act in accordance with the moral standards of society. For example, a person is hungry but he will not steal food to satisfy his hunger since he is acting on the basis of the moral principle of society. His superego will thus prevent him from stealing food. The superego is imposed on the child by parents in response to the rewards and punishments meted out by them. In order to obtain the rewards and avoid the punishments the child learns how to guide his behaviour along the lines lay down by his parents. The superego often opposes both the id and the ego and it tries to block the instinctual gratification. Freud also examined the dynamics of personality. According to him all humans are born with instincts that can be called a wish. The wish and the instincts of human beings exercise control over human conduct and behaviour and increase human sensitivity and understanding. The individuals also are further stimulated through the response that they receive in the outer world. Instincts have four main features: a source, an aim, an object and an impetus. Freud distinguished between two types of instincts that he called 'life instincts'. The life instincts are those that are needed for the purpose of individual survival. Hunger, thirst and sex falls under this category. Death instincts are the destructive death wishes of an individual. Aggression is a manifestation of death instinct. For example, a person fighting is a manifestation of a death instinct. The development of human personality, according to Freud, takes place in the early years of infancy that lays the basic character structure of an individual. Personality develops in response to tensions, including threats and conflicts. Through identification the humans learn to resolve his frustrations. In identification an individual takes over the features of another person and makes it a part of his own personality. For example, the child identifies with his parents as they appear omnipotent and supreme to him in his early years of infancy We also need to understand the concept of identity crisis while examining selfhood. Often we see life process such as amalgamation, cooperation, social solidarity reveal themselves in phases of non-functionality. Sometimes psychological factors lead to severe disturbances in the sense of identity such as alienation, depersonalization and confusion. Identity confusion is often recognized by neurotic disturbances that could result

from traumatic events such as war and migration. Often we can see mental disturbances in children and adolescences that are accompanied by social and maturational changes that occur in an individual. The identity crisis can also be recognized in very often perverted, bizarre and delinquent behaviour. Often an identity crisis is solved through therapy and correctional means. The identity formation of an individual takes place at birth. From his very stages of infancy the child learns from his socio-cultural environment. He responds to his immediate community and often relates to ideal prototypes. Self -identity is also related to history and historical processes. This leads to man becoming conscious of it. Man has also been divided into groups and subgroups, each coming up with their own notions of self. Identification also changes with new technological processes and shifting political and cultural systems. Changing roles needs to be redefined and also re-assimilated that are conditioned by new consciousnesses that are created as a result of technological and cultural advancements. For example, globalization has created a new consciousness and varied perceptions in humans. Identities of self are also strongly determined by religion. Through religion man hopes to attain happiness and some kind of immortality. A notion of evil and good and striving for omnipotent reality leads to man striving for a condition that is beyond the daily circumstances. Self-identity is closely linked to nation and nationalism which we will discuss in the next section.

Identity might seem like a simple concept. However, it is actually quite complex. The concept of identity has changed throughout the years. Many cultures have differing conceptions of identity. We will look at a number of ways this problem is formulated, and how it impacts our understanding of culture, society, and the individual. Identity is something that many people take for granted. However, identity is at the very heart of many conflicts throughout the world. Understanding identity gives us an opportunity to better understand ourselves and the world around us.

13.2.1 Identity and culture: definitions and theories

Identity is a central concern for the field of sociology, social psychology and cultural anthropology. Although many facets of identity are not agreed upon, it is generally agreed that identity is a social construct that refers to how the individual is perceived and labeled by the self and by society. Behaviors, physical attributes, memberships, and social roles determine the position of the individual in the world. It is the public face of the person in the world, and is the basis for their relationship to society. Some important qualities of identity are that is constructed, relational, and performed. What do we mean by the statement that identity is constructed? First of all, construction implies that something composed of discrete units that are held together. A house is made of separate elements which brought together make a house. There is a roof, a floor, a door and windows. For an individual there are also many elements which compose their identity. For example, age, gender, language, and profession can all be components of someone's identity. Another meaning of the word "constructed" is that the components are arbitrary and contingent upon choices which are made, either consciously or unconsciously. A house can be built of wood or concrete, and in fact what defines a house can differ greatly between societies. For a forest dwelling tribesman, a house might simply be composed of a bark roof and reeds, while for an urban dweller; a house would be made of very different materials. In a similar fashion, the components, which determine identity, are often determined culturally. Elements which might be extremely important in one society may have little or no relevance in another culture. For example, the ability to survive winter in the Arctic by making snowshoes has no value in London. Relationship is the second quality of importance in identity. Identity can be visualized as a collection of interlocking circles, with larger circles which represent wider social configurations. The relational nature of identity means that it can be created either as towards or away from something, and as inclusive or exclusive. That is, an individual can define their identity as positively Migrant Tribes / Nomads identifying with a trait, for example "I am a Hindu" or in the negative "I am not a Muslim". The relational nature of identity extends to many levels, including kinship relationships, ethnic identities, religious identities, and personal characteristics. These

interlocking figures can transform and be transformed by individuals. Collective identities can be asserted as a means to relate or exclude others. For example, the statement "I am an Indian" contains a certain number of assumptions, which are probably unspoken or unconscious. Gandhi's selfdefinition of that identity would be far different from a westernized businessman, or a villager, yet all three individual could truthfully make the same statement. The final component in identity is its performance. To perform means to display through actions. Performance also implies a set of conditions within which this performance is intelligible, and is meaningful both for the actor (the agent or performer) and the audience. What do we mean by performing an identity? If one is a scholar, they would perform this aspect of their identity by conducting research, by teaching, or writing. If one has a particular religious identity, by performing certain religious ceremonies, visiting shrines, or reading certain texts, one would reinforce this identity. This has been described as a "cultural performance" by the scholar Milton Singer. However, the performance of identity can also take place on an unconscious and/or embodied level. Certain gestures, the distance between individuals in different cultures, ways of speaking, and many other things can be part of social and personal identities. Pierre Bourdieu defines this as the "habitus", which, he says, is inscribed on the physical body as psycho-physiological patterns of conditioning. An important part of this concept is that fact that these patterns are not made conscious unless they are violated. For example, in India, many people do not point the bottoms of their feet at others, as it is considered to be disrespectful. An individual, brought up in this culture probably would not consciously think about this, until a visitor from another culture sat down with the soles of their feet pointed towards them. This action would reveal a particular belief by its violation.

13.2.2 Culture

Culture refers to the interconnected collective symbols, practices and meanings specific to a society or a group of persons within a society. There are several theories about the value of culture. Some felt that culture provides the basis for social cohesion and harmony, with norms

and values (Talcott Parsons). Newcomers to the society have to integrate to the norms, or ideals of the culture. The Marxist Birmingham School, under Raymond Williams, defined culture as the expression of the ideology and interests of the ruling classes, and felt that capitalism and mass culture would prevent the growth of a thinking class, and weaken democracy. Two other theorists, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, have posited that the act of knowing the culture, or being culturally adept, confer power on a person and create unequal groups. Elements of all these theories can aid in understanding group identity. Being part of a specific or identifiable culture creates a sense of group identity, and reinforces as well aspects of personal identity

13.2.3 Identity, culture and politics

Identity is important on personal, social and political levels. For a nation-state, the construction of a national identity has many purposes. Separate political, ethnic and tribal groups often have agendas and aims that conflict with those of the state. For example, a hydroelectric project might require the relocation of thousands of individuals. In order for groups to accept the relocation, it would be necessary for them to have larger identity that included the needs of others geographically separated from them. This would require the project to reconstruct this group's identity so as to align them with the State's objectives. When this reconstruction effort fails, extreme violence can erupt, as in the breakup of Yugoslavia, where the destructive assertion of specific ethnic identities led to fragmentation of a country into many small states.

13.2.4 Identity in India

The Indian sub-continent is a complex patchwork of linguistic, cultural, and geographic differences. The recently formed state of Uttaranchal, formerly part of the state of Uttar Pradesh, exemplifies the political volatility of regional identities and beliefs. Language, social mores, religious beliefs and practices, and performative systems (including music, dance and ritual) all find unique regional expressions. The Garhwal regional of Uttaranchal itself contains several distinct languages1 and religious systems. The importance of various cultural

practices in the creation and reinforcement of these regional identities cannot be underestimated. Even within a regional cultural system, diverse layers of social practices and religious systems co-exist. During and after the independence struggle, identity was an important factor. Gandhi's attempt to create a unified India was based on a strategy of creating wider circles of identity that included the "other", whether that of the lower castes or different religious groups. These same factors were also manipulated by other players. The final result of England's divide and rule policy's was the creation of Pakistan, a separate political entity based on religious beliefs. However, the cultural similarities between India and Pakistan are much greater than between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, even though both are predominantly Muslim countries. You can see that identity has multiple levels of significance, and can create great benefits or tremendous bloodshed.

13.2.5 Psychology and identity

Psychology and philosophy have long focused on the "self", the personal subjective entity that is the "experiencer" of the external world. Recently, anthropology has begun to examine the subjective agent, the "self", which is the locus of all experience. Post-modernism, a school of thought currently in vogue has taken the constructed or arbitrary notion of the self to an extreme position known as deconstruction, which claims that all identity is provisional and dependant on tacit assumptions. However, traces of these beliefs can be found in the ancient Hindu philosophy's division between the small, individual self (ultimately unreal), and the universal self (atman) which is the true experiencer of the phenomenal world. The ethnomusicologist Judith Becker has argued that sense of "self", or personal identity, differs between cultures, thus allowing for possession and trance in some instances, and its contrary. According to the philosopher Derek Parfit, identity is composed of a multiple, sometimes mutually antagonistic, "family of selves," including the present 'I', past and future 'I's', the ancestral self, and many others. This pluralistic concept of the self functions through the "mental continuity relationship," in which streams Migrant Tribes / Nomads of mental events over time, link this "family of selves" into a relatively stable

whole. This synchronic conception allows for the relative strength and weakness of certain aspects of personal continuity, depending upon the importance of particular streams of experience. Identity is a complex of mental, physical, and spatio-temporal identifications. Implicit in this is the need for the re-creation or reaffirmation of identity, and the enactment of ritual performances can be essential to this process. Identity is not merely a mental process, but something that also occurs in the body, as a psychophysiological process that 'entrains' the individual to a larger cultural process. Culture is manifested through the actions of living beings. Identity is fundamentally a relational process, wherein the individual defines and negotiates in themselves, relations either toward or against family, society, religion, and so on. In the caste system, the proscription and prohibition of specific behaviors are central components of caste identity, and are also manifested in spatial and linguistic hierarchical systems. This parallels Bourdieu's concept of the bodily hexis which are fixed motor patterns, bodily postures and speech patterns that are acculturated during childhood, often unconsciously, and are, in effect, the social transcribed on an organic individual. Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, "the durably installed principle of regulated improvisation" has immense value in the study of implicit social rules and takes into account the phenomenological experiences of participants' fields, but the rather deterministic nature of the habitus does not allow for direct resistance, or true agency outside of the conditioned field of personal and social identity framed by the habitus. The fluid, negotiated, and performative nature of identity is evident in ritual transitions between day-to-day and transitional social and psychic spaces. Many cultural practices, including music, facilitates and marks the transition into liminal realms and the return to 'everyday reality'. In Jaunsar-Bawar, as well as in much of India, the veil separating the divine from the mundane is made transparent on a daily and/or calendrical basis in religious practice, and this process is considered of central importance to the well being of the community.

13.2.6 Levels of identity

As mentioned above, there are many layers that formulate identity. These layers often interact in complex ways, and are situationally dependant. Let us examine some of the important components of identity. On an individual level, one of the most primary identifications is with the family. The size of the family and immediate social unit in a particular culture and/or situation can vary widely. A child also acquires a language, which is another important component of identity. So too is the child's relationship with themselves, including gender, body type, and other factors. These localized identities are linked with larger social structures which include extended kinship relationships, religious and caste identity, and identity in relation to the other, which could be other tribes, outside visitors, or government officials. The complex interplay of identity and situation means that identity can be expressed in a variety of ways. It also means that aspects of a particular group's identity can be threatened deliberately by outside intervention. An example of this is cultural change brought about by foreign invaders of other religions, which may change not only religious practice, but long-standing cultural customs. What we call identity is a process, not a static entity. It is the link between larger and smaller social units, and between the state and local entities. These distinctions have been described as differences between 'communities' and societies'.

The term 'community' has been used to describe a type of social configuration based on shared collective beliefs and identities that often supersede individual choice. For anthropologists, the community and communal social relations are characterized by several factors. These include cultural continuity, wherein similar practices, customs, and beliefs are maintained over generations. Communities also foster intense feelings of solidarity, of deep inter-personal connections, and shared visions and goals. Community is contrasted with a 'society' wherein individual come together for shared objectives, but these objectives can be mutually exclusive. A comparison of village life with city life makes this apparent. The rules of society are enforced by laws, not necessarily by voluntary agreement. In an urban environment, many differing groups may live in close proximity to one another and have little in common. The close bounds that are found in a community are replaced by an

agreed upon and enforced 'social contract', often with an economic emphasis. In a city, many people of diverse backgrounds can come in an attempt to gain economic advantage, and during this process still retain their unique cultural beliefs.

13.2.7 Identity and modernization

In the process of modernization, the forms of identity linked with communities have often been viewed as roadblock to processes of modernization. The community values could be replaced by more 'rational' belief systems and allow the development of individuality, in the modern sense. These processes can be seen at work all around the world. The process or lack of assimilation is often used as a designator of particular ethnic and cultural groups to measure their success in the process of modernization. In coming section, we will examine some of the cultural strategies employed by particular groups in this process. Identity often becomes the focal point of political movements, which are also often linked with the quest for political autonomy in a specific geographic region. Two examples of this from recent history include the separatist movements in Punjab and Assam. In Assam, the separatist's movements were linked with economic hardships, land ownership issues, and cultural devastation. However, in Punjab, these factors appear not to be relevant, as it was one of the most economically successful regions in India. The complex relationships between individuals, betweens castes and genders, between ethnic minorities and larger political/ social identities are not easily resolved into simple formula. One problem with the simplification of identity implicit in many projects of modernization is that it doesn't take into account the multiple levels upon which identity operates. Identity, fluid, constructed, and performed, can, ideally link the individuals to a larger social and historical continuum. These linkages are created in many ways, through many modalities, and their disruption can lead to psychological and social unrest. However, it must be kept in mind that cultural and community identities are not static entities, but are interacting and living systems One final point to keep in mind is that identity can often be manipulated and/o Migrant Tribes / Nomads r employed to serve larger political aims. This process of the manipulation

of ethnic, religious, caste or other modalities of identity can be utilized by all players in a particular conflict, from the state to the separatist movements. Identity is a complex and powerful motivating factor in all types of human cultures and societies. For the tribes of India, the assertion of identity and the sustenance of cultural traditions are a matter of survival. The survival of the community is linked with ecological factors as much as with social and political roles. We will now discuss particular types of cultural strategies and look at several specific case studies.

13.3 CULTURAL STRATEGY

Unlike other animals, humans learn most of their behaviors through the process of enculturation. Enculturation means that behaviors are learned through social contact, through observation, and by participating in community activities. This type of learning does not need to be expressed verbally, and often is linked with basic, intrinsic understanding of the world and one's place in it. Many, if not most aspects of human behavior can be linked to culturally accepted norms which are generally accepted without question. As discussed in an earlier section, the habitus is a term that describes these complex systems of behavior, belief, and modes of social interaction.And when these tacitly accepted systems are violated that they become conscious. We will first list a number of factors that can constitute identity, and then examine them in the context of several case studies, looking how groups attempt to maintain their autonomy by the preservation of social practices.

13.3.1 Autonomy and agency

In order to understand cultural strategies for the preservation of identity, it is necessary to examine two important terms in depth. The first is autonomy. Autonomy comes from a Greek word which means "one who gives themselves law" from auto (self) and – onomy (rule). Autonomy has meanings, much as identity, on many strata. A region or a province within a state can gain a measure of self-rule, which will then designate that region as an "autonomous region". There are of course varying degrees of political power that are conveyed by this term in the

relationship between smaller entities located within larger political units. Autonomy also refers to an individual's capacity for moral action, for selfregulation and free-will. To be an autonomous individual implies a capacity for self-reflection, self-awareness, and the ability to make reasoned, independent judgments. Autonomy can also refer to 'cultural autonomy' which is the ability of a particular culture to maintain its traditions, especially when confronted with social, economic, or political challenges. Agency is closely linked with autonomy. It refers to the capacity of an individual to act in the world. Agency implies that a particular actor (individual) has the power to change the external environment through their behaviors. This can be opposed with determinism, external forces which compel behaviors or reaction in various ways. The lack of agency can be seen in a variety of contexts. A prisoner is one who lacks much agency, as they are compelled to follow particular codes of conduct, have their freedom of movement restricted, etc. Another example is a natural disaster, which can be accepted passively as "fate", indicating the lack of agency. It is crucial to understand that these concepts are culturally dependent. The capacity for autonomy means different things in different contexts. The belief systems of a particular culture will often determine the boundaries, which can be conceptual, social, or even physical, which limit the domain of autonomous action. Likewise, agency is often linked with conceptions of the self, of the individual. Thus, it follows that in the more communal social configurations that we find in tribes, these concepts are manifested far differently than in a business environment, for example. When we look at the cultural strategies for the assertion of identity, they often mean the preservation of cultural traditions and the maintenance of a collective autonomy and collective agency, not necessarily the individualistic behavioral paradigms found in industrialized systems.

13.3.2 Performance studies

The concept of the 'cultural performance' is important to understand that what is being presented through particular actions may in fact encompass wider cultural elements within it. For example, a particular custom of wearing a piece of jewelry, such as the mangalsutra on a bride, has

meanings which exist on multiple levels. Let us look briefly at performance studies to understand this more fully Performance studies, like ethnomusicology, is a hybrid discipline, drawing on the disciplines of anthropology, linguistics, sociology, theater studies, psychology, and history. Performance studies pose the question: how is any performance effective, that is, how does it achieve its end? A political speech attempts to convince, a shamanic ritual attempts to heal, a salesman attempts to sell a product. Rituals index cultural and social content, including cosmological systems; the medium of performance links cognitive content with social efficacy, a merging of meaning and function. A performance requires both a performer and an audience, although the audience can sometimes be the self. Other aspects of performance also assert identity, of the performer, the audience, and the larger community. The English philosopher J. L. Austin is one of the progenitors of 'performance theory' through his work with the performative aspects of speech.A performative is a speech utterance that creates its own effect; 161 Migrant Tribes / Nomads the act of speaking is the performance of a specific action. The performative is a "being that represents a doing." A performative act of speech must create a result for it to be "efficacious", thus a performative is evaluated by the result it engenders, not for its veracity. Richard Schechner and Victor Turner were also important in the development of performance studies. Schechner defines performance as a "Ritualized behavior conditioned/permeated by play", and emphasizes the serious and dangerous aspects of play. Performance, especially ritualized performance, has the ability to re-define and restructure the social order; it can support or destabilize the dominant system, or both (as in the case of anti-structure). Turner feels that performance is fundamentally a type of experience, and sets symbolic categories in a living, fluid relationship, mediated between the performance, the audience, and the cultural system. Performance can be the site of the negotiation and transformation of the self and society. The anthropologist Milton Singer described performance as comprising both artistic and cultural categories. In his extensive work on modern India, he found that a broad range of cultural practices, which he designated as "cultural performances", could be viewed as a single phenomenon.A cultural

performance includes religious rituals, ceremonies and festivals, and he conceives them as “separable portions of activity thought by the members of a social group to be encapsulations of their culture”. Groups then, are able to reinforce their identity by taking part in rituals and performances, and the performers themselves, and the audience who all may belong to various sub-groups, can also validate their place in the community and the larger world.

13.4 CASE STUDIES OF CULTURAL STRATEGIES FOR ASSERTING IDENTITY

We will discuss specific examples of identity reinforcement using cultural strategies in the following paragraphs. Note the different ways and levels that groups and individuals give shape to and assert their identity.

13.4.1 Martial arts as paths to identity

The practice of the martial arts has long been a way for males in a culture to affirm their identity and cultivate a healthy body. Images of Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan have permeated theaters everywhere, and many countries have their own variations. One example is that of kalarippayattu, an indigenous martial art practiced in Kerala. It emphasizes the spiritual as well as the physical; participants perform the exercises in groups. Participants come from all ethnic and religious backgrounds. It is a unique expression of Keralite history and Malayi identity, and was revived as a reaction against British colonialism. Its goal is aimed more at promoting the spiritual wellbeing of the individual. It seeks to give meaning and promote an identity for the participants through physical exercise and discipline, and both are expressing an aspect of identity.

13.4.2 Tribal identity through music

The Kota are a tribe of about 1500 who live in south India, speak a Dravidian language, and practice their own religion. . Since the

beginning of the 20th century, they have been increasingly marginalized, but have made efforts to adjust to changes around them, and still preserve their culture. They used to play special event music for the neighboring villages in exchange for food and money, but do so no longer. Most Kotas are quite poor, but a few have a small measure of economic success. For their continued unity as a people, they sing at funerals and religious ceremonies. Their goal is to maintain tribal unity. Students can learn music through personal lessons and audio cassettes. Their identity as a communal group is bound together with the performance their music. , and they consciously strive to keep their traditions and life ways alive

13.4.3 Religious ritual and puja drumming in a tribal setting

The Jaunsaries live in Hanol, a remote village in the Himalayas, and practice a variant of Hinduism. They perform daily puja ceremonies that are central to the social and spiritual life of the community; ritual drumming is an integral part of the ceremony. During the ceremony, the Bajgis, hereditary musicians, perform a series of talas that bring the spirit of the deity into oracles known as bakis or malis. Their performance is integral to the ceremony, yet, since they are of a lower caste, they are excluded spatially. Both the Bajgis and Brahmins negotiate their identitythrough their interactions, one by drumming, and the other by priestly duties. The ritual itself, with priests, performers, and audience can have an effect on all involved. The performance is where they all meet, in a space/time conjunction. Each group maintains its identity through their caste, their role inside the temple, and their role outside.

Check your progress 1

Note: 1) Your answers should be about 30 words each;
2) You may check your answers with the possible answers at the end of the Unit.

1. How do you know the problem of identity?

.....

.....

.....

2. Discuss the Cultural strategy.

.....

.....

.....

3. Describe Case studies of cultural strategies for asserting identity.

.....

.....

.....

13.5 LET US SUM UP

Identity is vital to all segments of the population, and cultural strategies to maintain it or change it can be found elsewhere is examined closely. The human drive to identify with a group, to have a strong personal self-image, is a modern trait to some extent, as earlier groups identified with their community, not with the individual. Cultural strategies to maintain identity include dress, language, clothing, naming, and group exercise. Identity has been defined many ways by many different cultures. Modern psychology contends that most identity is socially constructed and that people have multiple identities. This means that people can shift between various social roles and self-definitions, but are often unaware of this process. We have also seen how autonomy and agency are important for a healthy identity.

National identity is highly influenced by the concept of self-determination. According to Wikipedia, “self determination is a principle, often seen as a moral and legal right, that all peoples have the right [to] freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” In India, national identity and consciousness arose in response to18th and 19th century colonialism. India’s freedom struggle and the everlasting efforts of selfdetermination of both Gandhi and Nehru cannot be underestimated. It was this principle of self-rule that lead to our freedom from the British and gave us a strong

national identity. The concept of self determination and national identity is closely linked up to freedom of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of political power. National identity is largely collective and not subject to an individual alone. Selfdetermination is also a communal right. Woodrow Wilson first applied self - determination as a concept in January 1918. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations states that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of a nationality or denied the right to change nationality. Self-determination is often invoked in national liberation struggles, secession of territories, and constitutional disputes about how this right can be expressed to the satisfaction of opposing interest groups. Of all the psychological processes directly relevant to political behaviour none is more pervasive than that of identification. This can be seen in the individual's identification with a nation, an ideological movement, a political party, a social class, a racial or ethnic group, a labour group or a religious association. Marx analyzed this as 'class consciousness' wherein different social and economic classes maintain individual interests and interact and communicate with each other. As discussed earlier, the term identification in the modern sense of the term was developed by Freud. He termed this as being the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person. The child may identify with his father. After the infancy this situation to identify carries into varying situations. Identification can be plural, for example a soldier can take his commander to be the ideal one and also identify with the rest of the soldiers and have strong religious affinities. Man is a social animal and he has the affiliates and emotional ties which gets manifest in strong national identities. This can be seen in the strong propagandas followed by the Nazis or organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan in America. Political party identification also has developed strongly in America and in that country any person who thinks, considers or regards himself to be a republican can be termed as being one. It is interesting to note that in America children start identifying themselves as Republicans or Democrats by the age of seven or eight. This is in great contrast to India where identifications to political parties are more limited. National identity also leads to the development of nationalism which is in essence

a political doctrine that divides the humanity into separate and distinctive nations. In this philosophy each nation is a separate political unit. Hence this invokes the

13.6 KEY WORDS

Bakis/mails: Jaunsarie shamans.

Diachronic: occurring across time, over a long period, and the study of the development of language and other culture systems.

Enculturation: the process of learning by doing, seeing, and participating.

Entrain: to vibrate in a similar rhythm. In terms of culture, to blend and fit in.

Heterodox: beliefs at odds with accepted beliefs and theories.

Habitus: an unconscious and ingrained patterning of behavior.

Modality: in terms of identity- various modes or types, can also be applied to the different senses.

Synchronic: occurring at one time- in the present moment.

13.7 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. How do you know the problem of identity?
2. Discuss the Cultural strategy.
3. Describe Case studies of cultural strategies for asserting identity.

13.8 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Bauman, Richard.VerbalArt as Performance.Rowley,MA: NewburyHouse, 1977.
- Becker, Judith. Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion and Trancing. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- Carlson, Martin. Performance: A Critical Introduction. New York and London: Routledge, 1996.
- Tillis, Steve. Rethinking Folk Drama. London: Greenwood Press, 1999.

- Wolf, Richard K. “Emotional dimensions of ritual music among the Kotas, a South Indian tribe.” Ethnomusicology 45.3 (2001): 379-422).

- 1 These include Kumaun, Gharwali, Jaunsaries, Bewari, and Phari.

13.9 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check your progress 1

1. See Section 13.2
2. See Section 13.3
3. See Section 13.4

UNIT 14: POLITICS OF VIOLENCE: TERRORISM, REVOLUTION AND WAR

STRUCTURE

14.0 OBJECTIVES

After this unit, we can able to know:

- To know State Violence: Theory and Types
- To discuss the State Violence in South Asia
- To know State Violence in India
- To discuss the Terrorism
- To highlight the Revolution
- To know the War

14.1 INTRODUCTION

Since times immemorial political violence has attracted our attention for more than one reason. Often it has multiple forms, perpetrators, victims and purposes. The category of political violence include state and non-

state actors; it may originate from internal or external sponsors; take forms that range from terrorism and guerilla warfare to sectarian violence, police actions, riots and assassinations. From Robespierre's 'reign of terror,' to the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood's motto of 'revolution sooner or later,' 'violence has often been used to generate publicity for a cause, besides attempting to inform, educate and rally masses "behind revolution". The 1880s, 1890s, the 1900s till the First World War saw an outright call for 'propaganda by deed', as a legible weapon to topple an established disorder. The 1930s, however, witnessed a phenomenal change in protracted terrorist campaigns against governments. It was now used less to refer to revolutionary movements and violence directed against governments and their leaders and more to describe the practices of mass repression employed by totalitarian states and their dictatorial leaders against their own citizens—Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, to name a few. While Europe wreathed under state-imposed violence against its own citizens, Asia experienced violent outcry for revolt, heralded by various indigenous/anti-colonist groups to oppose continued repression from colonial rule. The appellation of 'freedom fighters' instead of 'terrorists', came into fashion at this time. This position was best explained by PLO chairman, Yasir Arafat when he said: "The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorists lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and colonists, cannot possibly be called terrorists." By the late 1960s and 1970s, the usage expanded to include nationalist and ethnic separatist groups outside the colonial or neocolonial framework- entirely ideologically motivated organizations- the PLO, Left wing extremists etc,. This went on till the 1990s, until scholars, since the end of the Cold War, stepped up their efforts to identify the factors behind the onset, nature and termination of armed conflict in an era of unknown foes and unpredictable situations that now includes state and non state violence and insurgency and terror tactics. Peter Chalk, termed this under 'Grey Area Phenomena,' which he loosely defined as threats to the stability of sovereign states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations—a setting in

which standard military-based conceptions of power and security, have only limited relevance.

This Unit would enable you to:

λ define the concept of state violence

λ identify the types and theories of state violence

λ describe the conditions of state violence in South Asia and India.

14.2 STATE VIOLENCE: THEORY AND TYPES

Theory on Greed and Grievances: Though Aristotle once said, 'poverty is the parent of revolution and crime,' globalisation theorists of the present decade have underpinned personal greed and grievances as the major cause of armed conflict. According to them, globalisation represents two processes in greed theories. It brings changes in the state— particularly the erosion of state authority and public goods—which can make societies vulnerable to conflict; the other fostered by increased opportunities from transborder trade, both legal and illegal. As a result, "many civil wars are caused and fuelled not by poverty but by 'resource curse.' Data from Southeast Asia, distinctly show that, even those conflicts that has been categorised as "separatist," "communal", "ethnic" or "ideological," do have a clear element of 'greed' in them. The exploitation of mining opportunities in the Philippines has come into conflict with indigenous land rights and competition over resources, while ongoing violence in Papua, Sulawesi and Malaku in Indonesia, is not just religious or ethnic in character, but a tiff for land and resources exacerbated by environmental degradation. At the same time the greed theories do not talk about the greed of multinational corporations and the greed of the global elite that basis its profits on the extraction of resources from already poor countries. Instead they focus on the 'resource curse' as if just having a resource in a poor country is a curse itself rather than systemic poverty, colonialism and its forms being the

curse. A related set of theories applies the greed motive not to rebel groups but to corrupt governments, arguing that such governments engage in rent seeking and predation in order to enrich themselves, repay the support of allies and pay off potential adversaries. In the process they weaken the state's capacity to fulfill public service requirements and alienate groups that fail to receive the fruits of the government's benevolence. Ergo, groups in the periphery, mobilize in violent opposition to the government. In Indonesia, for instance, the top-down development approach that enabled three decades of rapid economic growth during Suharto's era was one-sidedly driven by the center. Profits from the exploitation of the natural resources of the Outer Islands were controlled by Jakarta, while a relatively small share of the revenue was directly returned to the provinces. The military was used to ensure compliance. As a result, separatist movement in some provinces—East Timor, Timor Lorasai, Aceh, Irian Jaya—carried social conflict to its ultimate extent, calling for the dissolution of natural ties and the founding of new nation-states. Still other scholars have associated certain types of conflict with instabilities that arise from social change in an increasingly globalized world. Barber, for instance, blames violent resistance to modernity, cultural imperialism, socio-economic exploitation and loss of sovereignty as reasons behind armed conflict. Others focus on economic instability with increasing marketisation as reason behind public dissension. Amy Chua and Michael Mousseau, see the market not as neutral but as one bringing fundamental change and violent opposition.

Grievance theory: Besides, economic and greed factors, a competing set of theorists, see political grievances as one of the most important source of violent conflicts. According to them armed conflicts in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, among others, cannot be understood without reference to political grievances. Edward Azar, for instance, has argued that civil wars generally arise out of communal groups' collective struggle "for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation. Other analysts have found political factors arising from weak state capacity to the denial of human needs, as central

to many contemporary conflicts, in conjunction with economic motives. Such theorists suggest that sustainable peace requires addressing underlying grievances through direct engagement with the state. However rather than just grievances, the root cause of the grievance which is often the denial of human rights should be analysed as the reason for conflicts. A second subset of grievances theorists focus on identity-based conflict as the salient catalyst of armed conflicts since the 1980s. Terming it as an acute "ethnic security dilemma," scholars like Ted Gurr, Woodward and Marshall, see ethnic and religious competition as the focal point of civil war in the post Cold War era. Drawing upon the Political Instability Task Force Data, these scholars suggest that ethnic wars are likely to occur when the state actively and systematically discriminates against one or more in the following: 1) larger countries with medium to high ethnic diversity; 2) when the country is a partial democracy with factionalism; 3) when the country's neighbors are already embroiled in a civil war or ethnic conflict; 4) when a country has experienced an ethnic conflict or genocide in the previous 15 years; 5) when a country has a large youth population. Samuel P. Huntington, for instance, stressed the threat from countries and culture that base their tradition on religious faith and dogma, identifying geopolitical fault-lines between "civilizations" as reasons behind social dissension. The West's 'next confrontation', is going to come from the Muslim world, traced Huntington. "It is the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin. "We are facing," said Bernard Lewis, "a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations—the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present and the world-wide expansion of both" These theories however are based on a racists ideology. Because civilizations do not go to war with each other, but countries do. Also countries go to war because of specific reasons that may be territorial, ideological, imperial etc. Thus both Huntington and Lewis have flawed ideas based on an ideology of Western supremacy and phobia against Islam. However, most scholars find this 'ethnic security dilemma' issue problematic.

According to them, ethnic dissention leading to armed conflict occurs only when: a) it is juxtaposed with high levels of poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources; b) When it is the result of elite manipulation whereby radical leaders exploit the insecurities felt by people in divided societies in situations of political volatility. Yet another school of thought thinks that relative deprivation sparks political grievances and violent mobilisation, as economic inequality within a society, especially across distinct identity groups or communities foment armed conflict. These "horizontal inequalities" appear to be linked with conflict at moments of economic change, sometimes extending to armed confrontation. Conflicts could be initiated not only by the most deprived groups may initiate conflict, but also the relatively more privileged, who fear the loss of their position. Researchers at the Center on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at the University of Oxford found that horizontal inequalities are more likely to provoke conflict when inequalities are sustained and prolonged over time, boundaries between different identity groups are relatively impermeable, there are fairly large numbers in the different groups, horizontal inequalities are consistent across dimensions, where aggregate incomes slacken down and new leaders are not co-opted into the ruling system and the government is not responsive to social grievances.

14.3 STATE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

In South Asia, the post-colonial state appears to be especially vulnerable to crisis and internal conflicts often related to the vagaries of their colonial legacy; arbitrary territorial borders; insecure ethnic, religious or national minorities; and post-independence nationalist and sub nationalist movements that deepen rather than transcend divisions. A unique argument here centres on the Weberian assumption that the state monopolises the legitimate use of violence- however such legitimacy maybe understood. Violence in other words becomes a form of politics by other means. According to Varun Sahni and Tharu, in South Asia, no matter how we define or classify subversive or secessionist groups, the state responds in a similar manner to all of them; in most cases it calls in the military. Faced with a perceived threat to its sovereignty, the state

knows only how to respond with force. Only when the military strength of the insurgent group is defeated or considerably weakened does the state begin to negotiate or consider non-violent approaches. The small number of cases of armed insurgencies that ended with negotiated settlement before military defeat—the Mizos, Gorkhas, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, are testament to this argument. The authors weigh in the variation in the quantum of force used by the state and conclude that in dealing with violent insurgencies, while both democratic and non-democratic governments respond with force, and all cases of successful negotiated settlement have involved democratic governments. Democratic states are more likely to "end the cycle of violence," Sahni and Tharu argue, but at the same time democratic states also use the force they posses. Two case studies explain the above statement- Sri Lanka and Pakistan, as brief recapture of their history shows. Sri Lanka attained universal suffrage in 1931 and the island gained independence from its British colonisers in 1948. Soon after independence, the island's political structure enabled particularistic and ethnic-based groups to hold sway— leading to its triumph over interethnic and minority groups. The Indian Tamils, who came here as indentured labourers were the worst victims of Sinhala 'majoritarian radicalism.' Their systematic 'exclusion' first came to the forefront in the form of the Swabasha Movement that made Sinhala the sole national language replacing English (as the Tamil were well-versed in English and held important government posts) as the country's official dialect. The Sinhala-only Bill was passed on 5 June, 1956. This led to widespread protest by the Tamils who wanted equal representation of their respective languages. The Tamils gathered outside the Parliament to non-violently fast and meditate. The Sinhala Language Protection Council attacked the Tamils and soon their violence killed around 150 Tamil minorities. Around this time, the minister of transport issued a directive calling for the Sinhala 'sri' to be included on all vehicle number plates. When the Tamils started replacing the Sinhala 'sri' with the Tamil 'shri', many Sinhalese protested by smearing tar over Tamil lettering on buses, public buildings and street signs (P Sahadevan and Neil Devotta, 2006). The majority Sinhala State used various methods to exclude the minority Tamils, that led to the exclusion and

marginalization of the Tamil minority. They worked on the principle of a majoritarian state. However they were soon to realize that a democracy is not just based on majority rights. The minorities must be protected and given right in a real democracy. But the Sri Lankan state policies for higher education were designed to lower the number of Tamil students gaining access to higher education. Policies were implemented to ensure that the government hired only Sinhalese for the civil service. Post 1977—the Jayawardene's government resorted to national security legislation and harsh practices to silence its critics and rein amid a growing Tamil rebellion movement. The government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1979 which retaliated against Tamil insurgency. Cases of rape, tortured and murder of Tamil civilians by the Sri Lankan military were reported. Successive governments in Sri Lanka (except Chandrika Kumaratunga's regime) have used the Tamil issue as a trump-card to a) intimidate, harass and murder opponents who ever spoke otherwise, and b) as a powerful weapon to continue in power in the centre. Post-1983, the Kumaratunga regime took some bold steps to bring the Tamils closer to her government. She tried to draw a distinction between the Tamil people and the militant group. War was declared as "against the enemies of peace" and not against the people. She partially lifted the economic embargo, offered a rehabilitation and reconstruction package worth Rs 40 billion to the Tamil populated North-East as a goodwill gesture. Restoration of supply of electricity to Jaffna and reconstruction of the Jaffna Library were also offered. The government proposed to supply food, clothes, medicines and other essentials to the people affected by war. A Human Rights Commission was set up by an act of Parliament in July 1996, while the armed forces were given strict instructions to spare the civilians from their attacks. In a bid to restore the democratic process and grass-roots level administration in the war-torn Jaffna peninsula, the government held civic elections in 1998. However, Chandrika Kumaratunga's peace initiatives were only shortlived. The peace process dwindled due to several reasons (P Sahadevan and Neil Devotta 2006). First, there had been steady efforts on the part of the government to dilute the original peace proposals under pressure from the Sinhala hard-liners. Second, the long-drawn-out delay

in giving constitutional status to the proposals due to lack of consensus among the Sinhalese, eroded the Sri Lankan Tamil faith in the proposed constitutional exercise. Third, the continuation of war, persistence of misery, hardship of the people in the North-East after re-imposition of the economic embargo failed to alter the view of the Tamils in favour of the government. The people's continued to rely on the LTTE and the LTTE developed as a strong a dictatorial insurgency force. Started in 1972 as the 'Tamils New Tigers,' and later renamed as the 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam' (LTTE) the outfit spearheaded militancy for 37 years, occasionally pausing for peace talks but single-handedly pursuing its goal of a separate state. In its Eelam War, the guerilla fighters acquired conventional military capability, building a loyal network of Tamil cadre—the Black Tigers—whose deadly suicide terror attacks made the LTTE one of the most gruesome guerilla fighters in the world. Vellupillai Prabakaran, its leader, was the product of a generation that felt Tamil rights and equality could not be obtained through moderate politics and Gandhian methods. Based on the level of use of violence and the duration of fighting, LTTE's 'war for Tamil Eelam' highlighted all the traits of a total war, encompassing: λ Intense regular fighting; λ Heavy deployment of forces (above a level of 50,000 men) and use of sophisticated weapons (tanks, artillery, helicopter gun-ships); λ A higher level of battle-related deaths (more than 1,000 people per year); λ Large-scale displacement of people and refugees (over 20,000 people per year); λ Extensive damage to property and economic infrastructure. λ Militarist and masculinist ideology and no tolerance for dissent or moderation from within the Tamils. The LTTE surge for supremacy was called the war-for-peace strategy and had several distinct phases: the first phase (1983-87) saw highly intense military confrontation between the insurgent groups and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) that led to the opening up of multiple war fronts. The SLA's counter-insurgency operations during this phase were to wrest control of territories from the LTTE and marginalise the Tigers militarily. The second phase (1987-90) of the war was solely between the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) and the LTTE: the former with strength of about 70,000 troops supported by heavy tanks and artillery went to the island to implement the bilateral

peace agreement signed in 1987. The IPKF, through its counter-insurgency operations, chased the Tigers out of the Jaffna peninsula to the Vavuniya and Mullaitivu jungles and hideouts in the east. But, the IPKF soon withdrew from the island following the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. During 1990-94, LTTE entered the third phase of its war with the SLA. The Army regained its hold over the eastern region, while the Tigers, in order to maintain their control over the north, engaged in a series of set-piece battles and hit-and-run operations. This was followed by the breakdown in any attempt to chalk a peaceful settlement to the dispute, the LTTE having entered its fourth phase of Eelam War in April 1995. The Tigers, by this time, shifted their headquarters to Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi and spread their sphere of influence in the east. The LTTE, by this time had also developed the Sea Tiger Wing—a daring guerilla Navy that played havoc with the Sri Lankan Navy. With territorial victory forming the core objective of both the rebel group and the government, this phase of war continued till 2002 when the government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement and held peace talks facilitated by Norway. Although Prabakaran had demonstrated strategic military capability, he appeared to have failed to analyse two warfront disadvantages: a) there was no factoring the impact of the defection of Karuna, his able military commander from Batticolao on the LTTE's overall military capability; b) the second was in misunderstanding the determination of the Sri Lankan political and military leadership to eliminate the LTTE thoroughly. Ultimately, in its last two phases, (2002-04; 2004-09) when the security forces launched their offensive in the north with huge numerical strength, the LTTE did not have the essential force to face the onslaught. Prabakaran failed to use his superior insurgency tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional warfare. By the beginning of the phase of Eelam War sixth, Prabakaran had lost all the 15,000 sq km of land he lorded over in the east and the north. The government, therefore, fulfilled the promise it has made in its election manifesto to eliminate LTTE terrorism at any cost. The military victory of Sri Lanka came with large scale human rights violations, reported by agencies of the United Nations, the international press and others. Many civilians lost their lives and thousands were

displaced as emergency continued even after the victory. A Lessons Learnt Commission was set up but the Tamil minority remain largely without the rights that they struggled for. Sri Lanka, as one of the oldest democracies among the Third world countries in Asia and Africa, finally pursued the LTTE fighters through the use of force {the government has been accused of engaging in extrajudicial killing, abduction, extortions and the use of child soldiers} to bring an end to one of the bloodiest civil wars in Asia. Brad Adams, Human Rights Watch, Asia director, rightly pointed out: "The government and the LTTE appear to be holding a perverse contest to determine who can show the least concern for civilian protection." Pakistan is a country where the military has been used as the ultimate guarantor of the nation's territorial integrity and internal security. Islamabad's prolonged tryst with military autocratic rule has seen the role of the army as expanding from; - Guardians of internal security to defenders of Pakistan's ideological frontiers- the Islamization process that picked-up under Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship took place on two levels: Internally, changes were instituted in the legal system, where sharia courts were established to try cases under Islamic law and second, Islamization was promoted through the print media, radio, television and mosques. - Externally, this process was used as an instrument to propagate pan-Islamism that would free Pakistan and other Islamic countries from perceived Western and particularly American, cultural and political influence. - Jihad, support for militancy and cross-border terrorism has become the cornerstone of such a staunch Islamization process (Hussain, 2007). Despite ritual Pakistani denials, there is now global consensus that the Pakistani army establishment, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has led the country to the brink of disaster, by its patronage of these jihadi groups. Analysts have shown that three pre-dominantly Punjab-based sectarian Deobandi/Wahhabi outfits backed by the ISI—the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the Sipah-e-Sahiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed- have joined the Taliban to wage jihad in Afghanistan and taken on Pakistan's army in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They have also waged wars on Shias, destroyed Shia mosques across the country, provoking strong protests from Iran. The majority Sufi oriented Bareilvi sect in Pakistan has had its leaders

assassinated by these groups. Ominously, even the elite Defence Housing Authority in Karachi has seen the construction of 34 mosques, out of which 32, including the prominent Sultan Mosque, are under Taliban control. According to Pakistan's foremost expert on Afghanistan, Ahmed Rashid, Pervez Musharraf adopted a "complex policy" of minimally satisfying American demands to act against the al-Qaeda, while giving the Taliban leadership and fighter's havens in Quetta and the tribal areas, bordering Afghanistan. General Musharraf also signed six agreements, virtually surrendering to Taliban groups and abdicating the authority of the Pakistan state. Like Musharraf, his successor General Kayani has pretended he is ready to deal with extremism, while in actuality, retained the army's link with the Taliban for "strategic depth" in Afghanistan and Punjabi groups like the Laskar-e-Taiba, to "bleed" India. These tactics have stifled democracy and democratic institutions within Pakistan as the military tries to influence and control policy making in several key arenas like internal and external security and foreign policy. Pakistan has long acted as frontline state for US interests. The US occupation and war in Afghanistan and their wars against terrorism have been used by the Pakistan army to increase their own leverage internally. At the same time the Pakistani Army also uses a doctrine of strategic depth, whereby it uses jihadi groups to extend its interests in Afghanistan and India. The US that long ignored this policy realized this only after the capture and killing of Osama Bin Laden in Abbotabad in Paksitan. Since this episode the relations between the Pakistani and US armies have deteriorated. The Pakistani civilian government is also trying to control the army which acts like a state within a state. The Obama administration's clandestine drone attacks on Osama's Abbottabad hide-out, has further proved that a) the days of US-Pak bonhomie is already numbered; and b) that Pakistan is gradually adjusting to the reality of the country's asymmetric tryst with militant radicalism. All indications suggest that civil society across Pakistan has come to a standstill and the state is nearing a "virtual collapse". India will have to face up to the reality of the growing radicalisation across its western frontier, rather than entertaining illusions that civil society or political parties in Pakistan have the ability or will, to take on the radicals.

14.4 STATE VIOLENCE IN INDIA

A heterogeneous state fragmented by divisive claims of ethnicity, India is a unique case study where most of the theories on state violence seem to have conglomerated. On the one hand it has been viewed as the silent 'recipient country' of cross-border terrorism, while, on the other, in recent years, the state is seen as withdrawing more from delivering public goods and services to the people and failed to redistribute income more evenly. As a result, it has become more repressive in maintaining the supposed stability and integrity of the nation. While mere snapshots are available of the state's growing intolerance towards people's demand in places like Orissa, Chattisgarh or Jharkhand, the real battlegrounds of repression have reached its nadir in the peripheral locations of the northeast or far north (Behera, 2008). Events on the insurgency front in India's Northeast have shown that rebel groups have often succeeded in neutralising the reverses faced by them by entering into deals with other insurgent groups, where their alliances often act as force multipliers, incapacitating the state apparatus. In Manipur, for instance, there are about 30 insurgent groups, of which 17 are active. They levy taxes and run kangaroo courts. The government machinery functions from Imphal and from the district headquarters. Government officials seldom go to the districts and tehsil or sub-tehsil headquarters because of fear of insurgent groups. Law enforcing agencies are ineffective in interior areas due to the presence of large number of undergrounds. The interior areas are controlled by the insurgents. The insurgent groups are the government and they decree 'justice'. These groups are well connected with those in Nagaland, Tripura, Assam and the neighbouring states of Bangladesh, Cambodia and Myanmar (as they are the major conduits for illegal supply in small arms, ammunition, drugs and fake currency). Pure 'law and order' solutions to ethnic and minority problems has gone hand-in-hand with ' large concessions' in the form of liberal aids and quotas for the educated youths in North-East. Still, the Indian state seems to have found no ways of resolving these insurgencies or even withdrawing measures like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. Unless and until it strives for holistic systemic change from the core, 'the carrot and stick' policy will just keep on adding to its already insurmountable problems.

India's other big 'northern conundrum,' the Kashmir conflict looks almost impossibly intractable. To the citizens of Jammu and Kashmir, whose fundamental allegiance lies with India, the only legitimate unit of governance is India—including Kashmir. To the citizens whose basic identity is with Pakistan, the only legitimate unit of governance is Pakistan—including Kashmir. To the citizens fundamentally committed to the achievement of an independent Kashmir, the only legitimate unit of governance is yet a phantom state of Jammu and Kashmir fully independent of both India and Pakistan. India will have to work out a negotiated settlement for a resolution to the Kashmir problem within a creative framework of competing nationalist claims by looking at the past history and methods of its federal framework. Of the other outstanding problems, India's post-1991 liberalisation policies has left the nation grappling with its ever widening gap between the rich and the poor and the gap between the privileged and the rest. In huge swathes of India, the most deprived people have fallen sway to radical ideology and have taken to violence. Such civil violence will increase in frequency and scope as more and more citizens fall prey to such disparity.

Check Your Progress 1

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. What do you know State Violence: Theory and Types?

……

……

……

2. Discuss the State Violence in South Asia.

……

……

……

3. Discuss the know State Violence in India.

……

……

……

14.5 TERRORISM

We are living in a world that is intimidated by belligerent forces that cannot be entirely attributed to any one particular region or country, or any specific religious or ethnic identity. Terrorism builds a kind of psychological state of extreme fear, insecurity and anxiety, besides the physical damages it causes in terms of loss of life and material goods. A terrorist activity is able to cause massive impairment to an individual and the society at large due to its surprise and shock tactics. The target is selected at random to produce the maximum panic among the innocent people. The perceptible cruelty of the act adds to the elements of shock and fear. Terrorism seeks above all to create a sensation within the ranks of the enemy in the public opinion and abroad.

ORIGIN AND DEFINITION OF THE TERM 'TERRORISM'

There are several opinions regarding the origin of terrorism. According to one theory, the term terrorism comes from the French word terrorisme, which is based on the Latin verb terrererin (to cause to urinate), and which refers to a kind of violence or the threat of imminent violence. It is noted that the terrorism as a concept was first used by the British statesman Edmund Burke. He used it in the context of the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. In those days, terror was understood to be a tool of dictatorship and as a symbol of power. However, the word terrorism assumed a slightly different connotation in the 18th century A.D. with the arrival of Immanuel Kant who wrote about it in 1798 to describe the destiny of humankind. He indicated terrorism as a kind of loss of trust and hope for a joint way out to the problems of life. It is also indicative of the frightening experience of extreme loneliness in one's struggles for liberation. The term terrorism assumed a revolutionary meaning in the 19th century when it tried to identify both the perpetrators of violence and their victims or objectives. Any terrorist attack at that time was seen as a special sort of violent behavior against the state. It was an attack aimed at disturbing the general running of the society to achieve some political goals. Terrorism involved itself with a variety of violent means starting from arbitrary

bombing, through politically motivated kidnappings, assassination, and destruction of property, both governmental and individual. Nationalism and nationalistic interests were brought into the fray of terrorism in the second half of the 19th century. Terrorism began to be symbolizing a kind of desire to rid a country of colonial powers through violent means. Nationalist terrorism implied the perception that there were no innocent non-combatants. Immediately after that the world wars brought about a distinctive meaning to terrorism. During this time terrorism came to be linked with the methodologies of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany. Since then, the terms terrorism and terrorist carry a strong negative undertone. These terms are often used as political labels to condemn violence or to rationalize the torture and even the execution of those who are labeled terrorists. But the so called terrorists and their supporters use terms such as separatists, freedom fighters, liberators, revolutionaries, militants, paramilitaries, guerrillas, rebels, jihadists, mujaheddin, and fedayeen etc. Though we are living in the midst of terrorism and similar activities, it is difficult to define accurately the phenomenon of terrorism. However, it can be defined as an organized violence against the State or individuals with some political and personal objectives. Again, it can be said that terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against a person or property to further political or social objectives. It is sometimes used as a means to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups to modify their behavior or policies. The Oxford Advanced Dictionary defines terrorism as the use of violent action in order to achieve political aims or to force a government to act. The Encyclopedia Britannica describes terrorism as the systematic use of terror or unpredictable violence against governments, public or individuals, to attain a political objective It can be broadly defined as violent behaviour designed to generate fear in the community or a substantial segment of it for political purpose. It is the use of violence on the part of non-governmental groups to achieve political ends. According to the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, terrorism is a method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its vowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence. The terrorists use various methods to cause panic and fear among people. Some of these methods include

hostage taking, hijacking, political assassination, kidnapping, bombing, and explosions. Terrorism has several objectives, such as, to advertise the movement or to give publicity to the ideology and strength of the movement; to mobilize mass support and urge sympathizers to greater militancy; to eliminate opponents and informers and thus remove obstacles to the growth of the movement; to demonstrate the inability of the government to support the people and maintain order; to destroy internal stability and create a feeling of fear and insecurity among the public; and and to ensure the allegiance and obedience of the followers.

HISTORY OF TERRORISM

Terrorism as it is today has a long historical evolution. It has evolved into the present form due to various factors and events. Another distinct form of dehumanization is seen in the thoughts of Frederick Nietzsche who classified people according to their intelligence and spoke of a master and slave morality. It is also a fact that there existed various other forms of dehumanization based on gender, colour, creed, false belief, employment, power, and myths etc. This eventful history can go as far back as the recorded history of the world. The Old Testament section of the Bible advocates terror, murder, and all type of callous practices on rivals. The assassination of kings by enemies, and the brutal suppression of loyalists afterwards, has been an established pattern of political ascent since Julius Caesar (BC 44). The Zealots in Israel (100 AD) wrestled against the Roman occupation in numerous ways. If terrorism can be understood subtly as the process of dehumanization, it can be recalled that such a scenario existed in ancient Rome in the form of the man-beast fight. The Assassins in Iraq (1100 AD) fought the Christian Crusaders with suicide tactics. The Thuggees in India (1300 AD) kidnapped travellers for sacrifice to their Goddess of Terror, Kali. The Spanish Inquisition (1469-1600 AD) dealt with Heretics by systematized torture, and the whole medieval era was based on terrorizing countryside. The Luddites (1811-1816 AD) destroyed machinery and any symbol of modern technology. A Serb terrorist (1914 AD) started the World War I. Hitler’s rise to power (1932) involved plans for genocide. Nations like

Ireland, Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia, and Israel probably would have never become republics if not for revolutionary terrorist activities. Based on the 4 above findings, the long and eventful history of terrorism can be further divided into the following periods: Terror in the Ancient World: The terrorist movement in Palestine during 66-73 AD is considered to be the first terrorist movement in the recorded history. The earliest known organization that exhibited aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots, a group of Jewish nationalists, who put up resistance to Roman rule in Judaea. Known to the Romans as Sicarii, or dagger-men, they carried on an underground campaign to root out the Roman occupation forces, as well as some Jews they thought had collaborated with the Romans. Terror in the Middle Ages: From the late 13th century to the 17th centuries, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare and conflict. Until the rise of the modern nation state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the sort of principal authority and organized society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Moreover, terrorism as we now understand it was not possible until the invention of gunpowder and subsequent explosives and incendiaries. In the late middle ages, the concept of terrorism was introduced during the French Revolution. It is said that in order to establish law and order in the State, the Committee of Public Safety killed more than 17,000 people. These severe measures of the government came to be known as “The Reign of Terror.” The agents of the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of “The Terror” were referred to as “Terrorists”. This is regarded as the origin of the word terrorism, though extra-legal activities such as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in gruesome spectacles started by the Parisian mobs long before the guillotine was first used. Terrorism in the Modern and Contemporary Era: The terrorists have become more destructive in the backdrop of modern complexities. During the 19th century, some nationalists in small European countries wanted to break free from the rule of larger empires. Known as Anarchists, they found they could get what they wanted by committing acts of terror. Revolutionary groups working to overthrow the Russian rule and the Irish nationalist groups also understood this. So they adopted terrorism as a method in Western Europe, Russia, and the

United States. They believed that the best way to effect revolutionary, political, and social change was to assassinate persons who are holding responsible positions. From 1865 a number of kings, presidents, and prime ministers were killed by the Anarchists. If early terrorism targeted those in power, in the twentieth century, the terrorists have begun targeting the innocent civilians who have no link with the actual cause they are fighting for. In the twentieth century there were many instances of terrorism. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Sikh and Kashmiri militants in India, the PLA, the government of Libya, Taliban and Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the Irish Republican Army were all involved in terrorist activities in the 20th century. Today's terrorists are techno-savvy. They are skilled in the use of chemical, biological, nuclear and conventional weapons and modern communication systems, which makes them more terrifying.

CAUSES OF TERRORISM Terrorism has several causes which can be related to social, historical, cultural, religious, economic, and psychological aspects. The following could be seen as some of the causes of terrorism: The Reality of Persistent Disputes: Terrorism has its breeding ground in conflicts. Reasons for conflicts, however, can vary widely. Basically, it is the differences in objectives and ideologies that show the way to conflict. Some of the historical examples to this effect are: dominance of territory or resources by various ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural groups; aspiration for freedom from foreign regimes; imposition of a particular form of govemment, such as democracy, theocracy, oligarchy, or dictatorship; economic deprivation of a population; and real or perceived instances of injustices. Dearth of Reasonable Redressal Procedure: The absence of a systematic and proper redressal system can cause continued terrorist activities. If such a system were to exist, people will have recourse to it and thus solve conflicting situations. When such systems are not available due to their nonexistence, sloth, corruption; or unaffordable cost, the socially and culturally wounded people will get tempted to seek solution by themselves. Terrorist activities thus can arise from a sense of denial of lawful right of a certain group of people, for which they have been demanding determinedly. Weakness of the Distressed People: When

there are violent discords coupled with the absence of a genuine redressal system, there could be attempts to find solutions to the problems by force. This could result in various kinds of organized violence like communal riots and war. However, violence takes an ugly form through terrorism when the distressed people realize their inability to 6 influence the dominator, due to their weakness. In such a situation, they are unable to face the oppressive forces face to face or in a direct manner. Therefore, they go underground and fight for their cause. Misguidance: When children and youth are not brought up responsibly by their parents or guardians, there is a high risk for them to get involved with violent groups or militancy. There are vested interested groups who indoctrinate young minds to take up arms to right for their causes which are sometimes fabricated. Often, an ideology of hatred in the name of religion, ethnic loyalty or nationalism are injected into the minds of people. These youngsters are trained to cause destruction and are armed with deadly weapons. Their misguidance becomes complete when they are taught to regard the death and destruction of their enemies as a glorious achievement and their own possible death in the process as heroic martyrdom. Influence of the Mass Media: Mass media are showing keen interest in terrorism and in the issues related to it. We find radio stations, television channels, newspapers, and Web pages often discussing this subject. These broadcasts reach a large portico of people in the world, especially those in the West and intensify the fear that the threat of terrorism generates. The terrorists make use of this effect of the media, thus turning them into an unwilling al1y. The wide coverage given in the media motivates a terrorist organization to go ahead with their plans, since they know for sure that they action will be made known to the whole world and thus draw greater attention to the cause. Often, the live coverage of the terrorist activity helps the perpetrators of violence to get away from the site of the violence in an easy manner. In such cases, the mass media can become an unwilling ally of terrorism. Democratic State: Though it is opined by researchers that democratic nations are generally less vulnerable to terrorism, however, they too are not free from terrorist activities. There is a complex relationship between terrorism and democracy. Though in one sense democracy diminishes the

risk of terrorism by undercutting some of its reasons, in another sense it often contributes to its prevalence. The open nature of democratic societies makes them vulnerable to terrorism. In such societies, civil liberties are protected, and government control and constant surveillance of the people and their activities are kept to the minimum. Taking advantage of such restraints by the government, terrorists have stepped up their activities. Studies done on the relationship between liberal societies and terrorism suggest that concessions awarded to terrorists have increased the frequency of terrorist attacks. By contrast, repressive societies, where the government closely monitors citizens and restricts their speech and movement, have often provided more difficult environments for terrorists. It should also be noted that in democratic societies the risk of terrorism is compounded if the law enforcement is slow or inefficient. In such democracies the aggrieved people, having lost faith in the ability of the legal system of the country to deliver justice, are seen to take law into their own hands, and if they are weak, they do it clandestinely. Globalization: It can be said that globalization, though not a direct cause of terrorism, it can often contribute to the menace of terrorism. The situation brought about by the linkage, even fusion, around the world of communications and financial systems has contributed to the promotion of global terrorism. Again, new communications such as the Internet and satellite phones have 7 made it possible for the extremist terrorist and political organizations to build large organizational networks, exchange information, and combine resources. Psychological Factors: Many psychologists believe that the key to understand terrorism lies in understanding people. According to this perspective, terrorism is purely the result of psychological forces, not a well-thought-out strategy aimed at achieving rational, strategic ends. Therefore, psychologists emphasize the study of the mind of the terrorists. Accordingly, various attempts have been made to gain knowledge of the hidden psychic dynamism which incites a person to perform such acts without any qualm of conscience. There is another psychological view which says that the terrorists are normal individuals, who due to their deep emotional need and a high order of motivation on the grounds of nationalism or religious sentiment forces him to take up

the path of violence. Another reason for taking up terrorism could be due to the desire to overcome loneliness. They claim that many terrorists are people who have been rejected in some fashion by society and tend to be loners. Since it is in human nature to be part of a group, an alienated loner is naturally drawn towards any group that will accept him, give him a sense of mission, and provide him the ways and means of accomplishing it, along with monetary gains too.

CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM The causes of the growing terrorism in a State are many. Mostly the terrorists are motivated by religious and political consideration, but there are also economic factors. Environmental Consequences: Terrorist activities can paralyze the entire cosmos with its vulnerable activities. It can be said that every terrorist attack is a way of demeaning the entire universe. The cosmos, which is the habitat of life, is dishonored into a place of death and doom. The very fact that a human being is a cosmic reality, he/she is automatically dehumanized in the wake of every terrorist activity. Anything that is done against the cosmic rta is going to affect all the living and non-living beings of the universe. Sowing the seeds of disorder, disharmony and discontent has turned to be the work of a number of psychosomatics. Political Consequences: Terrorism builds up both direct and indirect pressure on the government to weaken it physically and psychologically. The function of terror can also be to discourage the people from cooperating with or giving information to the government. The deepest anxiety amongst ordinary people arises when they fear a collapse of law and order. Terrorism works towards a collapse of the social order and terrorists exploit this situation by trying to project them as a better alternative. In this state of fear and anxiety the essential services may not function properly. Terrorism grew out of political anarchy. Terror incorporates two facets: first, a state of fear or anxiety within an individual or a group and second, the tool that induces the state of fear. Thus, terror involves the threat or use of symbolic violent acts aimed at influencing political behavior. Following World War II, political terrorism reemerged on the international scene. During the 1960s, political terrorism appeared to have entered into another phase. Perhaps the two most significant qualitative changes were: first, its transnational

character and second, its emergence as a self-sufficient strategy, namely, operating independently of the larger political arena. 8 Political terrorism occurs as the result of a conscious decision by ideologically inspired groups to strike back at what their members may perceive as unjust within a given society or polity. The answers to contemporary political terrorism, therefore, would have to be found within this larger social, economic, political, and psychological context. Economic Consequences: Terrorism aims at maximizing economic impact in the world at large. The destruction of the twin-towers on that Tuesday of 11th September, 2001 has caused much confusion and disarray in the global economic scenario. Since each act of terrorism is designed in such a way as to have an impact on the larger audience, its reverberations and after effects are largely seen in the economic area. Nations and government machineries are forced to equip themselves with latest technologies to combat the network of terrorism. All those involve the bifurcation of national funds which could be made use of other purposes. Terrorism, in other words, deteriorates the economy of a nation. The economy of a nation does not include its financial conditions alone. It deals with all forms of wealth such as human resource, natural resource, intellectual power, aesthetic power, creative power, money-power and so on. Therefore, economic consequences of terrorism affect all forms of wealth without which human life would be impossible.

14.6 REVOLUTION

The moral issues posed by revolutions are both practically important and theoretically complex. There are also interesting conceptual questions as to how to distinguish revolution from resistance, rebellion, and secession, all of which also involve opposition to existing political authority. Unfortunately, the recent renaissance in just war theorizing focuses implicitly on interstate wars and thus has largely ignored the morality of revolution, at least as a topic worthy of systematic theorizing in its own right. Recent work on the morality of asymmetrical warfare, on terrorism, and on humanitarian military intervention provides valuable resources for constructing a theory of the morality of revolution, but until the appearance of Christopher Finlay's book, Terrorism and the Right to

Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (2015), nothing approaching a systematic account of the morality of revolution has been available. In other words, moral theorizing relevant to revolution has been rather fragmentary and adventitious, because it has mainly occurred in the pursuit of other topics rather than as part of an inquiry directed squarely at the phenomenon of revolution. Furthermore, although prominent figures in the history of Philosophy have held views on revolution, they have primarily concentrated on the issue of just cause (and in some cases on rightful authority to wage revolutionary war), without addressing a number of other moral problems that revolutions raise, such as the question of whether revolutionaries can rightly use forms of violence that the armed forces of states are morally prohibited from using and whether they may conscript fighters, punish defectors and traitors, and expropriate property needed for the struggle. There are hopeful signs, however, that moral theorists will soon give revolution the attention it deserves.

Several terms are used to denote extra-constitutional rejection of an existing government's authority, either tout court or in some particular domain: resistance, rebellion, secession, revolution. Resistance need not be total; it can instead involve disobeying some particular law or laws or efforts to thwart a government's policies or the government's attempt to perform particular actions; and resistance can take a number of forms, including acts of disobedience that are not only public but designed to achieve maximal publicity (as in the case of civil disobedience), as well as covert acts of noncompliance; and it may also be either peaceful or nonviolent and disruptive or not. Rebellion, usefully distinguished from resistance, involves a wholesale rejection of government's authority. But such a rejection of governmental authority could be undertaken for quite different reasons, whether to do away with government altogether (the anarchist's goal), to establish a new government with the same domain of territorial authority, to create a new territorial unit out of part of the territory of the existing government (secession), or to sever part of the territory of the government and join it to another existing state (irredentist secession). Revolution is commonly understood to have two components: rejection of the existing government's authority and an

attempt to replace it with another government, where both involve the use of extra-constitutional means. On this reading, revolution and rebellion share a negative aim, the wholesale rejection of a government's authority, but revolution includes in addition a positive aim, to institute a new government in place of the one it has destroyed.

Some important empirical work relevant to the morality of revolutionary war is to be found in studies of civil war. The latter is sometimes defined as a large scale armed conflict between state forces and one or more nonstate parties. This definition may be too restrictive, however, since it would exclude a large-scale armed conflict between two or more nonstate parties under conditions in which the government had disintegrated entirely or still existed but was not capable of fielding forces. A broader understanding of civil war that would encompass that kind of case would be simply that of a large-scale intrastate armed conflict.

The preceding terms are not always sorted out in this way in actual political discourse. For example, the government of the United States labeled the secession of the Southern states from the Union as a rebellion, while many Confederates called their enterprise the Second American Revolution; and the American colonists who strove to secede from the British Empire tended to call themselves revolutionaries, not secessionists or rebels. (It may be that the Americans avoided the term "rebel" because they thought it had negative connotations). Similarly, the Algerian secession from France is often referred to as the Algerian Revolution and wars of colonial liberation are rarely called secessionist conflicts, though their goal is secession from a political order centered on a metropolitan state. In what follows, the term "revolution" will be reserved for extra-constitutional attempts to destroy an existing national government and replace it, to the full extent of its territorial authority, with a new government. On this way of sorting out the various terms, secessionists and revolutionaries are necessarily rebels, while rebels need be neither secessionists nor revolutionaries (they may be anarchists), and secessionists, as such are not revolutionaries.

Sometimes the term "revolution" is used in a stronger sense, as denoting not just an extra-constitutional attempt to replace one government with

another, but also to effect a fundamental change in the type of government, as in a revolution to overthrow an autocracy and create in its stead a democracy. Thus some scholars on the Left have contended that the so-called American Revolution was not really a revolution, because it did not create or even aim at anything other than a new form of the bourgeois state—a state controlled by and in the interest of the class that controls the means of production (Zinn 1980, Jennings 2000). Many American historians have concluded otherwise, asserting that it was a revolution in the stronger sense because it replaced a monarchy with a republic (Nash 2005; Wood 1993). On this stronger understanding of revolution as involving a fundamental change in the type of government, secessionists would also be revolutionaries, if the new government they attempt to establish in part of the territory of the state would be of a fundamentally different type. Obviously, this stronger conception of revolution is no clearer and less contentious than attempts to distinguish fundamentally different types of government (hence the debate over whether the war for the independence of the American Colonies from Britain was "really" a revolution). For the remainder of the discussion I will use "revolution" in the weaker sense, with the understanding that it can also encompasses revolutions in the stronger sense. It is worth noting, however, that the morality of revolution in the stronger sense is, if anything, more complex than that of the weaker sense, because the former involves not only the extra-constitutional overthrow of the existing government but also the extra-constitutional establishment of a new type of government.

One more distinction is needed. Revolutions may be violent or nonviolent and may begin nonviolently and become violent. This distinction, though obviously important, is not so crisp as one might think, because what counts as violence may be disputed. For example, attempts to overthrow a government by disruptive techniques (for example conducting general strikes, disabling power grids, or blocking main transportation routes) are not violent in the way in which discharging firearms or detonating explosives is, but they may nonetheless cause lethal harms. The chief topic of this entry is violent revolution where "violence" is understood in the most robust way and as

occurring on a large scale; in other words, the topic is revolutionary war as "war" is usually understood (Singer & Small 1994: 5).

It is well worth noting, however, that there is a position on revolution that obviates the need for a theory of just revolutionary war, namely, the view that large-scale revolutionary violence is never morally justified because the risks of such an endeavor are so great and because nonviolent revolution is more efficacious. Some empirical political scientists have argued that there is good evidence that nonviolent revolution is more likely to achieve its ends than revolutionary war (Chenoweth & Stephan 2011). Even if that is true as a generalization, the question remains as to whether there are exceptions—cases where nonviolence is not likely to achieve the aims of just revolution or would only achieve them with undue costs in terms of human well-being—and whether they can be identified ex ante. If there are any such cases, there is a need for a theory of just revolutionary war.

14.7 WAR

War, like diplomacy, propaganda, etc., is an instrument of national policy. It has been used by states to achieve their national goals and aspirations and fulfil their national interests. Questions of war and peace are central to the understanding of international relations; these are questions that involve the problem of survival. Today the term 'war' is used in many different ways. We speak of cold war, hot war, limited war, total war, conventional and unconventional war, civil war, guerrilla war, preventive war, and so on. Wars have also been labelled as imperialist wars or wars of national liberation depending on the perceptions of the users. A variety of statistical studies will tell you about the repeated recurrence of war in the world over the past several centuries. In the twentieth century, despite the horrors of the two world wars and the nuclear holocaust, the incidence of war has not diminished. Although there has been peace between the great 4 powers in the last half of the 20th century. the number of regional or civil armed conflicts has continued to grow, reaching a peak of 68 in the year 2000. A majority of these were low-intensity and intrastate, and mostly confined to the developing part of the world. In d 1968, historians Will and Ariel Durant

calculated that there had been only 268 years free 1 of war in the previous 3,421 years. It is most likely, that they undercounted the wars. Certainly there has been no year without war since. This unit examines two aspects of war: what is war and what are the causes of war by examining the different theories or conceptions of war. The next two units of this course will look at the various types of wars and understand why they are classified in the way that they are.

There has been a lot of study devoted to analysing the causes of war, but no consensus has emerged on the matter. Some of the confusion lies in the inability to distinguish between immediate and long-term causes or underlying causes. In some cases the analysis is cast in ideological terms and then only a single cause is focussed upon. Some causes are immediate and some are basic; some refer to specific events and acts committed by countries while others may look at various forces and underlying trends. Each of this cause needs to be explored and there can be no one final answer to the question what is the cause of war. Generally the causes of war are classified under political, economic, social and psychological causes. Quincy Wright points out that causes of war can be looked at from different angles. War has politico-technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious and psycho-economic causes. For Marxists, the roots of war are located in capitalism and imperialism. They also distinguish between certain kinds of wars like imperialist wars, revolutionary wars, and wars of national liberation. Others look for psychological causes and stress on the feeling of insecurity that nations feel. The causes of war are related to war as an instrument of national policy since wars are fought for the safeguard of national objectives, goals and aspirations. This may relate to territory, to identity, or to the very survival of the nation-state. It is convenient to discuss the theoretical approaches that seek to understand the causes of war at the following levels of analysis: 1) System-level causes, 2) State-level causes, and 3) Individual-level causes.

System-level Analysis System level analysis adopts a 'top down' approach to the study of world politics. The central argument of this approach is that state and non-state actors operate in a global social, cultural, economic, political, geographic, environment and that the

features of the system determine the behaviour of the actors. Four factors determine how a system functions: structural characteristics of a system; power relationships of the members within the system; economic realities that impinge upon the system and the norms and conventions that are likely to 'govern' the behaviour of the actors. The structural factors of a system refer to the organisation of authority witbin the system, the actors and the level of interaction. The ~nternational system does not have a vertical system of authority. It may best be described as 'anarchic'; where anarchy implies a lack of a centralised international authority and the existence of sovereign nation-states pursuing their individual national interests. Traditionally, students of international relations have looked at nation states as the central actors on the global scene. Today one has to recognise the existence of non-state actors as having an important role to play in international relations. Some NGOs such as the Amnesty International. or Green Peace have played an important role in international relations. So have some multinational corporations (MNCs). Today terrorist organisations would also be classified as non-state actors. Other prominent nonstate actors may include such inter-governmental and regional bodies like the WTO or region4 economicltrade blocs hke the AFEc, European Union, etc. The level of interaction between both, the state and non-state actors has increased over the years. The intensity of this interaction is seen mainly in nonmilitary areas like human rights, economic relations and social sectors. The power relationship within the system refers to the distribution of power. We have moved from the age of European domination in the pre world war era to US-Soviet bipolarity of the cold war years. Today one talks of the age of American dominance in the post Soviet era. These changing power relationships and the resultant changes in the balance of power in the world have been a continuing reality of international relations. The economic reality refers to the natural resources that a country has and the level of its economic and industrial development. The North South divide in the world is based on economic realities of a developed world in the North and a developing (or less developed) world in the South. While it.is true that we live in an economically interdependent world, the realities of the dominant developed world cannot be wished away. Conflicts are not only over

scarce resources, they are also over control of the available resources in the world. The history of colonialism has been understood in terms of economic realities of control; in modem times, oil, for example, has emerged as one of the key economic instruments. How importaiit are norms and conventions in zoverning the world order? This is a topic that has been debated by many. The general presumption is that nations would not seek to disturb the order in international relations unless there are some really compelling reasons. The debates over the Iraq war (2003) focused on whether the US and Britain violated international norms as represented in the United Nations when they went into war against Iraq. At the system level analysis therefore the following issues are focused on as causes of war: i) The distribution of power: Relative power postures and power vacuums, the balance of power politics alliance politics, etc are mentioned as possible causes of war. ii) The anarchical nature of the system is also considered a cause of war. The insecurity that is caused amongst nations due to a lack of a centralised authority may lead to an arm, - race that eventually may spill into a war. One may explain the need for pursuing nuclear weapons policy by the developing world as a means to overcome this sense of insecurity. i At the economic level, oil and natural gas, strategic minerals are looked as possible sources of conflict in the modem world. The Iraq-Iran war, American action in Iraq is sometimes looked at within the framework ofpolitics of oil. iv) Samuel Huntington's thesis of Clash of Civilizations is yet another systemic perspective of wars. The central argument made refers to the key causes of future wars to be ethnoreligious and therefore civilizational and not state centric.

State-level Analysis State-level analysis focuses on the nation-state and the internal process of the state as the key determinant of world politics. This is a state-centric approach to international relations. While the earlier system-level analysis believed that the state behaviour is a product of the compulsions of the system, this approach believes that states have a far greater independence in their decision-making. There would be both structural and non-structural determinants to making of policy. The structural would refer to the nature of government while the latter to the history and political culture of the state. Authoritarian governments and

democratic governments would differ in the way policy is formulated. Similarly, policies in times of crisis and in times of peace would also be different. At the state-level analysis causes of war are located in the following situations: i) Supremacy of national interest has been considered as a central driving force at this level. National interest would operate at two levels: One is a war to ensure the survival of the nation-state if attacked by the enemy. A second level is that of an expansionist national interest where extending of fi-ontiers is considered a security related national interest. Israel has seen both the situations. The 1948 war may be described as a war for survival while the latter wars of 1967 and 1973 saw the expansion of territory for security reasons. A linkage is sought to be established between domestic politics and foreign policy. It is sometimes argued that nations go in for war to divert domestic attention elsewhere. iii) There is yet another analysis that focuses on the linkage between the type of country and the likelihood of becoming aggressive. It has been argued that democratic societies are less likely to opt for war than authoritarian ones,

Individual~level Analysis The motto of UNESCO is 'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed'. lndividual level analysis focuses on human nature and therefore the psychological factors that contribute to decision-malung. It also focuses on the biological factors to understand the aggressive tendency of man. Whether human beings are naturally aggressive is a question that is asked quite often. Biopolitics examines the relationship between physical nature and political behaviour. Mention must be made of the Feminist approaches to international relations that argue that the aggressive human behaviour is essentially a male trait. Yet another dimension of the individual level analysis is related to group behaviour. Why do mobs turn violent? It is argued that individuals as individuals may not show aggressive behaviour. But when they are part of a riotous mob they are likely to commit atrocities that they in their individual capacities would have never committed. Perhaps the most significant contribution to this level of analysis is done with reference to leadership behaviour. A study of a John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile crisis, of La1 Bahadur Shastri during the 1965 Indo-Pak war, or

Indira Gandhi in the context of Bangladesh war are part of an attempt to understand leadership behaviour. Similarly, peace initiatives such as that of Anwar Sadat towards Israel, the opening up of a dialogue with China by President Richard Nixon, or the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger are all examples of leadership behaviour. Causes of war at the individual level analysis are located in the following: i) Arational decision taken by the leader, a conscious decision to go for a war for the protection of national interest is cited as one of the important reasons. The argument here is that even if the situation is ripe for a war in the final analysis the decision is made by an individual leader. As President Kennedy would have argued, 'the buck stops here'. ii) The opposite of this is a theory that would question the rationality argument. A decision to go for a war may be an entirely irrational decision of the leadership. iii) Some biologists seek roots of war in human aggressive tendencies. Much of theonsing in this realm is based on animal experimentation. There has been a lot of literature in this area since the tie of Darwin's writing on the subject. iv) Psychologists look to frustration, misperception and attitude change to understand stimuli that leads to aggressive behaviour. Freud, for example, stresses his belief in human instinct for violence or destruction, an instinct balanced by one for love or life.

Changing Nature of War

Two factors have contributed to changes in the approaches to understanding of war: role of nationalism and the revolutions in technology. The former addresses the theoretical concerns about war while the latter addresses -the tools used for war. The changes in technology, have had an immediate impact on the strategy and tactics of war and as such are not a matter of discussion in this chapter. / The right to self-determination based oiethnic nationalism had bekn the source of continuous conflict across Europe inlhe 191h century. The inter-war years saw the concept of self- 'determination being used with the exdicit recognition given to it by Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points. This concept has secured a renewed legitimacy in the post-Soviet world with new states emerging on this very-theoretical construct. The process of disintegration of the Soviet state and the granting of legitimacy to the new states was

done on the basis of the principle of ethnic nationalism and right to self-detedation. This construct was alsb used both for legitimising the disintegr&ion of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the integratih of Germany. A variety of secessionist movements across the world use this as a theoretical foundation for describing their struggle as national Iiberation. The concept of nationalism cuts across the system, state and individual level analysis of war. It has been a force to reckon with and is likely to dominate the approaches' to understanding war in the years to come. At another level, a war to overthrow an unjust social and economic order is also justified. In this case aggr&sion is not limited to a direct military attack but with internal matters also. This right is legitimate only if it seeks to remedy injustice. Injustice is defined mostly in terms of violation of human rights. Just Cause theories are based on the need to remedy injustice. They have a strong connection with right to resist tyranny. There is a strong internal connection between right to resist tyranny and self-determination. The right to selfdetermination is provided for in the framework of human rights. The basis for the exercise of this right is as follows: (a) A group is victimised, systemic discrimination or exploitation takes place, (b) Temtory is illegally occupied, (c) There exists a valid claim to the territory, (d) Culture of the community is threatened, (e) Constitutional remedies do not exist. Some of the approaches mentioned above may be useful in explaining the underlying causes of conflict; other may explain the crisis behaviour. These theoretical approaches provide some understanding of the nature of war.

Check Your Progress 2

Note: i) Use the space provided below for your answers.

1. Discuss the Terrorism.

……

……

……

2. Highlight the Revolution.

……

……

……

3. What do you know the War?

……

……

……

14.8 LET US SUM UP

South Asia has been an area multiple types of political violence due to various reasons:

1) The structural positioning of borders in South Asia are relatively recent, often arbitrarily redrawn after the withdrawal of colonial empires; thus trampling the hopes and aspirations of many sons of the soil. Not surprisingly, border areas in South and Southeast Asia have been rife with secessionist and recidivist nationalist movements, both within and across state boundaries. Such anti-state contests have taken the form of ethnic and minority struggles for autonomy or been subsumed into low-intensity inter-state conflicts. Ironically, while the colonial masters failed the state, the state has failed the populace owing to short sighted policies and elitist policies that left the mass of people behind.

2) The decades long Cold-War, the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance in the 1980s and the very fact of colonialism, de-colonisation and diaspora have all similarly affected the calculations and strategies of local political actors. Whatever their intended consequences, political actors have failed to adequately address the grievances of many sections of the people.

3) Ideational influences—for instance the much-vaunted transmission of radical ideas and literature to India and Southeast Asia, has succeeded in episodes of ‘brain-wash’ activity of young minds and their outright involvement in terrorist activities to kill innocent lives as they seek to capture state power through the use of force.

4) The process of rampant globalisation and instant 'societal change' that has resulted in self-alienation of ethno-linguistic groups, middle to lower income groups, finding it hard to adjust itself to widening gaps between the haves and the have-nots, more precisely the powerful privileged and the rest. Outside Asia, even the future of U.S and the rest is being hotly debated. The National Intelligence Council, has projected that in 2025, "The US will remain the preeminent power, but that American dominance will be much diminished." According to Joseph.S. Nye, "for all the fashionable predictions of China, India, or Brazil surpassing the United States in the next decades, the greater threat may come from modern "barbarians" and non-state actors. In an information-based world, power diffusion may pose a bigger danger than power transition. Conventional wisdom holds that the state with the largest army prevails, but in the information age, the state with the best story may sometimes win (Nye, 2010)." Meanwhile, even as India and Asia are part of the emerging and influential countries in the international system they remain beset with internal conflicts and violence. There is an urgent need for non violent protest, negotiated settlements and sustainable development in a human security frame.

Of all the forms of violence, state violence has been of much interest to researchers. As in other forms of violence, it too has multiple forms, perpetrators, victims and purposes. This category of political violence includes state and non-state actors; it may originate from internal or external sponsors; take forms that range from terrorism and guerilla warfare to sectarian violence, police actions, riots and assassinations. Violence is often used to generate publicity for a cause, besides attempting to inform, educate and rally masses. In South Asia, the examples of state violence are cited from Sri Lanka and Pakistan and in India. This violence takes varied forms from violation of rights to deprivation in terms of social and economic causes. Various factors have been identified for the perpetration of state violence and have been dealt with in the Unit.

14.9 KEY WORDS

Revolution: Revolution (originates from Latin revolutiononis = upheaval), in political science, is a phase of the historical evolution of nations that generates a rapid and radical (social, economic, and political) change in society.

War: a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country.

14.10 QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. What do you understand by state violence? What are the types and theories of state violence?
2. Analyse the situation of state violence in South Asia.
3. Discuss the extent of state violence in India.
4. What do you know State Violence: Theory and Types?
5. Discuss the State Violence in South Asia.
6. Discuss the know State Violence in India.
7. Discuss the Terrorism.
8. Highlight the Revolution.
9. What do you know the War?

14.11 SUGGESTED READINGS AND REFERENCES

- Noorani A.G., Islam and Jihad, Left Word Books, New Delhi, 2002.
- Sahni Varun and Shamuel Tharu, "Subversion, secession and the state in South Asia: Varieties of Violence," in Itty Abraham, Edward Newman and Meredith, L. Weiss (ed.), Political Violence in South and Southeast Asia: Critical Perspectives, United Nations University Press, 2010.
- Sahadevan, P, and Neil Devotta, Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka, Manak, New Delhi, 2006.
- Hussain Zahid, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam, Penguin Books, 2007
- Chatterjee Shibasis, "Intra-State/Inter-State Conflicts in South Asia," in Navnita Chadha Behera (ed.) International Relations in

South Asia: Search for an Alternative Paradigm, Sage Publications, 2008

- Bose Sumantra, "Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.34, No.13 (Mar 27-April 2, 1999), pp. 762-68.
- Desai Rajiv, Incredible India Indeed, The Times of India, Kolkata, Monday, November 16, 2009.
- Nye Joseph S., Jr., "The Future of American Power," Foreign Affairs, November/
- December, 2010, pp.3-12.
- Chenoy, Kamal Mitra and Anuradha M. Chenoy, Maoist and Other Armed Conflicts,Penguin, New Delhi 2010.

14.12 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Check Your Progress 1

1. See Section 14.2
2. See Section 14.3
3. See Section 14.4

Check Your Progress 2

1. See Section 14.5
2. See Section 14.6
3. See Section 14.7